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INTRODUCTION
“Developing a comprehensive medical information system was a more complex
task than putting a man on the moon had been,” writes Morris Collen in the
conclusion of his book about the history of medical informatics in the United
States [1]. This single sentence aptly illustrates the technological and organiza-
tional complexity of introducing an information system into hospitals that
Collen describes as one of the “most complex institutions created by humans.”
A key characteristic of implementing information systems is that organization-
al changes are an integral part of it. Unfortunately, however, the changes are not
always for the better, and more often than not, the performance of organizations
is worse after a system has been installed than before. The natural tendency is
then to conclude that the system was somehow badly designed. In 1975, when
the design and operation of information systems were considered primarily
technical activities, Henry C. Lucas, Jr. wrote about failing systems: “However,
all our experience suggests that the primary cause for system failure has been
organizational behavior problems [2].” Thirty years of research has increased
our understanding of information systems in organizational contexts; yet, the
record of successful systems is still dismal [3]. Clinical information systems are
particularly hard to implement because not only do they affect health care
organizations as a whole but also the work of health professionals who pride
themselves on their professional autonomy.
The research described in this thesis arose in the summer of 1997 from a ques-
tion of a nurse director at Radboud University Medical Center in Nijmegen. He
asked me whether I was interested to study their new clinical information sys-
tem. He described the system as a computerized order entry system that would
allow doctors to enter their orders. The project team responsible for the imple-
mentation could use some feedback, and he thought this would be a good the-
sis subject. I saw a golden opportunity to document a system from its initial
development to its full clinical use. It was an interesting system because it had
clinical work at its focus unlike other hospital information systems, which at
that time were primarily designed for clerical purposes such as patient adminis-
tration and billing. It would be a complex project, affecting 5000 professionals,
including physicians. In its first stages, the implementation seemed to go well
and there were no signs of the failure that was to come two years later. 
The study then is about implementation and about clinical systems.
Implementation encompasses the trajectory of introducing an information sys-
tem from the idea that such a system is needed to address perceived organiza-
tional problems up to its use in work practices. In order to understand the out-
come of an implementation trajectory one needs to go back in history to iden-
1
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tify important events that influenced the course of implementation, and to fol-
low in time how the information technology was introduced and installed.
Clinical systems, such as electronic patient records, are meant to be used by cli-
nicians to address their information needs. This study focuses on computerized
physician order entry (CPOE) systems. CPOE systems are a class of clinical sys-
tems that help a clinician enter medical orders electronically. Medical orders are
key in the delivery of health care in the sense that they are the result of making
clinical decisions. For example, when a patient needs to be treated with med-
ication, a physician writes a drug order. The written order will be received by
the pharmacy that will check the request, prepare a medication list for the
patient and prepare and package a dose. The nurse then can administer the drug
to the patient. A CPOE system can allow the physician to enter orders directly
into a computer, bypassing handwritten communication and the need for man-
ually copying information from one paper to another. [4]. Many benefits are
attributed to CPOE systems. They may eliminate ambiguities caused by illegi-
bility of handwritten orders or by incomplete orders. They can make physicians
cost-conscious by keeping prescribing practices in line with a hospital’s estab-
lished formulary. Reminders can be generated alerting physicians about dosages,
drug-drug interactions, adverse drug events and drug allergies. It may save pre-
cious physician time by reducing unnecessary telephone calls. CPOE systems,
then, have been identified as the technology that can help reduce medical errors
and increase patient safety. The respected Institute of Medicine of the National
Academy of Sciences released two reports in 2000 en 2001 that urge the adop-
tion of CPOE systems in hospitals [5, 6]. 
Four years later, however, Joan Ash and her colleagues found that still less than
10% of the American hospitals have implemented CPOE [7]. The large gap
between the perceived benefits and actual use testifies to the great difficulty of
getting such systems to work in clinical practice.
The study of system implementation cannot be separated of an understanding
of its organizational context. The sociotechnical approach I use in this thesis
stresses the importance of the interrelation between technology and its social
environment [8]. The sociotechnical approach is not so much a delineated the-
ory; it is rather a perspective, developed within information systems research,
technology studies and computer supported cooperative work that allows the
researcher to explore a variety of aspects of the interrelation [9]. The relevant
details of this approach will be addressed in the chapters that follow, yet three
general aspects are important to treat here. 
First, the sociotechnical approach acknowledges that the roles and tasks of
health professionals are tightly interwoven with each other and their environ-
ments. Material artifacts, such as a paper form, a room design or a computer
2
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system structure the work of health professionals, distribute their responsibili-
ties, and determine the nature of their relationships. For example, a patient
assessment form will structure how a nurse will examine a patient and what
information she will write down. Replacing the form by a computer-based
assessment system will change how the nurse will examine the patient. On paper
the nurse might ignore entries that she would consider not relevant for her
assessment of the patient’s health. A computer might force her to enter data in
all fields, even if they are not relevant. 
Second, medical work is a highly collective and collaborative process. In a clas-
sic study Anselm Strauss and his co-authors describe how the delivery of patient
care can be characterized as managing a patient illness trajectory. This includes all
activities that need to be done to make patient care possible [10]. Medical work
is very pragmatic and fluid because its response to unexpected events or contin-
gencies that are so common in health care. 
Third, in order to judge the value of an information system in practice it is nec-
essary to have a deep empirical insight into the work practices in which an infor-
mation system will be used. Qualitative research methods need to be employed
to grasp the intricate relations between health care professionals and an infor-
mation system [11]. Methods include, but are not limited to observational stud-
ies, interviews and document studies. Observational studies provide a direct link
with medical work activities that professionals do such as how they use a com-
puter, how they enter medical orders and how they communicate with others
while entering data. Interviews provide insight in people’s perception of facts
and are mostly done when there is often no other way to obtain data, for exam-
ple about events that happened in the past. Documents constitute a rich source
of information about organizations and their constituents. In this study they
encompassed decision and implementation documents, minutes of meetings,
user manuals, news reports, magazine articles and scientific journal articles.
Finally, combining different data sources provided a means to validation. 
The aim of the study described in this thesis is to understand the implementa-
tion of computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems in hospitals from
a sociotechnical perspective.
The study consists of three parts. The first part describes an implementation
model of clinical systems in health care organizations and forms a backdrop
against which the case studies are posited. The same model underlies the con-
tents of a postgraduate master course of health information management tar-
geting professionals who wish to use the benefits of information technology to
realize changes in health care [12]. The second part consists of two in-depth
studies of the introduction of CPOE systems in Radboud University Medical
3
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Center in Nijmegen and Atrium Medical Center in Heerlen aiming at under-
standing the complex dynamics of implementation. In the United States CPOE
systems have been implemented more widely. David Bates at Brigham and
Women’s Hospital in Boston and Joan Ash at Oregon Health & Science
University in Portland, Ore, have respectively studied clinical and organization-
al aspects of CPOE systems [13, 14]. Therefore, the last part of this study aims
to understand the findings of the case studies in a wider context of comparing
with the implementation of similar systems in the Netherlands and United
States. Furthermore, by interviewing high-level CPOE experts I have tried to
assess the implications of CPOE systems for professional collaboration and
workflow and their impact on quality of care. This part of the study was carried
out in 2003 and 2004 when I was a visiting scientist in the Department of
Medical Informatics and Clinical Epidemiology of Oregon Health & Science
University. The following questions were addressed in this study:
What are the general characteristics of an implementation trajectory of a clini-
cal information system?
How can the outcomes of the implementation of a CPOE system in a hospital
explained from a sociotechnical perspective?
What factors from a medical work perspective explain the different outcomes of
the implementation of a computerized physician order entry system in two
Dutch hospitals?
How do implementation strategies of Dutch and American hospitals compare
and how are physicians involved?
How can the perception of CPOE experts about workflow and professional col-
laboration and their impact on the quality of care extend the understanding of
CPOE systems?
These questions will be addressed in the next six chapters. Chapter 1 describes
the general characteristics of the implementation of a clinical information sys-
tem. It presents a model of stages that can be discerned and depicts how a
change manager needs to interact with the health care system and medical work
in particular to bring about change. It proposes case-based studies that offer a
systemic description of a complex and messy world of information systems in
practice.
Chapter 2 presents a detailed description and analysis of the implementation of
a CPOE system in Radboud University Medical Center in Nijmegen, the
Netherlands. It argues how insights from social studies of science and technol-
4
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ogy can help to understand an implementation process and the specific out-
comes described in this case. The case study forms the core of the thesis.
Chapter 3 expands the understanding to the analysis of the outcomes of the
implementation of a CPOE system in two hospitals. The hospitals both used
the same system, yet the outcomes were different.
Chapter 4 and 5 present the results of an international, cross-site qualitative
study of the implementation of CPOE systems in the Netherlands and USA.
The aim of the study is to understand and explain the resemblances and differ-
ences of implementing CPOE systems. Chapter 4 addresses the implementation
strategies and chapter 5 focuses on the involvement of physicians in the process.
Chapter 6 reports the results of interviews with CPOE experts to combine their
rich experience and insights with insights from medical sociology and the field
of computer supported cooperative work to enhance the general understanding
of CPOE in terms of professional collaboration and workflow and its impact on
quality of care.
The thesis ends with a general conclusion that summarizes and draws the find-
ings together.
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CHAPTER 1
USING A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF CHANGE WHEN IMPLEMENTING
LARGE-SCALE CLINICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS TO IDENTIFY
PRIORITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Jos Aarts , Victor Peel
SUMMARY
In this paper we identify domains for research based on a model that describes
the stages of change when designing and implementing large-scale informa-
tion and communication technology throughout a health care organization.
We use the model in the case of the electronic patient record systems. 
We suggest that the research agenda should include approaches from the social
and business sciences.
Published in: International Journal of Medical Informatics 1999; 56 (1-3): 43-50.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The design and implementation of information systems in health care is a com-
plex process that must address the issues of information systems, the prospec-
tive user(s) and organizational context and adequacy. 
Although complex in its totality, some aspects of medical information systems
are well understood. Over thirty years of research in medical informatics has
contributed to a deep understanding of the nature of applications that are con-
sidered relevant for health care. Without being unjust to the rich and diverse
medical informatics community one can say that representation of knowledge
and the means by which it is interpreted has been the core of this research.
There is an understanding that the user is an important factor in the study of
medical informatics, but the literature has been focused largely upon the hu-
man-machine interaction. In strategy formulation and project management
there is a substantial literature in the non-health care sector. Education about
designing and implementing information systems in health care has largely been
based on training of craft knowledge and is poorly substantiated by the results
of scientific research. 
The fuller research agenda proposed here does recognize the need for more
research on human-machine interaction of clinical information systems because
the progress in the development of graphical user-interfaces and speech input
demands careful examination of its consequences in a health care context.
However, the main focus of this paper is organizational, because there is an
increased recognition that the organizational context is an important determi-
nant for successful clinical information systems. Increasingly failures of clinical
information systems are attributed to organizational factors [1, 2]. Technical
faults in information systems have been reported to account for failure in 20%
of the cases. The description of the failures is mostly case based and anecdotal,
and an analyzing framework is not available. 
There is still little reported research on organizational issues in the medical
informatics community. The organizational ‘grand challenge’ in medical infor-
matics to identify techniques to ease the incorporation of information technol-
ogy into organizations looks increasingly narrow in its scope but even more
urgent [3]. It also presupposes that the organization is fixed while the techno-
logy is changing.
8
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2. LESSONS FROM EVALUATION
One could argue that evaluation research of medical information systems will
shed light on potential shortcomings. But most evaluation studies have been
limited to technical performance or cost-effectiveness assessments and do not
take a broader view. Some authors go even as far as to plea for controlled clini-
cal trials (CCT’s) of clinical information systems in the ‘real world’ as a method
to assess the impact of clinical information systems in practice [4]. Not only are
there theoretical arguments against this but a recent Finnish study shows
unequivocally how difficult it is to assess the use of computerized medical
records by primary care physicians when so many compounding social factors
are involved [5]. In a review article Forsythe and Buchanan list five arguments
that limits the usefulness of CCT’s and proposes some general questions to
broaden the approach to evaluating medical information systems [6]. Their
arguments include the exclusion of subjective reactions to information systems,
the focus on technical factors, the deletion of the social, and the quantitative
and formal bias towards evaluation. The general questions all deal with the
inclusion of context (user, stakeholders, the location of use and the social net-
work, organization, judgment). These questions elude the formal CCT
approach. It is clear that as evaluation studies increase their scope as well as their
depth, they will provide more insight but relatively few advance our under-
standing of the organizational factors involved. 
What makes the study of the organizational impact so difficult? We think that
three reasons are important. The first has to do with the paradigm of experi-
mental hypothesis testing which pervades research in clinical medicine and
medical informatics. 
Quantitative methods are predominant in this paradigm. Researchers in these areas
mostly conduct their research in a controlled environment of a laboratory. Even
when they go out and test a system in a clinical setting they seek to replicate labo-
ratory conditions. The aim is to uncover the ‘universal truth,’ which lies hidden in
the complex world. The second reason is related to the intrinsic complexity of the
organizational context. Questions arise for example how factors like culture, power,
and group relationships can influence not just the use but also the design and pur-
chase of an information system. These and many more questions are hard to tack-
le without qualitative approaches, which are not part and parcel of the research
toolkit of clinical researchers. It is not even clear what research method is best suit-
ed to address a particular organizational problem. An aspect of the complexity of
the organizational context is the need of a multi-disciplinary approach. When the
same problem is being viewed from different angles a richer picture and better
understanding is available. The third reason is that the organizational context of a
project may change over time and that other issues may become important. 
9
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Therefore we have developed a model of the stages of change, which can be dis-
cerned during the design and implementation of an information system in a
health care organization. The model is extensively described in [7]. The model
identifies at each stage the interaction of the design and implementation process
with clinical work. By explicitly identifying such interactions with clinical work
it is possible to focus on the research that would illuminate the nature of these
interactions.
3. IDENTIFYING RESEARCH PRIORITIES
This paper uses the model as a framework to locate previous research into the
human and organizational issues involved in the implementation of complex
health information systems and to identify future research priorities. We discuss
each stage in turn (see fig. 1). 
3.1 Assessing
A deep understanding of the context in which clinical work is occurring is
increasingly recognized as requisite for the successful implementation of an
information system. More specifically hospitals are changing and becoming
more and more a link in the chain of care delivery. Within hospitals the deliv-
ery of care is increasingly being organized around the patient. This will pro-
foundly change the way that the care process is organized and how clinicians
collaborate. This will influence how, when and for what purpose information
will be used. Although changes take place in the processes of care, clinicians will
still base their decisions on professional standards. How clinical work is done is
highly localized. It is determined by professional peers and the social arrange-
ments within the clinician’s group. Therefore the interests of the organization
and the individual clinician may not converge. Qualitative research methods
(such as participatory observation and ethnographic studies) are necessary to
elicit and understand these arrangements and behaviors and the impact that
introducing information system may have on them. 
Surprisingly very little research has been reported in respect of the rationale for
such major organizational changes, realignments and mergers between health
care organizations [8]. This seems to be not the result of captured experience
and understanding of how changes might work out, but of political and eco-
nomic imperatives. The lack of detailed knowledge as to how these changes
might affect clinical work means also that we do not understand how informa-
tion systems might be best integrated into the new forms and models of organ-
ization of the health care system, other than at the anecdotal level. The intro-
duction of an information system can be considered as a process of structura-
tion that will impose constraints on the arrangements and behaviors of actors.
10
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Barley suggests how institutional theory and structuration theory can be fused
for an empirical study of the links between organizations and actions [9]. With
his approach he was able to show how the introduction of modern imaging
technology changed professional dominance in radiology departments [10]. 
11
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Figure 1 - A model of the stages of changes, which can be discerned during the
design and implementation of a clinical information system and the
activities the change manager.
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Studies of organizational change entail two kinds of questions: ‘What are the
antecedents or consequences of changes in organizational forms or administra-
tive practices?’ and ‘How does an organizational change emerge, develop, grow
or terminate over time?’ There is now a growing interest in studying the second
question, which recognizes the temporal sequence of events. The shift towards
the second question calls for longitudinal field research methods to study
processes of organizational change [11]. 
3.2 Selecting and prioritizing
We also have little understanding how the mechanisms of prioritization, fund-
ing and selection of systems work and they determine what will be implement-
ed, with what kind of support, dissention or compromise and how that might
affect the success of the new system. Analysis of the power relationships between
stakeholders might well point the way to better understanding [12].
3.3 Knowing of appropriate technologies
We acknowledge that advances in information and communication technolo-
gies can have a profound influence and because of that much medical infor-
matics research relates to leading edge technology. However, technology assess-
ment projects have so far been largely focused on the usability rather than the
impact of these technologies on patient care and its outcomes [13]. In practice
as systems are increasingly implemented across large organizations such as hos-
pitals or even health care systems, there is a need to implement appropriate but
also proven technologies. There are risks in ‘bleeding’ edge technologies, such as
proneness to software malfunctioning, but proven technologies may impede
rather than assist best clinical practice by hindering technological innovation at
the bedside or meeting the practical immediate needs of a particular clinical dis-
cipline. The central question is therefore what is meant by ‘appropriate’ tech-
nologies and what do we know about both risks in order to minimize them.
The two most important arguments for implementing clinical systems are that
they will enhance the quality and cost-effective-ness of patient care. Cost and
benefit modeling for information systems has been largely restricted to business
case approaches, which concentrate on investments and operational costs [14].
There is little recent research into how cost reduction goals are to be achieved
and cost-effectiveness results or on the adequacy of valuation approaches to
costs and benefits [15]. Often implementation of systems is leading to addi-
tional costs that have not been accounted for. Some authors consider the
increase of costs even as an inevitable result of introducing new technologies.
System costs may decrease when technologies become more mature but they
often give rise to new applications and costs which where not envisaged before
12
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[16]. The phenomenon that the massive introduction of computers has not led
to increased economic gains has become known as the ‘productivity paradox’
[17]. It is also possible that increased productivity increases demand, activity
and total costs. It is clear that more research is needed, because our under-
standing of cost-effectiveness and cost-benefits in relation to such systems is
inadequate. 
The process of implementing requires eliciting stakeholder support from the
first conception of the project. The stakeholders will include not only prospec-
tive users, but also founders and people who can act on behalf of the team as
power brokers to gain and sustain necessary support [18]. Again, more knowl-
edge about the nature of these processes and particular the process of recovery
if support breaks down, is crucial for the management of such implementations
in large organizations when the total process may take several years.
3.4 Involving people, planning and introducing
Health ICT project management has been for long time associated with the
application of formal methods to achieve a particular goal with an agreed allo-
cation of human, financial and material resources and a set time frame.
Instruments of control such as formal time planning schedules (PERT and
Gantt charts), project management tools (PROMPT) or accounting methods
have been attributed great value. However, recent research shows that resorting
to an increased use of instrumental control methods in project management
when a project is taking a wrong course increases not decreases the chance of
failure [19]. The need to consider such projects in a more flexible way recog-
nizes the often unpredictable consequence of the way a new system interacts
with organizations and humans
3.5 Evaluating
The need for more work on the evaluation of impact, costs and benefits has
been raised earlier in this paper. Although the model depicts it at the end of the
implementation process, we emphasize that using lessons learned from previous
failures and successes should be designed into the change process at the begin-
ning of each new project.
4.THE CASE OF AN EPR SYSTEM AS AN ILLUSTRATION
With the help of the model we can identify the current gaps in our knowledge
about the development and implementation of the electronic patient record sys-
tem and point to new directions of research. The need for an EPR system has
been brought forward since the late fifties as a solution for the ever increasing
13
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amount of medical knowledge, the growing disorder of the paper-based medical
record and the variations in physician practice [20, 21]. 
Several studies in the 1960’s enumerated the problems experienced with the
paper-based record such as availability when needed, accessibility, completeness,
comprehensiveness and readability [22]. In the seventies and eighties the desire
to curb the growth of costs of health care delivery, obtain better value for money
and the growing demand of the general public for quality care prompted the
Institute of Medicine to publish a report on the computer-based patient record.
Changes in health care are shifting towards managed care and rely on greater
expectations of outcomes research and evidence based medicine. According to
the updated report the EPR should be the essential technology for the health
care system [23]. We observe here how the context of the health care system is
considered as an impetus to design, implement and use EPR systems. We do not
know however how the proposed changes will influence the actual development
and use of EPR systems because of uncertainties involved with introduction of
these changes and the slow adoption by health care professionals. The objectives
of senior health policy makers and senior hospital management to introduce an
EPR system may well diverge from those of clinicians. 
However, the extent of use of such a computerized system by clinicians is mod-
est. Apparently other factors inhibit the widespread use of the EPR. Several
authors state technological factors, such as user interface design and the fact that
many electronic data sources reside on different systems [24]. Few authors until
relatively recently have suggested that social issues in the clinical environment
may be a substantial inhibitor. Social factors may include collaboration patterns,
the reluctance for clinical audit, source of funding reimbursement models, and
the practical and social role that the paper-based record may play [25].
A 35-year longitudinal study showed the success of the use of structured flow
sheets as part of the medical record and the gradual introduction of computer
technology to support specific tasks [26]. Nordyke and Kulikowski write, “We
maintain that success comes from choosing a level of technology that matches
the information needs of a clinical practice, rather than adopting whatever cur-
rent technology has to offer regardless of the clinical needs.”
In short, referring to the model of fig. 1 we see that most research on EPR sys-
tems is related to the technical domain, while the changing health care context
is taken for granted as an impetus that the use of these systems would increase
in the future. Social and organizational factors, which are more important in the
remaining stages of the model, are only dealt with in relatively few papers [27].
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CONCLUSION
Our model does not claim that the social factors are more important than oth-
ers, but seeks to identify such domains to prioritize the agenda for further
research. It is only through having a much better and shared understanding of
the organizational issues that we can hope to meet the challenge of not ‘easing
the incorporation’ of information and communication technologies into ever
more complex organizations, but of matching changing technologies to chang-
ing organizations. From the review it becomes clear that theories and method-
ologies from social and business sciences are equally necessary tools to study the
development, implementation and the impact of information systems in health
care. Such studies will evidently be case-based and focus on a systemic descrip-
tion of a complex and messy world [28]. Ultimately the result of the proposed
research agenda may lead to new design methods to which Berg alludes in his
paper on successful sociotechnical design [29].
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CHAPTER 2
UNDERSTANDING IMPLEMENTATION:
THE CASE OF A COMPUTERIZED PHYSICIAN ORDER ENTRY SYSTEM
IN A LARGE DUTCH UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
Jos Aarts , Hans Doorewaard, Marc Berg
ABSTRACT
Most studies of the impact of information systems in organizations tend to see
the implementation process as a ‘rollout’ of technology, as a technical matter
removed from organizational dynamics. There is substantial agreement that
the success of implementing information systems is determined by organiza-
tional factors. However, it is less clear what these factors are. We propose to
characterize the introduction of an information system as a process of mutual
shaping. As a result both the technology and the practice supported by the
technology are transformed, and specific technical and social outcomes gradu-
ally emerge. We suggest that insights from social studies of science and tech-
nology can help to understand an implementation process. Focusing on three
theoretical aspects, we argue first that the implementation process should be
understood as a thoroughly social process in which both technology and prac-
tice are transformed. Second, following Orlikowski’s concept of ‘emergent
change’ we suggest that implementing a system is by its very nature unpre-
dictable. Third, we argue that success and failure are not dichotomous and
static categories, but socially negotiated judgments. Using these insights we
have analyzed the implementation of a computerized physician order entry
(CPOE) system in a large Dutch university medical center. During the course
of our study the full implementation of CPOE was halted, but the aborted
implementation exposed issues that we initially did not focus on.
Published in: Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 2004; 11(3): 207-106.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the traditional system life cycle approach, implementation is seen as a clear-
ly defined phase that comes after the initiation and development phase of a sys-
tem and before a system is put into actual use. Each phase has clearly defined
inputs and outputs and therefore documentation and sign-offs are crucial ele-
ments of the life cycle. The phase of implementation encompasses such activi-
ties as training, conversion, acceptance testing and a post-implementation audit
[1]: p. 433. In this view, implementation is understood as a ‘rollout’ where tech-
nology is far removed from its organizational dynamics. 
Few studies have been devoted to understanding the actual processes of imple-
mentation of information systems in health care, mainly because such studies
require access to hospital sites and the following of an implementation over a
longer period of time. Yet it is now generally accepted that the traditional sys-
tem life cycle is not very adequate to understand the process of implementation
of information systems [1]. Different authors inside and outside medical infor-
matics have sought to improve upon this understanding, and to get a better
grasp on the intertwinement of technology and the organization. Kling and
Scacchi have proposed the ‘web of computing’ in which the use of an informa-
tion system is understood in terms of the larger social and technical context in
which the information system is embedded [2]. Medical informatics scholars
have sought to understand how information systems are diffused in organiza-
tions and the barriers to such processes. Lorenzi and Riley, for example, exam-
ined the role of leadership and change management skills to introduce new
technologies [3]. In a fictitious case presentation of the introduction of a com-
puterized physician order entry system, Ash et al. sought to identify different
stakeholders and how their opinions and behavior might influence the adoption
of new technology [4].
We describe findings from a longitudinal study of the implementation of a com-
puterized physician order entry (CPOE) system in a large Dutch academic med-
ical center. We have been in close contact with this center between 1998 and the
present (January 2003). During this time, we collected data through semi-struc-
tured interviews, observations of staff meetings and document analysis. Also, we
have constructed an in-depth overview of events before 1998 through inter-
views and documents analysis. We use this material to further enhance the
emerging understanding of the implementation process. In this paper we will
draw on theoretical insights from recent social studies of science and technolo-
gy [5]. Contrary to more traditional views, we propose that implementation
encompasses the trajectory of introducing an information system from the very
first idea that such a system is needed to address perceived organizational prob-
lems to the dynamics of use in work practices [6]. 
18
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The purpose of this study is to examine the three theoretical insights to under-
stand the implementation process. First, we elaborate the claim that to under-
stand ‘implementation’, one needs to focus on the interrelation of the organiza-
tional environment and the technology. Kling and Scacchi argue that the social
context determines to a large extent how a new technology will be adopted and
used by an organization [2]. They reject the idea that ‘inherent’ characteristics
of a technology will determine specific effects in the organization, for example
that increasing the speed of data flows will lead to faster and better decisions.
Intent on showing the importance of social context, however, they also tend to
underscore the importance of the system’s technical properties. Just how an
organization will react to an information system, after all, is importantly influ-
enced (not determined, indeed) by the characteristics of that system. As one of
us has phrased it, the introduction of information systems in health care prac-
tices is a thoroughly social process, in which both the technology and practice
are transformed [5]. We have labeled this perspective the sociotechnical approach
[7]. The term derives from the field of social studies of science and technology,
where researchers aim to understand how technology is shaped as part of ‘messy’
networks that combine technical, social and economic elements [5].
The second aspect is the concept of emergent change and the notion of an
unpredictable outcome of an implementation process. In the classical system life
cycle each phase forms the input to the next phase. This implies that the intro-
duction of information systems is a linear process with predictable outcomes in
the form of deliverables. We will argue, however, that implementation process-
es are typified by contingencies, and proceed in a far from linear manner. They
are part and parcel of organizational dynamics that, due to the complexity of the
organizations of which we speak, cannot be foreseen, let alone be predicted [8].
In addition, the broader context in which these organizations find themselves is
in a constant flux. Demographical changes, political pressure, increasing
demands for quality care and new medical technologies alter the conditions in
which health care is delivered. Following Orlikowski, we use the concept of
‘emergent change’ to get a grasp on the development of information systems in
such circumstances [9]. This process of ‘change’ never stops: even when the
implementation is ‘formally’ finished, users will still shape and craft the infor-
mation system to fit their particular requirements or interests, often in a way
unanticipated by the designers [10].
The third aspect is the concept of fit and the notion that success and failure are
not dichotomous and static categories. Rather, ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are socially
negotiated judgments, which may vary depending on the moment in the imple-
mentation process and the perspective of the stakeholder focused upon. In addi-
tion, the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of an information system lies exactly in the inter-
action between the system’s functioning and the organization’s needs and work-
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ing patterns [11]. Lorenzi and Riley wrote that a “technically best” system can
be brought to its knees by people who do not feel ownership and resist imple-
mentation, while a “technically mediocre” system may be extremely valued by
its users [12]. Often, even apparently clear-cut technical shortcomings can be
the result of poorly managed development processes [11]. We explore how the
concept of ‘fit’ can give meaning to a successful implementation of an informa-
20
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Interviewed person
Project leader 1
Project coordinator
medical applications
Project coordinator
education and training
Medical records coordi-
nator clinical surgery
and system implemen-
tation specialist
Project leader 2 
Chief gynecologist
ambulatory clinic
Chief pathologist
Pathology technician
IT administrator depart-
ment of pathology
IT administrator depart-
ment of pathology
Medical records coor-
dinator clinical surgery
and system implemen-
tation specialist
Project coordinator
CPOE system
Project leader 1
Project leader 2
Project coordinator
medical applications
When
Jan 1999
Jan 1999
Feb 1999
Mar 1999
Mar 1999
Mar 1999
Apr 1999
Apr 1999
May 1999
May 1999
Jun 1999
Jul 1999
Jan 2000
Jan 2000
Feb 2000
Topics of interview
Goal and setup of CPOE implementation project
Goal and setup of CPOE implementation project, envis-
aged nature of CPOE implementations
Education and training issues of CPOE system implemen-
tation, development of customized user manuals
Goal and setup of CPOE system implementation project,
setup and expected outcomes of pathology-gynecology
pilot project
Goal of CPOE in medical center, setup of pilot project,
collaboration with various clinical departments
Goal of CPOE pilot, planning of the pilot project, nature,
workflow of pathology orders, expectations about CPOE
and expected outcomes of the pilot project
Expectations of CPOE and pilot, workflow issues in pathology
Workflow issues of pathology, experience with pilot setup
Setup of pathology pilot, general issues of experience with
CPOE system implementation since beginning of project
Clarifications of issues raised in first interview with
respect to implementation of the CPOE system
Review of pilot project and evaluation of CPOE system
implementation project
Evaluation of CPOE system implementation
Review of aborted implementation and goals of CPOE
Review of aborted implementation
Review of aborted implementation
Table 1 - List of interviewed persons
Three interviews were held in prior to the implementation pilot project and the issues addressed per-
tained to the goals of the CPOE system implementation and the setup of the pilots. The interviews in
1999 addressed the CPOE pilot gynecology-pathology, but general issues were raised as well. The inter-
views in 2000 were conducted after the presentation of the external evaluation results. The first author
remained in contact with the project leader and project coordinator medical applications after 2000.
Interview
no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 20
tion system [13]. Southon et al. introduced the concept of fit in health infor-
matics to emphasize the importance of the organizational configuration in man-
aging the transfer and diffusion of technology, specifically organizational strat-
egy, structure, management processes, roles and skills [14]. Our focus is on the
necessity of actively producing fit between work processes and information tech-
nology.
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Qualitative research methods are very appropriate to study systems in organiza-
tional contexts. Information systems in organizations are complex technological
artifacts because they are shaped by time and continuous change [15]. From
1998 the first author conducted open interviews, attended meetings and stud-
ied documents about the selection, specification and implementation of the
information system, and the evaluation of the CPOE pilots.
The interviewed persons included the two project leaders and the medical and
the technical coordinators of the implementation team of the CPOE system and
the members of the pilot project that tested the feasibility of order entry in
gynecology and pathology. In total 10 persons were interviewed and 15 inter-
views were conducted (see Table 1). Apart from the staff gynecologist and head
of pathology all interviewed persons had various roles during the course of the
implementation. Therefore they could provide us with a unique insight about
the full history of the introduction of the system. The interviews lasted between
one and two hours. Ongoing contacts have been maintained with a few mem-
bers of the now dissolved implementation team, who are still active in infor-
matics projects of the medical center. In addition we observed and took notes
of all staff meetings of the pilot project that we followed. We observed the use
of the system during the pilot project, and occasionally asked the users what
they were doing. In the staff meetings we focused on how the participants were
behaving and what they were saying.
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Figure 1 - CPOE system implementation timeline. The timeline indicates key 
events during the implementation of the system.
1988: considerations
july 1993: proposal to 
purchase CPOE system 
2000: CPOE 
implementation aborted
1995: contract signed
1988 1995 2000
1997: system live
1999: CPOE pilots
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Finally, we also observed and took notes of the meetings in which the conclu-
sions of the consultancy firm about aborting the implementation were present-
ed. The documents pertaining to this advice and the decision making about the
cessation of the implementation were also made available to us.
Notes, interviews and implementation documents were coded for occurrence of
specific keywords, but generally the documents available to us were structured
such that patterns could be extracted.
Permission to study the documents, interview persons and attend meetings was
obtained from the steering committee of the CPOE system implementation
project. The use of patient data was not envisaged and did not take place.
Therefore we did not seek approval of the medical ethics committee of the med-
ical center.
3.THE CASE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ORDER ENTRY AND RESULTS
REPORTING SYSTEM
3.1 History of the implementation
Contrary to other Dutch university medical centers, a large 953-bed university
medical center in the east of the country has always developed its own infor-
mation systems. In 1988, the hospital concluded that its hospital information
system was becoming obsolete and decided that it would rather buy an off-the-
shelf product than build a new one again (see figure 1 for implementation time-
line). As a key feature, the new system would have to be focused on the core busi-
ness of the hospital: supporting clinical work (rather than only clerical work). A
small group of senior staff from nursing, medicine, clinical laboratories and
information systems departments, the initiators, set out to identify the needs of
the hospital and scout for information systems available, especially in the USA.
The computing infrastructure of the medical center consisted of two IBM
mainframe computers under the operating system MVS/XA and the network
protocol SNA through which a host of other systems and terminals were con-
nected. On one mainframe resided the information systems in use; the other
was used for back up, and development and testing purposes. The medical cen-
ter had been using IBM systems since the late sixties.
The university hospital clinical registration system (UZIS) was home grown,
while the financial, clerical and personnel software packages were commercially
acquired. UZIS allowed for requesting diagnostic and therapeutic treatments,
registering diagnostic and therapeutic interventions and ordering laboratory
tests. In a way, it was a very primitive order entry system.
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The existing computing infrastructure and cost considerations constrained the
choice of a new information system. An internal report of 1990 described three
systems available for the Dutch market, of which the TDS7000 system of the
TDS Healthcare Systems Corporation1 was favored. The medical center had
always built its own clinical registration system on the existing IBM mainframe
infrastructure. It therefore maintained a large development and support group
of about 100 staff. Yet the center felt that building and maintaining a complete
23
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Figure 2 - The structure of the CPOE system implementation team. The coordina-
tors of each taskforce and the project leader formed the implementation
team. The project leader was a physician who spent about half time on
the project and was for the other part still active in medicine. The proj-
ect coordinator, a senior member of the IT department, was responsible
for all issues technical of the implementation and coordinated the mem-
bers of the implementation team on a day-to-day basis. Each taskforce
was responsible for a particular application domain. The taskforce
‘Function Departments’ encompasses departments, such as radiology,
nuclear medicine, pathology, and vascular ultrasound imaging. The
taskforce for pharmacy applications was planned to become active in a
later stage. The director of IT was member of the Steering Group.
1
Eclipsys Corporation has acquired TDS Healthcare Systems Corporation. The TDS7000 hospi-
tal information system is now known as the E7000 system. Eclipsys ceased selling the system but
the installed base is still considerably large. The authors would like to emphasize that the system
is taken as an example to address implementation issues, none of which are intended to be por-
trayed as product specific. We shall therefore use the term “CPOE system,” or “the system.”
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clinical system on its own would be a risky (and potentially very expensive)
strategy. Also, changing the technical infrastructure would be costly. The acqui-
sition of the hospital information system that was used by all other university
medical centers in the Netherlands and that ran on a different platform was
therefore never seriously considered.
The medical center wanted to move towards more clinically oriented systems.
All three systems under consideration supported order entry and results report-
ing. The decision to move towards the TDS7000 system was motivated by site
visits in the USA convincing the participants (including key future users) that
the system was the best choice: it had advanced functionalities, its configuration
was highly flexible, and it would be feasible to connect to systems already in use
because of the network and data communication protocols. With this system,
the medical center thought, it would become the leading center in patient care
information technology, moving far beyond the other university medical centers
in the country.
In July 1993, the group proposed to purchase the system, which was primarily
a computerized order entry and results reporting system for physicians. The sys-
tem had been developed in the late sixties and was the first system specifically
designed to have the work of health care professionals as its core orientation
rather than being oriented to the support of clerical and financial activities [16],
p. 293-297. The advantages listed were less paperwork, more complete orders,
fewer transcription errors and faster availability of results. Indeed, later studies
showed that CPOE reduces medication errors and improves patient outcomes
[17]. It was expected that reductions of clerical staff could be achieved because
of the reduction in paper work and a more efficient user interface. However, the
hospital community was assured that the nature of their work would not seri-
ously change and that there would be no job redundancies. In 1995, after a
number of site visits (in the USA and UK) and in-house consultations of med-
ical and nursing staff and representatives of the employees, the board of direc-
tors signed a contract with the vendor to deliver the system and the accompa-
nying support and implementation procedures. The decision was made to
implement and activate the registration functionality first so that UZIS could
be phased out as soon as possible, and to implement the CPOE functionality
after a limited number of pilots. Between 1995 and 1997 work focused on the
configuration of the system and training the trainers. Training of all prospective
clerical users, including the super users, started about six months before the sys-
tem became operational. Computer based training facilities were made available
for classroom and individual ‘walk-in’ training. Each prospective user had to
pass a computer-based exam before he or she would be issued a password and
authorized to use the system. Freeing time for training and education proved to
be difficult for busy clerks and caused an extension of the originally planned
24
Understanding implementation
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 24
training period that was to end in the summer of 1997. The hospital commu-
nity was informed about the progress of implementation through articles in the
hospital news magazine and special newsletters. These articles were of a human-
interest nature since they focused primarily on the personal experiences of indi-
viduals in the project. The newsletters carried more factual information, such as
descriptions of the system and its parts, the implementation plan, the progress,
training and software releases.
The system went live on December 1, 1997. At that moment only the clerical
functions of patient admission, medical procedures registration and patient
scheduling became active hospital wide. During 1998 and 1999 many correc-
tions and improvements were made to meet the needs of the users and counter
serious problems (see further). 1999 also saw the start of the next phase of the
introduction of order entry and results reporting functionality. A few small-scale
pilots were conducted to assess the effects and feasibility of fully implementing
this functionality. Yet, as we shall see in more detail later, from the summer of
1999 physician resistance against the CPOE system built up significantly. The
board of the specialist staff (medisch stafconvent2) requested an external review
of the system. In October 1999 the hospital board hired a consultancy firm to
review the system and the project management structure and to make recom-
mendations for the continuation of the project. In February 2000 the consul-
tancy firm advised the board to discontinue the implementation of the system,
which was graphically depicted as a Trabant3 car with square wheels (see fur-
ther). In December 2000 the board decided to freeze further deployment of the
system and not to implement CPOE. It only would allow system modifications
to maintain current functionality for the hospital, minimizing the damage, as it
were, until a new system would have been selected and implemented. 
3.2 The project team
A project team (see figure 2) was responsible for the implementation of the sys-
tem. This team reported to a steering group, which consisted of key individuals
representing the medical departments and the hospital board. The steering
group made major decisions about the implementation process, including
involvement of clinical departments and the allocation of funding. A medical
specialist headed the project team. His main tasks were to manage the project
and to ensure the ties with the medical professionals and other stakeholders
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2 The ‘medisch stafconvent’ is the formal gathering of all tenured medical staff of a Dutch uni-
versity hospital. The stafconvent advises the hospital board in all matters medical. Some deci-
sions cannot be made without its consent. The board is elected by the membership.
3 Trabant was a car of East German make that was proverbial for the fully outdated technology
of the then communist government.
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within the hospital. His position was part-time in order to allow him to con-
tinue medical practice. A project coordinator, a senior staff member of the IT
department was responsible for the day-to-day management of the project team
and all matters technical. The other members of the team came from the infor-
mation technology department. The latter primarily focused on ‘technical’
issues such the development of specifications, designing databases, creating a
technical infrastructure, designing screens and educating future users. Each
member, also, addressed a specific domain of applications of the system. Each
main domain—medicine, nursing laboratory, radiology, pharmacy, patient reg-
istration and scheduling—had its own taskforce consisting of members of clin-
ical departments and technical staff. These taskforces decided on the way the
system would be used and which functionalities would be implemented within
their domains.
In the beginning the local project team was mirrored by a team of the vendor
as part of their implementation procedures. This was later abandoned because
the implementation took more time and effort then expected, and the costs
were becoming prohibitive for the hospital. According to the same procedures,
key contact persons were appointed at all clinical, ambulatory clinical and ancil-
lary departments. The original list numbered close to 150 names. The key con-
tact people were usually physicians, nurses, clerical personnel or technicians
26
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Key figures of the university medical center for the year 2002
Ambulatory clinical department visits 381,011
Clinical admissions 24,494
One day therapeutic treatments 15,410
Bed occupancy rate 60%
Beds 953
Staff 8,153
Fulltime equivalents 5,548
Table 2 - Key figures of the university medical center for the year 2002. Ambulatory
clinical departments are an intrinsic part of the Dutch hospital system
and are linked to the equivalent clinical departments. Staff physicians
and residents see their patients at both places. In the Dutch system patients
need to be referred by their family physician to see a medical specialist. 
A medical specialist will usually see the patient first in the ambulatory
clinic and then decide what further action will be needed, including a
clinical admission. Therefore ambulatory clinical departments process a
high number of patients. The number of single day treatments is a sig-
nificant compared with the number of clinical admissions. The high
number of staff is indicative of the high load of training requirements.
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who were supposed to be familiar with work procedures in their departments.
However, this approach was also abandoned because the number of people
involved was too large to manage properly and it proved to be difficult for these
contact people to produce useful information and specifications for the imple-
mentation staff. The project team relied most on the expertise of the members
of the different taskforces.
3.3 Computerized Physician Order Entry
The core functionality of the system was CPOE around which the future devel-
opment of the electronic patient record would be shaped. Our study focused
initially on this point. The implementers expected that all physicians would use
this application. The people involved in the gynecology-pathology CPOE pilot
held the same view. Writing orders, after all, was the professional responsibility
of the physician and was not to be delegated to nursing or clerks. User codes,
passwords and electronic authentication would ensure that only physicians
could enter orders and that any misuse of the system could be detected through
logon trails. However, this core functionality was never implemented organiza-
tion wide, and could not be studied in full.
4.ANALYSIS
4.1 The sociotechnical reality: the intertwinement of organizational environment
and technology
Existing technologies and organizational arrangements are important factors
that determine the introduction of new technologies, such as the introduction
of CPOE. In the case of the university medical center the organizational con-
siderations determined the choice of the system could be summarized as follows.
• The existing IBM technological infrastructure narrowed the choice. The
technology itself did not dictate the choice but the associated organizational
arrangements did. For instance, a large body of IT-staff over a long period of
time had gained expertise to develop and support the IBM infrastructure
including the mainframes and the network. It was simply too costly to retrain
them for a new computing infrastructure or to replace them.
• Another factor was the fact that investments had been made in non-clinical
IBM mainframe applications, such as personnel and billing systems that had to
be connected to the new clinical application. Again it would be a destruction
of capital investments and human resources if these systems had to be replaced.
The system had of course to be adapted to the Dutch situation. The most visi-
ble adaptation was the translation of the screens into Dutch. But the more sub-
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tle part was the translation of the clerical workflows into pathways within the
system. This led to an explosion of the number of screens to reduce the rigidi-
ty of the implied workflow. Sometimes this adaptation was difficult to achieve.
The system was conceived to be used within the American hospital system,
which is primarily oriented to its inpatient functions. The CPOE implementa-
tion in El Camino Hospital is a good example of that approach [18]. It proved
to be more difficult to adapt the system to the Dutch situation, where medical
specialist diagnostic assessment and therapy takes place in ambulatory settings
(‘polikliniek’, ambulatory clinical department or ambulatory clinic). The ambu-
latory clinics process a high number of patients per day and form an integral
part of the medical center (see table 2). With a referral letter from his family
physician a patient usually sees a medical specialist first in the ambulatory clin-
ic. The medical specialist may then decide to admit the patient clinically, or
continue treatment in an ambulatory mode. Also after a clinical discharge a
medical specialist would see his patient in the ambulatory clinic for follow-up
treatments or check-ups. We examine the consequences of that later in this
paper.
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Figure 3 - Dutch translation of a TDS7000 system screen. This menu screen allows
doctors to see standing orders and patient data. Under the heading
‘Patientgegevens’ (patient data) the last arrow is a reference to the DRG
like classification scheme (DBC’s) that will become mandatory in Dutch
hospitals as of January 1, 2004. Note the coarseness of the system emula-
tion compared with the finesse of the Windows environment (see
Windows task bar).
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The screens of the CPOE system were translated into Dutch as figure 3 shows.
The mainframe screens were emulated in a Microsoft Windows environment.
Data could be entered with the keyboard or with the help of a mouse and click-
ing on selected fields on the screen, a key characteristic of the system. The
mouse movements were very coarse. The interface was originally conceived for
terminal interaction with a light pen. For adequate user interaction the screen
could hold maximally 24 x 40 characters.
The implementers of the system assumed that the introduction would not sig-
nificantly affect the organization for two reasons. First, the introduction of
CPOE would build on a functionality that already was agreed upon in 1983,
and that was, though very limited and primitively, implemented in UZIS. The
functionality was expected to remain basically the same. Second, the existing
IBM infrastructure would remain familiar to most IT staff, while the Windows
emulation would make use easier. The implementation focused at first at trans-
lating the clerical procedures of UZIS into the new system. In a later stage, the
functionality of real-time physician order entry and results reporting would be
added. 
In reality the implementation had a drastic impact on the organization. Soon
after the implementation, clerical users found that retrieving and entering
patient data took much more time because each screen would only allow them
to handle a limited amount of data. For most tasks, many more screens now had
to be worked through. Also, when making (typing) errors they had to go back
in the pathway and redo a part of the transaction, or even the whole transac-
tion. Furthermore they discovered that data they held to be essential vanished
after a few screens. In the old system, some data such as the patient ID-number
would remain in view to help navigation through the system. 
All this caused a severe slow down of work processes, which created chaos at the
ambulatory clinical department desks: long lines of (often angry) patients wait-
ing to be helped, frustrated physicians, and verbally assaulted secretaries.
“Are you so stupid that you can’t handle a computer?”
[Patient, ambulatory clinic]
The problem could only be remedied by increasing the clerical staffing of the
ambulatory clinical departments in order to handle the patient load. This was
quite contrary to the expectation that the introduction of the new system would
save on personnel, as was projected in the proposal. 
The problems that the users encountered with the system showed that the reg-
istration work processes were closely interrelated with UZIS, the old system.
29
A computerized physician order entry system
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 29
The screen of that system would hold the patient number always on the top
line. The users were very proficient with use of command and function keys to
interact with the system. A telling example was the following. The laboratory
system could not be connected to the system after the ‘big bang.’ UZIS
remained functional to allow users to see the data of the laboratory information
system. Users of the system would also access UZIS at a terminal next to the PC
and use the patient name and number, visible on that system, to navigate
through their own.
The recurrent problems also changed the attitude of those physicians who were
at first champions of the system. When they saw that the workload of the clerks
had increased and were confronted with the practical consequences of the sys-
tem in use, they turned into opponents of the system. They started to empha-
size that it was not their task or interest to spend so much time behind a com-
puter.
“The system requires a doctor to send electronic notes. Doctors
don’t send notes. They have other people doing that for them.”
[Physician, former project leader CPOE implementation] 
Weiner et al have reported a similar response of physicians towards CPOE [19].
In economic terms, CPOE envisages the most highly trained professionals with
the greatest opportunity costs to be placed in the data-entry role [20]. Given the
legal distribution of responsibilities, and the expectation that work procedures
would be streamlined, the designers in the medical center had embraced this
principle. The professionals, however, now started to rally against this idea
because it was clear to them that the system would cost them time. What was
much less clear to them was what benefit it would bring and how it would fit
in their work practices.
Another problem occurred at departments where patients would undergo diag-
nostic or therapeutic treatments. The budgeting of these departments depend-
ed on the number of patients treated. When after some months the figures
requested from the information systems department turned out to be wrong, it
took a few months to find the cause. This endangered their proper enumera-
tion, which caused uproar among the medical specialists involved. (In fact, it
turned out that the main problems were due primarily to poor instructions on
how to enter patient information correctly into the system). Other small issues
further hurt the acceptance of the system, such as a problem with clinical trial
patients who erroneously received bills for their experimental treatments.
Our findings emphasize the intertwinement of organizational and technical ele-
ments in information technology. The combination of technical considerations
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(the pre-existing IBM infrastructure) and organizational considerations such as
‘cost containment’, ‘being clinically oriented’ and ‘being a leading medical cen-
ter’ together led to the choice for the CPOE system. The system, subsequently,
was translated into Dutch, and tinkered with to be able to support the typical
Dutch ‘ambulatory clinic’ emphasis in hospital work. When put to work in
actual practice, the technical features of the system felt restrictive and cumber-
some to the users—especially in a time that more and more people had become
adjusted to graphical user interfaces. This restrictive and cumbersome ‘feel’,
however, was not just a technological issue: the screens could have been config-
ured differently (e.g. more easy to use in admitting a patient), but they were not.
Also, organizational routines could have been altered to fit the system better, but
that was also not tried. Finally, the choice to have the physician in the data entry
role was not a technological necessity: it was an organizational, largely unques-
tioned, implementation choice.
Understanding the implementation of an information technology, therefore,
requires a simultaneous orientation towards both social and technical aspects.
Likewise, the account illustrates how it is useless to attempt to determine
whether the experienced problems were ultimately ‘technical’ or ‘human’.
Technical design finds its roots in the organizational conditions and arrange-
ments and organizational conditions are changed as a result of technical design,
as the example of the clerical users demonstrates.
4.2 The unpredictable outcome of implementation processes: emergent change
In 1999, a few pilots were conducted to assess the feasibility of the order entry
and results reporting functionality of the system. The main objectives of the
pilots were to understand how and which work practices would be influenced
by the system, to identify program errors and to establish the conditions and to
plan for a hospital wide rollout. The conditions were classified in three cate-
gories, which were the description of work processes and possible adaptation of
the system’s functionality, the technical infrastructure, and the level of support
and training for users. It was thought that if the conditions in these categories
were judged to be adequately met, then the order entry functionality could be
activated.
The departments of the hospital were selected according to a judgment about
how well work processes were formalized. The department of radiology and
nuclear medicine and the department of pathology were considered good can-
didates for starting pilots since both departments were thought to have well for-
malized work routines that would require little adaptation. The clinical depart-
ment and ambulatory clinical departments were selected through the informal
network of the project leader and other team members and at the suggestions of
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the radiology and pathology departments. There was little preplanning of the
pilots. For example, it was agreed that physician order entry would be imple-
mented as a pilot between the departments of gynecology and pathology
because during examinations physicians would usually take tissue specimens
and send them to pathology. The number of orders was expected to be sufficient
to make a valid assessment of the feasibility of order entry. A plan was made
detailing who would be involved in the project. Only a few days before the start
of the pilot the technical staff discovered that the expected refurbishment of the
operating theater was cancelled and that it was impossible to install a PC
because the whole theater would have to be rewired to comply with electrical
safety regulations. The pilot then moved to the ambulatory gynecology clinical
department and only one doctor was involved. A PC was activated close to the
nursing station and a printer was installed for printing labels. Actually, the par-
ticipants including the pathologists, the pathology technicians and the attend-
ing gynecologist and nurses evaluated the outcomes of this pilot very positively.
The connection of the CPOE system with the laboratory information systems
of the hospital was considered crucial for lab ordering. As in most modern hos-
pital laboratories, the processing of samples and analysis and collection of data
is to a large extent automated. The selection of a new laboratory information
system in the department of clinical chemistry turned out to be very problem-
atic and was only resolved well after the decision to abort CPOE implementa-
tion. No connection was made with the new system and UZIS was still used to
see the data on the old laboratory system. The selection process was not a
responsibility of the implementation team; it belonged to the laboratory people
who did not want to be involved with the project because they thought that
they had already enough problems of their own. It crucially affected the planned
implementation.
The examples of the selection process of the pilots and the laboratory informa-
tion system shows that it was fraught with uncertainty because it was depend-
ent on the willingness of individuals and departments to participate and on the
local contingencies. In a hospital there is no central line of command that can
align departments and projects. The process contributed to the overall unpre-
dictability of the outcomes of the pilots.
Time influenced the implementation process. Because several years passed after
the decision to implement a new system users got acquainted with Windows
based personal computers. The interface became ‘stone age’ in appearance.
“The characters look like Braille”
[Nurse, dermatology clinic]
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Especially due to the pressure from the physicians, the Board of Directors start-
ed to shift their position with regard to the CPOE system. The board did not
move towards ‘owning’ the system but looked for arguments to halt the imple-
mentation. Finally, by having an external review they effectively blamed factors
outside of their influence, such as the aged character of the system in the con-
text of rapid developing Windows based PC-systems.
The end-result was a ‘lock-in’ situation. The full-blown implementation of the
system was aborted, but the system was not put out of use. Nobody was happy
with the system, but on the other hand it was clear that for the time being no
alternative was available. The system is still in use as a patient registration sys-
tem, and in due time will be replaced by a new system. Work is now focused on
the development of graphical workstations that allow health care professionals
to see patient data in a clinically meaningful way.
Designers and implementers devote much effort to controlling the implemen-
tation process. Pilots in this perspective are meant to identify shortcomings of
the system that can be remedied before a full-blown implementation. The scal-
ing down of the gynecology pilot was not anticipated, as it was the result of con-
tingencies that they could not know. The implementation team did also not
realize when the pilots became futile. They did not recognize how adverse expe-
riences with the patient registration portion of the system had negatively affect-
ed a major stakeholder group. In the dynamics of implementing the system the
above-mentioned changes were not anticipated and certainly not planned for.
Planning occurred as a response to new arising situations, as the gynecology-
pathology pilot showed. The focus on systems implementation as technical
strategy allowed different stakeholders to develop their own agenda, as circum-
stances would dictate. Changes only emerged as a coming together of contin-
gent events and decisions made on an ad hoc basis. As Orlikowski puts it:
“emergent change is the realization of a new pattern of organizing in the absence
of explicit, a priori intentions [9].” Therefore we would characterize the imple-
mentation of an information system in a complex organization as ‘emergent
change.’
4.3 ‘Success’ or ‘failure’: producing ‘fit’
The implementation of an information system in clinical practice is not a lin-
ear process with a defined starting point, clearly delineated goals and readily
identifiable stages. By most accounts, the implementation of the system was a
failure (although the system is still in place). Looking back, the functionality of
order entry and results reporting which constituted the core of the system was
never activated. But it would be too simple to argue that this failure could have
been predicted at the beginning of the project. Similarly, it would be too sim-
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ple to say that a simple checklist with critical success- and failure factors could
have prevented the problems. The outcome was rather the result of a series of
events and contingencies that were not planned for or whose impact was not
anticipated. Decisions that looked reasonable when made can thus become con-
straining and clearly ‘wrong’ in retrospect. Each step in the process of imple-
mentation leads to new and partially unpredictable outcomes that have to be
judged in the context of the new situation. In the checklist, the box ‘appropri-
ate technology’ would have been ticked at the time the procurement decision
was made: the mainframe technology appeared to be highly problematic only
later. At the time of the decision, the choice for the IBM mainframe environ-
ment made perfect sense: infrastructures based on PC-technology for large
organizations were far from mature up to the middle of the nineties. One may
conclude that long lead times for implementation are questionable because
objectives, goals and context (organizational and technical) can change drasti-
cally over time—yet it is hard to imagine how such expensive and complex
implementation processes could reduce their lead time sufficiently. In complex
organizations large-scale implementations are observed to take a long time.
Such long times are even deemed to be necessary for the mutual learning process
to develop and implement information systems [20, 21].
There is, then, no simple formula for success or failure. The complexity of the
sociotechnical networks, and the inherent unpredictability of IS implementation
within complex organizations, is simply too great [11]. In addition, what counts as
success or failure is not clear-cut, but the outcome of a social negotiation. Many dif-
ferent definitions of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ can and are employed by the involved actors
[11]. In this case study, the proposal to introduce the CPOE system very much
focused on savings. Savings could be found in fewer budgets spent on system devel-
opment and maintenance and reducing the number of clerical staff. The benefits of
medical order entry and results reporting were phrased in technical terms of better
readable and more complete orders, but the consequences for medical work were
not highlighted. Some studies and reports in the public press have shown that cost
benefits of strategic IT in health care and the services industry in general were not
achieved [22]. In the discussion about medication errors physicians do not see them-
selves as part of the problem [23]. Other professionals in the loop of ordering med-
ication often correct potential errors so that the ordering physician is not confront-
ed with the potential negative outcome of his action [24]. In a survey of hospitals
that have implemented order entry and results reporting systems, Ash et al. found
that in only 15% of these hospitals physicians were using the system [25]. The
remark of one of the leading physicians in the CPOE system implementation proj-
ect that physicians don’t send electronic notes is a telling example. 
From the case study it became apparent that the system did not fit well with reg-
istration work practices. In a study about evaluation of medical informatics
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applications, Kaplan made a plea to employ evaluation methodologies based on
social interactionist theories [26]. In this paper she suggested that ‘fit’ is a key
factor for the successful implementation of information systems in health care.
‘Fit’ has various dimensions such as compatibility of the system with the work-
flow, with the level of expertise of the users, with the belief system of the user
or the organization, and so forth. We agree with Kaplan that fit with work
processes constitutes an important explanation for success. However, we find
that whether ‘fit’ exists or not is not due to the technology introduced and the
practice in which it is to be used. Rather, this ‘fit’ has to be actively produced: the
technology and the practice have to be made to fit. An information system has
to be adapted to the work practices of the user, but users will have to change
their practices as well as a result of the opportunities and constraints of the
technology. To achieve this fit, first of all, requires a thorough understanding of
the work practices. Yet an analysis of work practices should not only include an
analysis of what people do, but also how they might do it better [27]. Often, a
proper understanding of a system’s functionality can point into the direction of
such improvements. In this case, for example, it was a moot point that the hos-
pital did not attempt to restructure work routines so that an order entry system
would be able to articulate with the practice much better [6]. An order entry
system becomes truly useful, even for doctors, when standardized care paths and
protocollized order sets are made part and parcel of working routines. A deeper
understanding of clerical work practices, also, might have led to their reorgani-
zation and perhaps could have prevented the increase in the number of clerks.
In the current example, since ‘organizational change’ was not planned, measures
to remedy organizational impacts were now mainly defensive. Alternatively,
proper IT implementation should always be seen as a process of organizational
change, and should thus always be oriented towards a redesign of—in this
case—professional working patterns [28]. 
5. CONCLUSION
In the case study of the implementation of a CPOE system in a large universi-
ty medical center we have sought to further our understanding of the process of
information systems implementation. We argue, first, that the introduction of
the order entry and results reporting system can only be properly understood if
we consider the social and technical aspects of the story as highly interrelated.
‘Implementation’ is not a purely ‘social’ process; nor is it determined by or
reducible to ‘technical’ issues. It is always and irreducibly both. This makes the
task complex for the analyst, since he or she should be able to dive deeply in
both the organizational dynamics and the technical details of an implementa-
tion account. In addition, it points at the difficulty of managing an implemen-
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tation: there as well the challenge of ‘bridging’ and integrating the organiza-
tional dynamics with the technical (im)possibilities has to be met head-on [29].
We argue furthermore that the implementation process is highly unpredictable.
At the time of the decision to implement the system no one could foresee that
later experience with PC-windows technology would influence the attitude of
users. Despite the fact that the implementation of the system has been ‘frozen’
continuous changes are made to incorporate new requirements such as the com-
ing of a DRG-like financing scheme in Dutch hospitals (see figure 3). We saw
that the implementation process was influenced by contingencies that were not
expected and certainly not planned for. Some were small, as for example the
move of the gynecology order entry pilot from the inpatient clinic to the ambu-
latory clinic. The ‘feel’ of an interface becoming obsolete and the changing posi-
tion of the medical staff were major changes that had major impact on the
acceptance of the system. Unanticipated and unplanned changes are part and
parcel of the implementation process and can often manifest themselves in
hindsight. Emergent change is key characteristic of implementing information
systems in complex organizations.
We conclude that there is no simple formula for success because of the com-
plexity of the sociotechnical networks and the inherent unpredictability of IS
implementation within complex organizations such as the university medical
center. Failure of the implementation could not be predicted at the beginning.
But it became apparent that the information system did not fit well with work
practices. In our view ‘fit’ can be seen as a key factor for the successful imple-
mentation of information systems. But fit is not a property that relates to the
nature of technology or work practices; it has to be actively produced. Just ana-
lyzing work practices to discover how technology might be implemented is not
sufficient. Both technology and work practices have to be changed to imple-
ment an information system successfully.
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CHAPTER 3
COMPARING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPUTERIZED PHYSICIAN
ORDER ENTRY IN TWO DUTCH HOSPITALS: SAME SYSTEMS,
DIFFERENT OUTCOMES
Jos Aarts, Marc Berg
SUMMARY
Objectives
To compare the outcome of the implementation of computerized physician
order entry (CPOE) systems in two Dutch hospitals. Methods: Qualitative
research methods, including interviews in both hospitals, observations of sys-
tem in use, observations of staff meetings and document analysis, were used to
understand the implementation of CPOE. The transcribed texts and imple-
mentation documents were analyzed for relevant concepts. The transcripts and
field notes were analyzed using a heuristic success and failure model with
medical work as the primary focus.
Results
Occasions that determined the outcome of the implementation were classified
according to factors that may influence the success or failure of implementing
systems.
Conclusions
The themes and patterns that emerged from the data helped validate the con-
cept of medical work as the primary focus of our analysis model; in addition
the concept of a support base necessary to accept changes in medical work
that result from introducing CPOE may help to understand the different
implementation outcomes.
To be published in Methods of Information in Medicine (Methods Inf Med 2005;44(5): in press)
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1. INTRODUCTION
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems have been implemented
and used in hospitals for over thirty years. In 1971 El Camino Hospital, a 440-
bed community hospital in Mountain View (California) implemented CPOE
and the system has been in constant use ever since. Evaluation of the system
showed savings in terms of the turnaround times of medical orders [1]. Despite
the implementation in some prominent hospitals the adoption of CPOE in US
hospitals has not been widespread as was evidenced by the 1998 survey of Ash
et al [2]. CPOE caught attention again after two reports by the Committee on
Quality on Health Care in America on medical errors and improvement of the
quality of the health system suggested that the wider introduction of CPOE
would reduce the number of medical errors significantly and that therefore
CPOE would improve the quality of care and patient outcomes [3, 4]. Indeed,
studies such as by Overhage and Bates have shown that CPOE can reduce med-
ical errors and adverse drug events and improve patient outcomes [5-7]. 
The implementation of CPOE systems however, has been fraught with prob-
lems. Massaro described how residents in the University of Virginia Medical
Center opposed the implementation of CPOE [8]. Although they felt that the
system cost them too much time, its use was mandatory. Ash et al. found that
in only 15% of the hospitals that had implemented CPOE physicians were
using it [2]. Ash et al. later concluded from a cross-site study of CPOE in hos-
pitals that implementation strategies for CPOE should be designed for its com-
plex nature [9]. Despite the indication of positive outcomes of CPOE, the call
of the Leapfrog Group—representing Fortune 500 companies providing health
benefits—to implement CPOE and legislation of the State of California requir-
ing implementation by January 1, 2005, few hospitals have acted upon it [10].
In a recent survey Ash showed that even less than 10% of US hospitals have
implemented CPOE, a figure even lower than the 1998 survey [11]. In addition
there is evidence that implementing CPOE while reducing errors of prescrip-
tion legibility and completeness may induce new errors [12]. From these stud-
ies one may conclude that the implementation of CPOE in clinical environ-
ments is problematic and that easy solutions are not readily available.
The introduction of CPOE is not a problem unique to the United States. We
have studied the implementation of CPOE in two Dutch hospitals over a peri-
od of ten years. The implementation of CPOE in one hospital was aborted and
in the other hospital only clerks and nurses are using it. We have sought to iden-
tify the factors that would explain the differences in the outcomes by focusing
on medical work practices and interpreting our findings using the sociotechni-
cal approach, which addresses the interrelatedness of technical and social aspects
of a work practice [13].
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2. BACKGROUND
Scholars have sought to understand the nature of success and failure of imple-
menting information systems for about thirty years [14]. The study of IS fail-
ures focused initially on technical system properties because building the right
system was seen as problematic. During the 1980s the focus shifted towards the
human-computer interface, which was seen to be poorly designed. Only recent-
ly more empirically grounded, organizationally focused explorations by which
IS had failed became the focus of research [15-17]. Building upon sociological
traditions that emphasize the interactions between people and between people
and their (technical) environments Sauer developed an IS failure model [18,
19]. Sauer’s model portrays the development of information systems as an inno-
vation process based on three components: the project organization, the infor-
mation system and its supporters. Each of the components is arranged in a tri-
angle of dependencies in an organizational environment. The information sys-
tem requires the efforts and expertise of the project organization to sustain it;
the project organization is heavily dependent on the provision of support in the
form of material resources and help in dealing with contingencies; supporters
require the benefits from IS. In his view information systems can have flaws that
cannot yet be described as failures. Systems can be delivered, at increased costs,
with inadequate functionality and may be largely unused. So long as the proj-
ect organization can command the resources and power to sustain its system, it
will not be counted a failure because it serves some organizational purposes
[18], p. 30. Figure 1 shows this triangle of dependencies.
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Figure 1 - Triangle of dependencies. Sauer is intent on the role of a project organi-
zation to develop, operate and or maintain an information system. The
supporters representing different stakeholders and resources provide sup-
port for a project organization. An information system is supposed to
serve its supporters and their interests. The source of innovation in this
model rests with the project organization (adapted from [18]). 
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3.A SUCCESS AND FAILURE MODEL BASED ON DEPENDENCIES
We propose a heuristic model that, while preserving his concept of interdepen-
dencies refines Sauer’s work in several ways. Sauer, first of all, puts the users in
the role of supporters, while we suggest emphasizing their work as it is sup-
ported by the system. In doing so we are able to examine how work practices
may change when an information system is put in place and how clinicians,
whose work practices will change, relate to the system. In hospitals often a proj-
ect organization is not well identified; assumptions about the nature of project
organizations that may be valid in a corporate environment cannot be taken for
granted in health care [20]. Even in the case that a project organization has a
clear mandate of top management, it still may need to negotiate decisions with
the medical profession before they can take effect. Moreover, a project organi-
zation may disappear, while potentially problems of implementing the system
successfully may remain unresolved. We consider a project organization part of
the hospital organization. Often organizational arrangements, for example a
steering group, are in place to ensure its connection to regular entities of a hos-
pital, such as clinical departments, an IT department and a board of directors. 
Furthermore Sauer is very intent on the nature of the technology and not so
much on the nature of the work it supports. We agree that innovation must
occur when an information system is implemented. But Sauer’s model tends to
ignore the idea that innovation is part of work practices by assigning the driv-
ing force for innovation to the project organization.
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Figure 2 - Medical work practices as center stage for system implementation. The
success of implementing an information system is defined by the capa-
bility to create a support base for transforming medical work practices
induced by the IT system.
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We believe that medical work practices take center stage when analyzing the
outcomes of CPOE implementation (see figure 2). Users talking about an infor-
mation system tend to focus on the effect upon their work. Changing work
practices needs a support base, especially in health care where professional
autonomy is important [21]. We define a support base as a group of persons
accepting a change of work practices caused by introducing an information sys-
tem. As seen later, a support base may not be equal to the information system’s
target group: change may not happen when a support base is lacking.
In order to implement a CPOE system successfully, synergy needs to be creat-
ed between the technology and the medical work practices to bridge the
requirements of the work situation and the tool’s functionality [22]. Because an
information system cannot be separated from a hospital organization, similarly
synergy needs to be created between the hospital organization and the work
practices. Synergy implies interdependency. A hospital is dependent on its cli-
nicians how they work, but medical work practices are also very dependent on
the organizational arrangements within the hospital. In the case of information
systems one of us has introduced the notion of fit as a sine qua non for synergy
to emerge [22]. Synergy is a dynamic concept. All parties, or elements of the
network in sociotechnical terms, need to actively adjust to one another to cre-
ate synergy. The change of medical work practices as a result of the new tech-
nology needs to have a support base; otherwise the implementation may
become very problematic. On the other hand the intended target group may
not accept the change, but another professional group may see advantages in
taking up the change and form as a new group the support base for the chang-
ing work practices. Changing work practices may also be accepted because there
is no alternative. This may explain that a complete abandonment of an infor-
mation system is quite rare and only occurs if there are technologic alternatives
that could support medical work and for which a support base can develop.
Because of our focus on medical work practices we do not make a direct con-
nection between an information system and its support base. The support base
for changing medical work practices is crucial for the acceptance of an infor-
mation system.
An information system is intrinsically connected to the hospital organization.
An information system reflects a major capital investment and usually organi-
zational conditions have been created to accommodate such a technology, for
example through the establishment of an IT department or the creation of a
project organization. The implementation lead times of technology are quite
long, and will therefore draw on the organization’s resilience. Also the informa-
tion system represents a history; technological infrastructures are reflective of
the organization and its constituents and often cannot be replaced easily [23].
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A hospital organization is about all the constituents and work practices that
make medical work possible [24]. A hospital organization, or more specifically
its top management may harbor expectations or ambitions about how medical
work should or will change as a result of an implicit or explicit strategy or a
changing external environment. Management may try to implement that
change by attempting to create a synergy between the organization and medical
work practices. In hospitals it is frequently the case that in the absence of a-pri-
ori intentions of the top management groups may pursue their own agenda. The
success of these groups is determined by the support base for the changes in
work practices they want intentionally to achieve or, very often, unintentional-
ly may realize. Conversely, existing work practices may influence the expecta-
tions or ambitions of the hospital. For that the hospital organization also needs
to have a support base.
We view support base as a dynamic concept. When changing medical work
practices usually the support of physicians is needed, but when physician sup-
port is lacking other professionals may step in. They thus can create synergy
between medical work practices and the information system, but in a way not
anticipated or intended by the hospital organization. 
Our model would give a new perspective on success or failure of information
systems. We define a successful implementation of an information system as the
capability to create a support base for the change of (medical) work practices
induced by the system. We can talk now about the dynamics of success or fail-
ure. We argued in a previous paper that success and failure are no static cate-
gories but are socially negotiated judgments [25]. ‘Negotiation’ clearly has a
dynamic connotation. In our view different groups negotiate through formal
and informal channels what is going to happen with an information system
employing implicit and explicit strategies [20]. Such a consideration allows for
positions within a hospital to shift in a way unintended by, for example, the
champions of a system. The dynamics of failure may point at the failure to cre-
ate synergy.
4. RESEARCH METHODS
The study focuses on the understanding of the outcomes of CPOE implemen-
tation using a heuristic model and aims to identify factors that determine suc-
cessful implementation. Field and documentary-historical methods best achieve
this interpretive explanation generation [26]. We gained access to the hospitals
through our network of contacts. The two hospitals selected were the only in
the Netherlands implementing CPOE systems at the time of the beginning of
the study. 
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We collected data through open interviews, analysis of implementation docu-
ments, observing systems in use, and attending staff meetings in both hospitals,
starting in 1997 and ending in 2003. In both hospitals we interviewed project
leaders, clinical members of the implementation team, staff and resident physi-
cians, nurses and technical and clerical personnel. The interviews were tran-
scribed and submitted to the interviewees to correct for factual errors. A total of
25 interviews were conducted. See table 1 for an overview of data acquisition
methods.
We specifically examined documents pertaining to the selection and the use of
the CPOE system, the outcome of pilots in both hospitals and the evaluation
by an external consulting firm.
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Table 1 - Qualitative Research and data acquisition methods applied in the case
studies
Data acquisition methods
Implementation 
documents
Other documents
Interviews
Observations
Staff meetings
Hospital A ([25])
Selection and recommendation
documents, 1990 – 1993
Functional specifications, 1993
Letters, newsletters and 
magazine articles, 1982 – 2003
Project leaders, project team
members, users, 1999 – 2000
Pilot project, 1999
Pilot project planning meetings
and meetings discussing the
decision to abort CPOE imple-
mentation
Hospital B
-
Functional specifications, 
2001 [29]
Users in nursing wards, 
1997 [27] 
Head of IT, physicians,
project team members, 
2001 – 2002 [29] 
Participant observation in 
nursing wards, 1997 [27] 
Observation of system in
use, 2002 [29]
-
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We also transcribed the observations of the systems in use and staff meetings.
During the observation of people using the system we would occasionally ask
them to explain what they were doing. In the staff meetings we focused on the
behavior and discussions of the participants. Both interviews and observation
transcripts were coded for relevant keywords, but generally the documents were
structured so that patterns could be extracted. The methods are described more
extensively in earlier publications and documents [25, 27-29]. 
5. CASE PRESENTATION:THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CPOE IN TWO DUTCH
HOSPITALS
The implementation of CPOE is not widespread in the Netherlands. Of the
hundred acute care hospitals three hospitals have implemented and currently
use a medication order entry system [30]. Two hospitals, a university medical
center (hereafter hospital A) and a regional hospital (hereafter hospital B), have
attempted to implement a full scale CPOE system. The hospitals chose the
TDS7000 system of TDS Healthcare Systems Corporation1 and shared their
computing resources. The key figures of both hospitals are listed in table 2. The
cases will be described in more detail separately.
5.1 Hospital A
Hospital A is a 953-bed university medical center in which the medical school
is integrated. It employs about 400 staff physicians and over 300 residents.
There are about 1500 medical students, but they do not count as qualified
physicians when they do their medical rotations. 
In 1988 the medical center wished to replace its IBM mainframe based home-
grown hospital information system with a system that would support clinical
work. Considerations for the selection of the order entry system its clinical
focus, the reputation of being advanced compared with other university med-
ical centers in the country and the retention of the existing IBM infrastructure
including the expertise of the IT staff. Benefits listed were easier use and more
readable and complete medical orders. The hospital signed the contract in 1995
and the system went live late 1997 with only clerical applications activated such
as patient admission and scheduling. From 1997 until 1999 a few pilots were
conducted to assess the feasibility of medical order entry and to prepare for a
hospital wide rollout. Soon it became apparent that clerical users in the ambu-
latory clinical departments were not happy using the system. To complete a
task, such as scheduling a patient, a secretary had to page through many screens
and the Windows emulation of the CPOE system was not intuitive in use (see
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figure 3). When it became clear that these properties slowed down the users, the
physicians realized that using the system would cost them much time. Through
formal and informal channels the physicians mobilized enough support to halt
its further deployment. The university medical center is still using the system
for clerical purposes while preparing decisions about the future role of clinical
IT [25].
5.2 Hospital B
Hospital B is large regional 1230-bed medical center based on three locations in
an urban area. The main location offers all medical services varying from routine
interventions to complex procedures. The other two locations offer basic med-
ical services. While it is not officially an academic medical center, it is involved
in the training of medical students as part of an agreement with a university med-
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Table 2 - Key figures of the university medical center (hospital A) and regional hos-
pital (hospital B) for the year 2002. Ambulatory clinical departments are
an intrinsic part of the Dutch hospital system and are linked to their clin-
ical counterparts. Staff physicians and residents see their patients in both
places. A medical specialist will usually see the patient first in the ambu-
latory clinic and then decide what further action will be needed, includ-
ing a clinical admission. Therefore ambulatory clinical departments
process a large number of patients. The number of patients that gets a
one-day medical treatment (e.g. simple surgery) is growing saving the hos-
pitals the costs of expensive beds. Hospital B is involved in training of
medical specialists but the number of training positions is much less than
in an academic medical center. Hospital B also hires physicians who not
do enter into specialist training position and accommodate for variations
in patient caseload. The figures show that hospital B is more focused on
‘medical’ production; it treats much more patients with less personnel.
Hospital A Hospital B
Ambulatory clinical department visits 
Clinical admissions 
Day case admissions 
Number of beds 
Staff
Fulltime equivalents
Tenured medical staff
Residents
Non-training physicians
381,075
24,494
15,410 
953
7,855
5,902
393
321
-
432,119 
27,298
21,777
1,230
2,773
2,007
188
80
50
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ical center in a nearby city. The physicians are mainly self-employed and their
practices are organized in medical specialty groups. The groups have a high
degree of autonomy to regulate their own affairs. The hospital also provides for
training of medical residents. The residents are employed by the hospital, but
belong organizationally to the medical specialty groups where they are trained.
The hospital had no previous history of medical computing, and in early 1990s
it felt it could move directly into implementing an information system to sup-
port medical work. Through personal contacts it was offered a deal by hospital
A to use the IBM infrastructure by leasing large bandwidth communication
lines. This offer would save substantially on capital investments. The two hos-
pitals worked together to acquire the same computerized physician order entry
system. The earlier implementation of the CPOE system by hospital B would
48
Understanding implementation
Figure 3 - A typical screen of the CPOE system implemented in hospital A and B.
Note the contrast between the coarseness of the CPOE emulation and the
Windows environment. The figure represents a nursing documentation
(‘rapportage’) screen in hospital B.
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provide the IT staff of hospital A with a unique opportunity to gain experience
with the development and maintenance of the system. Hospital B signed the
contract in 1992. The system went live in 1995 and gradually its functionality
was expanded to include CPOE in all clinical departments. The system has not
yet been implemented widely in the ambulatory clinical departments.
The physicians resisted the implementation of CPOE, but the secretaries, clerks
and nurses appropriated the system to support their own tasks. The nurses used
the system to document nursing care and entering medical orders, most of
which were medication orders. In the beginning nursing use of CPOE had been
made difficult by inserting authorization screens that prompted the nurses to fill
in detailed information about the physician responsible for the medical orders.
Later on this ‘agent for’ construction was simplified when it became clear that
physicians would never use the system and procedures were implemented to
ensure that physician would sign the orders [28]. However, medication orders
proved to be problematic in this hospital. Nurses would enter orders and it was
agreed that physicians would electronically authorize them or sign printed med-
ication sheets. In reality about 60% of the medication orders were not author-
ized. The interviews revealed differing opinions between the physicians and
pharmacy about the responsibility for medication quality. Carpenter and
Gorman have reported similar findings [31].
6. RESULTS: SAME SYSTEMS, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES
The case description shows how intertwined the histories of CPOE implementation
in both hospitals were. The university medical center could not have moved forward
if the regional hospital would not have provided the needed opportunity to get expe-
rience with the system and to convince the board to acquire it. This interdepend-
ence continues to this day. Despite these linkages the different outcomes of the
implementation allows us to make a comparison and draw conclusions from it.
From the documents, interviews and observations in both hospitals we identified
key occasions that influenced the course of the implementation of CPOE. Using
our model we examine in more detail medical work practices and the support base,
the information system and the hospital organization, and how they are interde-
pendent. The occasions are summarized in chronological order in table 3.
6.1 Medical work and support base
The implementation of the CPOE system in both hospitals was aimed at physi-
cians. The benefits of CPOE were phrased in ‘technical’ terms such as an
improved completeness and legibility of medical orders. Since writing orders
was seen as a responsibility of the medical profession the implementers expect-
49
Comparing the order entry in two Dutch hospitals
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 49
Understanding implementation
50
Hospital A 
The hospital had an existing computing
infrastructure constraining the choice for 
a new CPOE system. 
The hospital wanted to be number one in
clinical computing and distinguish itself
from other university medical centers.
Order entry and results reporting was
already a rudimentary functionality of the
old system. 
The implementers did not anticipate or
plan for major changes when the new 
system would be implemented.
The implementation of the CPOE system
was initially targeted on clerks and
secretaries to support their tasks of
patient admission and transfer, scheduling
appointments and registering treatments.
Despite expectations that work practices
would not change, the new system did not
fit well with current clerical work practices.
Clerks and secretaries in ambulatory 
clinical departments experienced severe
slowdowns when admitting patients and
scheduling appointments. 
Responses to remedy shortcomings of the
system were mainly defensive. 
Physicians never used both the old 
system and the new system. Clerks and
secretaries, and to a lesser extent nurses,
were the main users of the system. 
When the physicians saw how much time
the secretaries and clerks needed to use
the system, they started to rally against
the system
Hospital B
The hospital had only automated a few
clerical applications. There was no strong
computer history that could influence the
choice for a particular system.
Support of clinical work was a major 
driver for the selection of a new system.
The choice for the CPOE system favored
by hospital A was facilitated by the offer
to use its computer infrastructure saving
major investment costs.
The implementation was targeted on both
clerical and clinical users.
The clerical users changed their paper
based work practices in order to make
best use of the system.
The physicians saw no advantage in using
the system, but especially nurses 
perceived the system as a help to their
current manual medical ordering practices
and nursing care documentation. At first
the entering of medical orders was made
difficult by inserting extra verification
screens, but later this ‘agent for’ 
procedure was simplified.
Chronology
Before 1990
1990 – 1992
1990 – 1992
1990 – 1995
1992 – 1995
1997 – 1999
1995 – 2000
1999 – 2000
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ed that physicians would agree on the signaled problems and use the system. In
hospital A the implementation was initially targeted on the clerical users to sup-
port their tasks of admitting and transferring patients, scheduling appointments
and registering diagnostic and therapeutic treatments that needed to be reim-
bursed. In a later stage the full functionality of physician order entry would be
realized. Immediately after the introduction however, the clerks and secretaries
experienced severe problems in using the system. The implementers responded
defensively; they tried to fix each problem and the organization added more
staff to handle the increased workload for the clerical end-users. Because the old
system was phased out the clerks and secretaries had no choice but to use the
system. The physicians, however, observing the problematic use of the system
became increasingly opposed to its further implementation. They now foresaw
how CPOE would significantly change their medical work practices, tying them
to a slow and cumbersome computer system. In this way they never formed a
support base.
In hospital B the implementation encompassed the complete functionality
including order entry and was targeted on both clerical and clinical users.
Having no previous experience with computerized systems the clerks and secre-
taries found that the system was helpful for their clerical tasks. Yet here as well,
the physicians refused to get involved because they rejected their ‘clerical’ role
in entering prescriptions and work orders. They were used to writing and sign-
ing paper drug prescriptions and giving verbal and telephone orders to nurses.
Their work routines were efficient and heavily facilitated by the nursing staff. In
hospital B then, the nurses continued this tradition and started to enter the
orders for the doctors. In the beginning the process of entering orders was made
difficult for nurses by inserting extra authorization screens, but when it became
clear that physicians would not change their position and enter orders them-
selves this process was made simpler [28]. In combination with order entry the
nurses would also document nursing care. The nursing documentation was pri-
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Table 3 - Occasions determining the outcomes of the CPOE implementation in hos-
pital A and B. The occasions are presented in chronological order and span
the period from 1988 until 2002.
The outcomes of the order entry pilots
were not convincing to influence the 
position of physicians and nurses. 
Because of a thin support base for changing
medical work practices it was not possible
to implement medical order entry and no
other professional group stepped in.
Clerical use of the system stabilized.
The core functionalities of medical order
entry and nursing documentation filled 
the need of nurses, secretaries and
clerks and allowed them to appropriate
the system.
1999
2000 – now
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marily used to facilitate the transfer of workshifts and print nursing care plans
(figure 3). Continuing efforts by the board of directors to involve physicians in
using CPOE failed, but the nurses and clerks appropriated the system to sup-
port the medical work practices much as they had been doing before. In that
manner they became the support base for the system up until today.
6.2 Information system
How an information system will be perceived depends very much on the con-
text. Hospital A’s existing IBM hardware infrastructure constrained the choice
for the new physician order entry system. The hospital had a long experience of
information systems in use and inevitably the new system was judged in that
perspective. The implementers assumed that emulating the terminal in a
Windows environment would make easy use possible (see figure 3). In compar-
ison to the old system the use turned to be very cumbersome. A single screen
could hold limited information and therefore many screens had to be paged
through in order to complete a task. Also what information and in what way it
was presented on the screen was not intuitive, thereby causing loss of oversight.
All this slowed down the speed of use, which was especially problematic in the
ambulatory clinical departments processing large numbers of patients (see table
2). It could only be remedied by adding clerical staff. There was a poor fit
between the user and the system and contributed to its rejection by the physi-
cians. 
In hospital B the users saw a clear advantage over their paper based work tasks
and made the system fit in their work practices. The lack of a history of using
computers could not color their judgment and therefore they were more will-
ingly to abandon their paper based work practices. The implementation was ini-
tially limited to the clinical departments and only five years later the first
attempts were made to introduce the system in the ambulatory clinical depart-
ments. Therefore the hospital did not see the slowdown of clerical work prac-
tices experienced by hospital A.
6.3 Hospital organization
Hospitals are highly complex organizations. They are knowledge-intensive and
typified by a co-existence of a classic hierarchical structure and a juxtaposed
body of semi-independent units: the medical specialists [20]. Managerial
authority stops short from the autonomous professional status of physicians,
whether they are employed by the hospital or more or less independently asso-
ciated. This forces hospital management to negotiate with physicians about all
matters medical and decisions are therefore mostly the result of compromise.
Sometimes hospital management has to give in to preserve good working con-
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ditions. Only in the last decades external developments such as cost contain-
ment, the increased awareness of patient safety issues and quality improvement
and patient advocacy forced physicians to align themselves with institutional
goals [32, 33]. Hospitals balance also between setting goals for patient care and
being mere facilitators for physicians to practice. Likewise physicians are
dependent of hospital organizations for the resources they cannot afford in pri-
vate practice only.
Both hospitals were ambitious in implementing information to support clinical
work and viewed this as a way to distinguish themselves from other hospitals.
They expected that their physicians would follow them in their ambition and
underestimated the fact that medical responsibilities are not necessarily reflect-
ed in medical work practices. Both hospitals were not able to get the physicians
on board. For hospital A it meant eventually the abandonment of core func-
tionality of physician order entry and for hospital B leaving them out of the
loop. The fact that hospital A could provide the computer resources to hospital
B and thus allowing to save substantially on capital investments was an impor-
tant factor in the decision of the latter to acquire the order entry system.
7. DISCUSSION
Most recent accounts of implementing information systems focus on the user
and his or her organizational environment. Here we have emphasized the cen-
trality of medical work in health IT implementation. ‘Medical work’ is the core
business of health care organizations; it is that what professionals are here to do
and what clerks and other non-medical workers are there to support [24].
‘Medical work’ is where the different resources of the hospital—its people,
materials, and information—come together. Medical work is highly fluid
because it geared towards treating patients, whose individual trajectories are
never completely predictable [24]. This concept of medical work implies that it
is not uniquely related to the profession of medicine, but other professions such
as nursing or physiotherapy and even the patient may be involved.
We will now examine the interdependencies in more detail. It is obvious that
medical work is dependent on and shaped by the hospital organization. Though
physicians tend to see patient care as a highly individual activity separated from
organizational arrangements, a hospital provides for personnel, technological
and material resources that allow physicians to practice medicine. A hospital not
only facilitates but also constrains. The current shortage of highly skilled ICU
nurses and OR personnel clearly limits the number of patients that a physician
can treat. Similarly medical work practices have become highly dependent on
complex and expensive technologies and resources—including IT—that only
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can be shared in a hospital [34]. For example, admission and scheduling of
patients, lab testing and imaging is nowadays impossible without IT and facili-
tates the efficient handling of a high number of patients by physicians and other
health care professionals. This was an important reason that hospital A did not
terminate the information system completely. A study in a Dutch academic
children’s hospital describes how physician drug prescribing practices can be
shaped by a computerized medication order entry system that allows only to
prescribe drugs listed in an electronic formulary and that the system thus might
help to reduce hospital prescription costs [35].
In an ethnographic study how physicians and nurses use documents to share
knowledge within and across health care settings Østerlund finds how the
apparently inefficient way of taking patient histories multiple times, writing up
and looking up data is determined by the nature of the work at hand such as
admitting, finding a diagnosis and deciding for a therapy, coordinating care
activities, and transferring the patient to an other care giver [36]. The study
argues that health care records should be approached as work practice-centered
and suggests that the implementation of information systems should take med-
ical work practices as point of departure. This study supports our view that
health professionals and others who work in health care organizations experi-
ence IT through their work and our choice to put medical work center stage in
our model of system implementation. Related to the centrality of medical work
is the question whether the formal status of a physician in a hospital influences
their use of CPOE. Data from Ash et al. suggest that hospitals employing their
physicians are more successful in implementing CPOE [37]. However, our find-
ings suggest that employment status may not be a strong indicator. Although
medical specialists are ‘regular’ employee in many European hospitals, this does
not imply that their organizational role is that of a ‘regular’ employee. A study
about medical errors suggests that the professional behavior of physicians is to
a large extent determined by professional socialization during their years of res-
idency [38]. In both hospitals the staff physicians arrived at the opinion that
CPOE was not part of their professional work and the residents followed them
in their stance.
Transformations in medical work practices—whether induced by IT or not—
may breed enthusiasm, indifference or resistance among health care profession-
als. Negative reactions do not necessarily mean that a transformation will not be
taken up. A professional group for whom it was not intended, but which in
hindsight profited most of it may take up a change. How different professions
might take up medical work practices varies from hospital to hospital and
whether it is appropriate is a question not raised in this paper. The growing
shortage of physicians will arguably lead to the delegation of medical work prac-
tices to other professionals and a growing role of information systems to sup-
54
Understanding implementation
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 54
port them. In practice already nurses are doing clinical work that formally
belongs to the professional domain of medicine [39]. For example, the British
government allows NHS nurses to prescribe drugs using a tailored formulary
and supported by strict guidelines and protocols [40]. In such a dynamic con-
text medical work practices and professions are therefore less tightly coupled
than one would expect. The question of who is involved in medical work and
whose tasks are being supported we seek to answer by examining the support
base for transformations of medical work practices.
In our account of the implementation of computerized physician order entry
systems in two Dutch hospitals we described medical work as partly consisting
of creating and entering medical orders. The success and failure model based on
the centrality of medical work and its interdependencies helped us to compare
and understand the outcomes of the implementation of the CPOE systems. The
implementation of CPOE in hospital A can be considered a failure. The change
of medical work practices of creating and entering orders with the help of an
information system did not receive a support base among physicians and no
other group stepped in to fill the void. Similarly the implementation of CPOE
in hospital B can be seen as a success because the process of computerized order
entry received a support base, but not among physicians as was originally
intended. Yet we would like to introduce nuance with regard to the question of
system implementation failure. As is often the case, failure was not the result of
wrong decision-making or other clearly identifiable causes but the coming
together over time of contingencies such as the specific technologic history and
organizational conditions.
8. CONCLUSION
In order to understand the different outcomes of the implementation of a
CPOE system in two Dutch hospitals we developed a heuristic model based on
Sauer’s failure model of dependencies. In our model we focus on medical work
(practices) that will change as a result of implementing a CPOE system.
Accepting or rejecting an information system will depend on whether those
involved in the medical work practices will accept a transformation of these
practices. The power of the model lies in the fact that it allows the analyst to
understand the role of and focus on medical work practices to implement sys-
tems successfully. Furthermore, we argue that identifying factors that determine
success or failure is very difficult because often implementation decisions that
were completely sensible at the time they were made often prove to be con-
straining in hindsight. Yet we have only here made a modest start: it remains still
a daunting and elaborate task to understand the nature and context of medical
work practices.
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CHAPTER 4
A COMPARISON OF HOSPITAL-BASED COMPUTERIZED PHYSICIAN
ORDER ENTRY IN THE NETHERLANDS AND USA,
PART I: IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES
Jos Aarts , Dean F. Sittig , Joan S. Ash , Marc Berg
ABSTRACT
Objective
To compare the implementation strategies of hospital-based computerized
physician order entry systems in the Netherlands and USA. 
Design
Analysis of case studies of CPOE implementation in Dutch and American
hospitals. 
Measurements
Interview transcripts, implementation documents and published articles con-
cerning the implementation of CPOE systems in three Dutch and three
American hospitals were analyzed with regard to implementation strategies. 
Conclusions
Implementation strategies do not differ substantially between Dutch and
American hospitals. Implementation lead times tend to be about five years,
which lends credibility to the suggestion that these long organizational
acclimatization periods are integral to an implementation process.
Submitted for publication.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) is defined as a process that allows
a physician to enter medical orders directly into a computer rather than hand-
writing them and having a third party enter them into the computer system [1].
CPOE systems have been implemented in many different countries in the world
including, but not limited to: United States, United Kingdom, Japan and the
Netherlands [2-6]. Among others, two IOM reports on patient safety and qual-
ity of the health care system have recommended the implementation of CPOE
systems to improve patient outcomes [7, 8]. The findings and recommendations
also drew attention in Europe and have prompted several governments to assess
medication safety issues and develop plans for actions. For example, the
Netherlands has decided to introduce a national electronic medication record
[9].
In two papers the results are presented of an international, cross-site, qualitative
study of the implementation of CPOE systems in the Netherlands and USA.
The aim of the study is to understand and explain the resemblances and differ-
ences of implementing CPOE in two different countries. This paper addresses
the implementation strategies focusing on the dynamics of introducing CPOE
in hospitals. The companion paper focuses on the involvement of physicians
since CPOE systems are designed to support the physician responsibility and
task of managing medical orders. Physicians merit special attention because they
enjoy in the different countries a considerable degree of professional autonomy.
However, increasingly they are held accountable for the outcome of their med-
ical practices because of budgetary, quality and medico-legal reasons.
Arguably the differences in the health care systems across western countries are
considerable. It varies from completely state run systems such as the United
Kingdom National Health Service to mixed public and private systems existing
in most western European countries and mostly private systems such as in the
USA. Even within the USA different health systems co-exist. For example,
health maintenance organizations are closed systems that tie together patients,
providers and health insurers co-exist with public systems such as
Medicare/Medicaid. Despite these differences hospitals are quite similar in their
operation and the services they provide, allowing thus a comparison of hospi-
tal-based CPOE.
The comparison is limited to hospitals. CPOE has been implemented in pri-
mary care organizations in the USA, while this is not the case in the
Netherlands. Moreover, primary care systems in the Netherlands and the
United States differ to a greater extent thus making comparisons more difficult.
In the Netherlands primary care is in the hands of general practitioners, and in
60
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the USA it can vary from large primary care organizations offering a wide vari-
ety of medical services to single practice physicians.
Several quantitative and qualitative cross-site studies of CPOE system imple-
mentations across the USA have been conducted in the period 1998 – 2003 [2,
10-16]. There are no international cross-site studies reported.
2. BACKGROUND
In this study implementation encompasses the trajectory of introducing an
information system from the idea that such a system is needed to address per-
ceived organizational problems up to the dynamics of use in work practices. In
a study of introducing CPOE in a large university medical center in the
Netherlands Aarts et al. have argued that implementing a system is a thorough-
ly social process and therefore the implementation of information systems in
health care is far from a straightforward process characterized by clearly defined
inputs and outputs [6]. Markus argues that an implementation strategy should
be informed by a diagnosis of the organizational setting and Dourish argues that
this strategy should inform the application functionality and usage [17, 18].
Lorenzi et al. describe how an implementation strategy needs to cover financial,
training and project management resources next to a change management plan
[19]. Ash et al. identify usability, order sets, training and support, and time as
CPOE implementation issues [13]. Zmud identifies the concept of infusion,
which looks at the sophistication of use of an innovation [20]. Furthermore
Lauer et al. describe how implementation strategy encompasses the establish-
ment of a project organization, the phasing of the implementation and the
training of the users [21]. Combining these insights lead the authors to identi-
fy ten aspects that characterize a CPOE implementation strategy. The ten
aspects are listed and explained in table 1.
3. RESEARCH METHODS
3.1 Selection of cases
The comparison is based on hospital cases in the Netherlands and the USA (see
table 2). In the Netherlands the cases comprise two hospitals that have been
studied by the first and last author from 1997 to 2003. The third case is an aca-
demic medical center that implemented a computerized medication order entry
system in the period from 1994 to 2002. The first hospital was Radboud
University Medical Center (Radboud) in Nijmegen, which has used the
TDS/Eclipsys 7000 system since 1997. It is an academic teaching hospital with
953 beds affiliated with Radboud University Nijmegen. It experienced a diffi-
61
A comparison of order entry part 1
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 61
Understanding implementation
62
Table 1 - Aspects of CPOE implementation grouped into three themes
Theme
Context
Context
Implementation strategy
Implementation strategy
Implementation strategy
Implementation strategy
Implementation strategy
(Clinical) impact
(Clinical) impact
(Clinical) impact
Physician involvement
Description
This refers to the characteristics of the organiza-
tion—teaching or non-teaching—and the goals in
patient care
This refers to the history of installed information
technology and types of application software (ven-
dor, custom development)
This refers to the nature of the project organization,
lines of authority, responsibilities and (physician)
leadership issues
This refers to the time needed to plan for the sys-
tem and implement the system up to the moment of
complete or partial activation
This refers to the training methods for users applied
during implementation
This theme refers to what hardware—PC’s, printers,
network, etc.—and how it is rolled out
This refers to how CPOE is activated, for example,
by making it operational in all units at one time or
gradually, care unit by care unit
This covers the properties of the CPOE system
implemented; for example, does it have the capabili-
ty of creating order sets, or does it have decision
support to monitor orders entered
This refers to the occurrences of setbacks during
implementation and how they are dealt with
This refers to the time it takes that the full potential
of the innovation becomes embedded in medical
work systems [20]. This percentage can vary from
0% (no use) to 100% (use of full potential)
This theme, which is addressed in the companion
article, refers to issues of appropriation of CPOE by
physicians, changing medical work practices and
models of care and changing organizational contexts
Aspects
Organizational setting
and goals 
Technology history
Project organization and
committee structure
Planning and lead time
Training
Hardware rollout 
System activation
Clinical contents
Setbacks
Infusion time
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cult implementation and the physician order entry functionality has never been
activated. The second institution is Atrium Medical Center (Atrium) in
Heerlen, a 1230 bed regional teaching hospital. It has also implemented the
TDS/Eclipsys 7000 system. The third institution is Academic Medical Center
(AMC) of the University of Amsterdam, a 1002 bed academic teaching hospital.
It has implemented Torex-Hiscom (now iSoft) Medicator, a computerized med-
ication order entry system. Medicator is now being implemented in other Dutch
hospitals, which are, amongst others, Leiden University Medical Center and
Erasmus University Medical Center in Rotterdam. The selected cases are repre-
sentative for the current situation of CPOE implementation in the Netherlands.
The American hospitals have been selected from cases studied by the third
author’s research team from 1998 until 2001. The first case was the University
of Virginia Medical Center (UVMC), which has used the TDS/Eclipsys 7000
system since 1989. It is a state institution that comprises a 591-bed hospital and
a network of ambulatory services. It experienced a difficult implementation that
has been reported in a landmark study that described how the introduction of
CPOE impacted organizational culture and behavior and medical education
[22, 23]. The second institution is the Veterans Affairs (VA) Puget Sound
Health Care System (VAPS), with campuses in Seattle and American Lake com-
prising a 347 acute bed hospital and a 142-bed nursing home. CPOE has been
implemented as part of the VA’s Computerized Patient Record System (CPRS).
The Seattle campus is one of five teaching hospitals of the University of
Washington. The third institution is El Camino Hospital (El Camino), a 395-
bed hospital. The hospital has implemented the TDS/Eclipsys 7000 system,
which has been in use since 1971. Its implementation and use has been well
documented, see for example [24-26].
3.2 Data collection methods
The data in this study included the case study interviews with key leaders, project lead-
ers, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, other health professionals and technical experts from
all organizations. The methods of obtaining the data for the case studies are described in
more detail in Aarts and Ash et al [6, 13, 27]. Furthermore, interviews were held with
two pharmacists who were co-responsible for the introduction of Medicator in the
Academic Medical Center of the University of Amsterdam. Currently the pharmacists
hold respectively positions as head of clinical pharmacy and project leader for the imple-
mentation of Medicator at Erasmus University Medical Center. In addition, all published
papers and documents pertaining to the hospital cases have been included in this study. 
The interviews were analyzed using Atlas.ti,
1
a computer application for qualitative text
analysis. The ten aspects listed above were used as units of analysis.
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4. RESULTS
There is a large gap between wish and reality when it comes to CPOE. Several
studies have shown that in the US no more than 10% of acute care hospitals
have implemented CPOE [2]. The situation in the Netherlands is comparable.
The number of hospitals in the Netherlands that have implemented CPOE is
also very low. Out of a 100 acute care hospitals probably no more than five have
implemented order entry systems of which three are reported in this study.
However, a number of hospitals have announced to introduce some form of
order entry systems. The aspects have been clustered in three overarching
themes: context, implementation strategy and (clinical) impact. See table 1 for
the grouping of the units.
5. CONTEXT
5.1 Hospital characteristics
Three of the six hospitals are academic teaching hospitals, where students and
house staff are being trained. Both in Dutch and American hospitals medical
students do not write orders, but house staff take a major responsibility for writ-
64
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Table 2 - Description of cases
Hospital
Location of Hospital
Acute beds
Annual admissions
Annual outpatient visits
Full Time Employees
Attending Physicians
House Staff
Clinical Service Profile
CPOE system
Radboud
Nijmegen 
953
24,494
381,075
5,902
335
321
Academic 
tertiary
Eclipsys
E7000 
Atrium
Heerlen
1,230
27,928
432,119
2,007
188
80
Tertiary
Eclipsys
E7000 
AMC
Amsterdam
1,002
23,642
332,394
5,335*
473
335
Academic
tertiary
iSoft
Medicator
UVMC
Charlottesville,
VA
547 
29,207
621,993#
5,290
687 
687
Academic 
tertiary
Eclipsys
E7000 
El Camino
Mountain View,
CA
395
20,846
553,430
2,000†
600‡
- 
Tertiary
Eclipsys
E7000
VAPS
Seattle and 
Tacoma, WA
315
11,924
482,701
2,643
186
147
Tertiary - 
adults
CPRS 
# These include home health visits.
* Approximate value.
† Approximate value.
‡ Approximate value. The figure refers to both medical group physicians on medical staff as hospitalists.
The medical group physicians are not employed by the hospital.
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ing orders supervised by attending physicians. VAPS serves a particular group of
patients—retired military personnel and their family members—and is affiliat-
ed with the University of Washington Health System and in this respect will be
considered as an academic teaching hospital. As a major regional hospital
Atrium trains both medical students and house staff as part of an agreement
with Maastricht University and the Royal Dutch Medical Association medical
specialist training supervisory committees. El Camino has no medical teaching
responsibility. The academic teaching hospitals including VAPS employ their
physicians. Atrium and El Camino do not employ their physicians, but have
contractual agreements with them to provide for medical care. Radboud, AMC
and Atrium in the Netherlands and the academic teaching hospitals in the
United States are very similar in operation. They all are tertiary care referral cen-
ters where physicians provide for complex medical care on a 24/7 scheme. El
Camino physicians may see and treat their patients in their private community
offices and when necessary continue to treat them in the hospital. They divide
their time between their private offices and the hospital. Increasingly commu-
nity hospitals and medical groups hire hospitalists—primary care physicians or
internists—to provide for around the clock basic medical care in the hospital.
5.2 CPOE systems
The CPOE systems in all six hospitals are commercially, or in the case of VAPS
freely, available products. The development history is however quite different.
El Camino was the first hospital to implement CPOE; the system was devel-
oped in close collaboration with Lockheed and later Technicon Data Systems
and became operational in 1974. The incentive at the time was to save costs and
the agreement between El Camino and Technicon stipulated that the company
would take the risk of financial losses and pass on the savings to the hospital.
The history has been well documented by Hodge and Collen [24, 26]. The
same TDS system has been implemented in Virginia, Radboud and Atrium in
the period from 1985 to 1997. The need of clinical efficiency—by improved
legibility and completeness of orders—was the main reason for these hospitals
to acquire the system. The VAPS CPOE system is an integrated part of a nation-
wide implementation of CPRS in the Veterans Affairs medical centers [28].
VAPS was a beta test site for the CPRS functionality. The project started early
1997 and CPRS became operational in December 1998. The main reason for
implementing CPRS was again the need to improve clinical efficiency and to
increase the quality of care. In AMC clinical pharmacists initiated the imple-
mentation of Medicator. The illegibility and incompleteness of written drug
prescriptions and the use of non-conclusive short-names for drugs were seen to
contribute to logistical problems, which could result in patients receiving inad-
equate pharmacotherapy [5]. Medicator was developed in 1994 as part of the
hospital information system and piloted in three clinical departments. As a
65
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result of the positive outcomes of the pilots and the support of residents the hos-
pital board authorized in 1996 the implementation of a Windows emulation of
the application and it became operational hospital wide in 2001.
5.2.1 Implementation strategy
An IT-implementation strategy may be described as establishing a series of activ-
ities and an organizational structure to arrive at an operational system that
serves organizational purposes. It contains both technical aspects such as the
rollout of hardware and organizational aspects such as the training of prospec-
tive users and change of work procedures. Usually some organizational structure
with a steering or oversight group, project leaders and members and user com-
mittees is set up.
5.3 Project organization
All hospitals had a project structure in place. In the Dutch hospitals projects
tended to be of a temporary nature, the tasks of maintaining, updating and
training being absorbed into existing structures such as an IT-department as
soon as the implementation was considered finished, while the American hos-
pitals established more permanent structures by creating a physician lead posi-
tion and physician committees for the development and implementation of
clinical content, guidelines and protocols. The latter approach indicates the
importance attached by the American hospitals to clinical use of CPOE. The
formal decision-making authority rests with the steering committee or chief
hospital executive. However, without an appropriate network of support they
are not able to function. The Dutch project structures tended more to make
decisions by negotiating and consensus building; the American project
approach emphasized leadership. VAPS was for example very intent in creating
a physician leadership role; this would at the one hand facilitate acceptance of
the CPRS by physicians because the physician leader would be considered as
one of their peers and at the other hand he would be seen as the person with
decision authority. The Radboud project team had to negotiate each decision
with various stakeholders and could not even be sure whether decisions would
be implemented. Similar findings were reported in Atrium. In the AMC the
hospital board had to put in its full weight to have the decision to implement
CPOE accepted, but not after having ascertained the support of the residents.
5.4 Lead time
Implementation lead time is defined as the duration of the introduction of
CPOE from the first time that the need for CPOE is identified until the
moment that the system is available for use throughout the hospital. In every
66
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case the decisive moments could not be easily identified, but from the inter-
views and published papers it became clear that an implementation lead time of
at least five years is common. Only VAPS reported a much shorter time of two
years, from 1997 to 1999, but it should be noted that the predecessor of CPRS
with limited order entry capability was already implemented in 1995. If that
fact is taken into account then the implementation lead time comes close to the
figure of the other hospitals. The implementation lead times of the six hospitals
are listed in table 3.
5.5 Training
Training was highly individualized in all hospitals. During the implementation
phase small teams would go out and train the prospective users. Formal train-
ing was required before the prospective user was authorized to use the system
and a password could be issued. The hospitals that implemented the E7000 sys-
tem used a Computer Based Training (CBT) application provided by the ven-
dor and adapted for local use. A classroom with terminals allowed for walk-in
CBT. In VAPS and AMC small groups would go to the clinical departments
and train the physicians and other intended users of the system. All hospitals
reported problems of physicians finding time to complete a training session.
After the implementation of CPOE was completed VAPS and UVMC started
training classes on a regular basis for each new groups of residents and they also
relied on senior residents instructing juniors how to use the system. VAPS made
a strong effort to have help readily available under the slogan ‘help-at-the-
elbow.’ AMC also established classes for group training. In El Camino nurses
were and are still instrumental in training physicians.
5.6 Technical infrastructure
The CPOE systems in the hospitals run on mainframes and client/server con-
figurations. El Camino and UVMC run E7000 on a remote IBM mainframe.
Radboud has installed E7000 on its own IBM mainframe and Atrium uses also
the same computer. In the early stages users connected to the system through
dumb character based terminals. There was no need to use the keyboard; all data
67
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Table 3 - CPOE implementation lead time
Lead time
Start CPOE project
End CPOE project
Duration
Radboud
1988
2000
12 years
Atrium
1990
1997
7 years
AMC
1994
2001
6 years 
UVMC
1982
1992
10 years 
El Camin
1969
1974
5 years
VAPS
1995
1998
3 years 
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could be entered and retrieved with the help of a light pen. Later on the termi-
nals were replaced with personal computers on which the E7000 system was
emulated. The principle of not interacting with the keyboard was maintained.
In the VAPS the CPRS runs on a local client/server configuration and the users
use standard Windows screens to interact with the system. One of the project
members at VAPS reported how in the fashion of a production line PC’s were
rolled out in the hospital. Similarly, in AMC Medicator as part of the hospital
information system runs on client/server configuration and the interface is emu-
lated on PC’s in a Windows screen. Apart from occasional mishaps such as mis-
placed printers or insufficient network wiring none of the hospitals reported
serious problems with hardware rollout.
5.7 System activation
Activation refers to the moment that a new system goes live. Except for
Radboud and VAPS all hospitals chose for a step-by-step activation of the
CPOE functionality. The main reason was to allow the users to get accustomed
to the system, to identify possible software problems and improve procedure for
hospital wide implementation. Radboud prepared the transfer of all patient data
from the old system to the new system and wanted to avoid the use of old and
new system simultaneously and thus insure that patient data integrity would
not be compromised by sitting in different systems. Therefore a large number
of prospective clerical users were trained prior to the ‘big bang.’ A similar
approach was planned when the order entry functionality would be activated.
VAPS followed an “aggressive” policy to activate CPRS at one time in which a
major care setting would start to use the system after having a stable network
infrastructure and workstations installed and testing the application software for
more than one year [28]. The transition was helped from day one by the 24-
hour availability of CACS who offered help even in the ‘dead’ hours of the
night. The policy was to avoid problems of patients transferring from a CPRS
to a non-CPRS environment.
5.7.1 (Clinical) impact
Whether intended or unforeseen, implementing new information systems will
impact users and their work practices. A more detailed account of how physi-
cians were involved and how they were impacted is presented in the companion
article.
In CPOE studies medication ordering is highly profiled, because of its signifi-
cance for medical care and because it is the single most important source of
medical errors. Of course it encompasses other diagnostic and therapeutic
orders. An overview of computerized ordering in the six hospitals is listed in
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table 4. In Dutch hospitals drug order entry is gradually expanded to ambula-
tory clinics; a major problem is the fact that patients there do not fill their pre-
scriptions in hospital pharmacies but in public pharmacies, which do not nec-
essarily hold the same stock of drugs. 
5.8 Order sets
Personal and group order sets form part of the CPOE implementations in the
American hospitals. The order sets result from a desire to group orders for des-
ignated groups of patients. Personal order sets belong to an individual physician
to address the needs of certain type of patients that he sees frequently. Group or
departmental order sets reflect a common understanding or agreement con-
cerning what orders should be initiated for particular groups of diseased
patients. The order sets were mainly physician driven. They had been developed
to make the ordering process more efficient. In the E7000 system the number
of screens to be paged was reduced to save the physician time. This became for
example a critical issue in the University of Virginia Medical Center after the
residents protested that they had to spend too much time on entering orders
[22]. A UVMC surgeon summarized how he addressed the problem of group-
ing orders: “We tried to make it even better than that, so I’m a surgeon, if I do
a gall bladder operation, it’s fairly standard in terms of what I want for my
patient and so we had constructed an order set for a patient that was gonna have
a gall bladder removed, they’d come in the hospital and they had a certain stan-
dard set of orders that, dose of antibiotics was already written and ordered so
you had to no clicking, you just clicked on it to check it basically and so now
you could go down a check list. So it had vital signs all written out, it had admit,
it had, you know, NG tube orders, it had your drugs, it had NTO, it had one
that you could just click the things you wanted, and scroll the screens as if you
were going through a preprinted page of orders. And that became the most effi-
cient thing, at least for us.” Creating personal order sets is the first step of group-
ing orders. An El Camino nurse described how a personal order set is a limited
set of orders for a small type of procedure: “An example would be a bowel prep.
We have a patient, and he’s going to come in and he’s going to have a lower ante-
rior resection tomorrow. And it’s not really a clinical pathway. To do a bowel
prep you don’t really need a clinical pathway. But one of the surgeons has a per-
sonal order set for his standard bowel prep.” Clinical pathways are the next step
in the grouping of orders. They entail for a given disease group a whole set of
evidence based diagnostic and therapeutic procedures and that are implement-
ed department- or hospital-wide. A clinical pathway implies the collaboration
of different medical specialties and other health care professionals. El Camino
had implemented clinical pathways to a greater extent than the other American
sites. The cost benefits and efficiency perspective dominated this move. In
AMC the pharmacists took a lead in developing departmental order sets, which
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include both simple and complex medication protocols. This reflects the fact
that in the Netherlands pharmacists are co-responsible for the quality of pre-
scribing. Medicator does not allow for the development of personal order sets.
Atrium did not implement personal and departmental order sets. Nurses page a
number of screens in a fixed sequence for each order that they enter.
5.9 Decision support
Decision support is seen as an intrinsic part of CPOE and indispensable for
individualized care [29]. However, decision support should not be identified
with the presence of an active intelligent agent that takes context into account.
As part of a CPOE system it helps the physician to make decisions by con-
straining choice in the form of tables of allowed drugs or in the form of rules
about drug prescription such as dosages, drug-drug interactions and possible
adverse drug events, etc. In all hospitals decision support is part of the CPOE
system. VAPS seems to have the most advanced application of decision support
of the hospitals in this comparison. The decision capabilities are listed in table 5.
5.10 Setbacks
When complex information systems are implemented, inevitably setbacks
occur. Setbacks may delay the implementation process or even halt them. All
hospitals in this comparison reported setbacks. After an initial successful imple-
mentation El Camino experienced around 1975 strong physician opposition.
When more orders were coded into the CPOE system, physicians complained
that they were spending too much time at the terminal. Apparently the prob-
lem was resolved after more training was offered and when it was made clear
that the system wasn’t going away. At VAPS an earlier attempt to implement
CPOE was aborted, again because of a time issue compounded by the com-
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Table 4 - Computerized ordering (after [14])
Computerized ordering
Inpatient
Medications and other therapeutics
Diagnostic tests
Patient care and therapy
Consults and referrals
Ambulatory
Medications and other therapeutics
Diagnostic tests
Patient care and therapy
Consults and referrals
Radboud
-
-
-
+
-
-
-
+
Atrium
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
AMC
+
-
-
-
+
-
-
-
UVMC
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
El Camino
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
VAPS
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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plexity of the software. The opposition of house staff to mandatory CPOE at
UVMC has been widely cited; Massaro found four factors that contributed to
the organizational stress: the change of the established workflow, the literal
interpretation of rules by the CPOE system and, ambiguity of governance poli-
cies and a lack of understanding within the physician community of the strate-
gic value of the system [22]. Ultimately the solution was the introduction of
departmental and personal order sets, which allowed physicians to group orders
and made the ordering process more effective than the handwriting of single
orders [23]. Setbacks were also reported in Dutch hospitals. AMC reported a
delay in the implementation process because of lack of personnel. Atrium and
Radboud reported more severe setbacks. Physicians in Atrium opposed the
introduction of CPOE arguing that it was not their job to do clerical tasks. The
board of directors allowed them to stay out of the loop; nursing and clerical staff
appropriated the system [30]. Radboud experienced a major setback when
physician pressure forced it to abort the implementation of the CPOE func-
tionality of the E7000 system [6]. It was the accumulation of a series of mishaps
where it turned out that contrary to expectations the use of the system was very
time consuming. The four factors identified by Massaro had a familiar ring in
this case too.
71
A comparison of order entry part 1
Table 5 - Decision support for computerized ordering of medications (after [14])
Type of decision support
Drug name checking
Default administration route
Listing by formulary
Patient drug allergies 
(simple – specific drugs)
Patient drug allergies 
(advanced – drug families)
Protocol or diagnosis based therapy
Duplicate order checking
Drug – drug interactions
Substitute therapy suggestion
Subsequent or corollary orders
Default doses
Relevant information display
Drug cost display
Guided dosing calculation
Time based checks to ensure 
optimum timing and duration
Administration route change
Drug – laboratory interactions
Radboud
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Atrium
+
+
+
+
+
-
+
+
-
-
+
-
-
+
-
+
-
AMC
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
-
+
+
-
-
+
+
-
UVMC
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
+
+
-
+
+
+
+
-
El Camino
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
+
+
-
+
+
+
+
-
VAPS
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
+
+
-
-
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5.11 Infusion
With any implementation it is hoped that after some time all intended users
would use the system. How it is achieved is dependent on different factors,
which include the way the implementation is planned, training and the accept-
ance by the users. The American hospitals and AMC all achieved close to 100%
physician usage after a few years. Except for VAPS the hospitals reported infu-
sion times of at least three years. VAPS managed to achieve close to 100% usage
within one year. Atrium is a case in point that all orders are electronically
entered, but that there is no physician usage. Depending on the perspective cho-
sen one may observe 100% infusion from a systems perspective and 0% infu-
sion from a licensed professional perspective. This issue will be assessed further
in the companion paper. Radboud did not at all achieve CPOE functionality,
so infusion is 0%.
6. DISCUSSION
One is struck by the similarities of the CPOE system implementation trajecto-
ries in both Dutch and American hospitals. Technology and software issues of
CPOE in hospitals showing up in the comparison have already been discussed
elsewhere. This discussion will focus more on the socio-organizational issues of
implementing CPOE. 
The reported reasons for each of the hospitals to implement CPOE were based
on cost-savings and improving efficiency of medical ordering by reducing illeg-
ibility and increasing completeness. It was only later, after the publicity around
the publication of the IOM reports ‘To err is human’ and ‘Crossing the quality
chasm’ that issues of safe drug prescribing and patient safety became dominant
in the discourse to implement CPOE. The Dutch Government Health
Inspectorate was similarly able to bring the same issues to the forefront and ini-
tiate initiatives that would improve patient safety such as mandatory reporting
on quality indicators. Despite the fact that the involvement of physicians is cru-
cial for the successful use of CPOE systems, the implementation seems to be a
mainly managerial driven effort with the exception of AMC. In AMC pharma-
cy was the driving force for the development and implementation of Medicator.
Their problem was drug prescribing and Medicator was specifically designed to
support just that and geared towards the needs of the hospital pharmacy.
The project structures in Dutch and American hospitals tend to be different.
Dutch projects tend to be based on the equity of its members and decision mak-
ing by consensus, whereas American project structures tend to emphasize lead-
ership, whether it is in the person of a chief hospital executive in the lead
(UVMC and El Camino) or a physician (VAPS). Dutch project leaders are more
dependent on negotiating and compromising, a lack of which can compromise
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a project, as was the case in Radboud where no agreement with medical staff
could be reached to implement CPOE functionality. American leadership tends
to articulate goals more clearly and emphasize change management [31]. Those
who oppose change must be identified and the right measures have to be taken
in order to overcome resistance. In such a view it is necessary to know the attrib-
utes that characterize resistance and to address each of them [32]. The imple-
mentation of CPRS in VAPS is a good example of the emphasis on successful
leadership [33]. The leader was visible, goal oriented, very knowledgeable about
the subject matter, encouraged clinicians and as a practicing physician, accept-
ed by his peers. However, a closer look at the cases reveals that the differences
were not so absolute. For example, when the implementation of CPOE seemed
to founder in the UVMC, negotiations with house staff representatives became
necessary. In AMC the hospital board backed the policy of the hospital phar-
macy to allow only electronic drug prescribing and the physicians complied.
Training is seen as key factor for successful implementation of an information
system. Contents and timing are important. Wrong timing can delay the acti-
vation of a system, which happened in Radboud. But often implementers do
not pay sufficient attention to training needs of users when the system is oper-
ational. Often users are then confronted with problems of use that requires at
least support and more often further instruction. The implementation of a hos-
pital information system in the University of Geneva Cantonal Hospital in the
1970s and 80s was so successful because after the system became active instruc-
tors would remain available 24 hours per day [34]. When a user would
encounter a problem, he or she could pick up the phone next to the terminal
and get support from an instructor who could see on his screen what the user
was trying to do. Only at VAPS health professionals were trained as Clinical
Application Coordinators to provide “extremely thorough” customer support,
including training [33]. The fact that CPRS was up and running within two
years may be attributed to that fact.
The account of activation of the system in the hospitals seems to posit a ‘big
bang’ approach against a step-by-step approach. However, the dichotomy is not
as black-and-white as the terms suggest. In Radboud the CPOE system was acti-
vated hospital-wide, but the functionality was only limited. The planning fore-
saw that first radiology ordering would be activated, then lab ordering and final-
ly medication ordering. Similarly AMC activated full functionality of Medicator
department-wise. Step-by-step implementation can thus be defined as activat-
ing a limited functionality hospital-wide or a full functionality per clinical
department.
The CPOE implementation lead times for all hospitals were, except for VAPS,
a minimal of five years. The lead times were not reported as such but could be
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construed from the interviews and the papers that describe the introduction of
CPOE. VAPS reported an implementation lead time for CPRS of three years,
but it must be noted that the implementation of an earlier version of a VA com-
puterized order entry system failed. If that is taken into account, then the lead
time comes close to that of the other hospitals. Such long lead times may be
contradictory to the dictum of dynamic change in health care, which implies
that organizations are in a constant flux. In such view long implementation lead
times are seen as detrimental to respond to change. It lends however support to
the suggestion by Aarts et al. that such long lead times, or organizational
acclimatization periods, are necessary for the mutual learning process to devel-
op and implement information systems [6]. If long lead times are part and par-
cel of an implementation process, then it must be accepted that long-term plan-
ning can be difficult. Rather, implementation trajectories change over time and
are inherently unpredictable [35].
7. CONCLUSION
The implementation strategies of three Dutch and three American hospitals
have been compared. The implementation strategies do not differ substantially.
All hospitals emphasized that the need to save costs and increase efficiency of
health care delivery were the main reasons to introduce CPOE. In the last five
years patient safety has become an important reason to implement CPOE, but
emphasis remains on cost savings. A report on the adoption rates of CPOE in
Massachusetts still phrases the benefits of CPOE in terms of costs benefits and
asks the rhetorical question [36]: “So if a $210 million investment can generate
on-going savings of $275 million, not to mention significantly improve patient
safety and care, what’s keeping that investment from happening?” Discourse
suggests that project organization in American hospitals tend to be more cen-
tered on leadership, while in Dutch hospitals it is centered on negotiation and
compromise between stakeholders. However, the difference between the two is
more characterized as a sliding scale. No hospital questions the need of adequate
training, but the example of VAPS shows how training combined with user sup-
port around the clock led to a successful implementation. The implementation
lead time of CPOE systems on average is a minimum of five years if setbacks
are taken into account. This lends credibility to the suggestion that long times
are necessary for the mutual learning process of developing and implementing
systems.
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CHAPTER 5
A COMPARISON OF HOSPITAL-BASED COMPUTERIZED PHYSICIAN
ORDER ENTRY IN THE NETHERLANDS AND USA,
PART 2: PHYSICIAN INVOLVEMENT
Jos Aarts , Dean F Sittig , Joan S Ash , Marc Berg
ABSTRACT
Objective
To compare physician involvement in the implementation of hospital-based
computerized physician order entry systems in the Netherlands and USA.
Design
Analysis of case studies of computerized physician order entry (CPOE) imple-
mentation in Dutch and American hospitals.
Measurements
Interview transcripts, implementation documents and published documents
concerning the implementation of CPOE systems in three Dutch and three
American hospitals were analyzed with regard to the involvement of physicians.
Conclusions
CPOE implementation initially does not meet the perceived needs of physi-
cians. However, once physicians appropriate CPOE as part of their work prac-
tices they are able to add sophistication in the form of departmental order sets.
Furthermore as socialization process medical education can help adopt CPOE.
Submitted for publication.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The involvement of physicians is a very problematic aspect of the implementa-
tion of computerized order entry (CPOE) systems. A survey in 1998 by Ash et
al. has shown that physician use of CPOE in many hospitals that have imple-
mented CPOE does not exceed 50% [1]. Later surveys do not show a substan-
tial change [2, 3]. In a survey Poon et al. found that management officials cited
costs and physicians resistance as the most significant barriers to implementing
CPOE systems [4]. In their study Poon et al. cite reasons like the superior speed
of completing a paper-based order from the physician’s perspective and a low
computer literacy level. Scholars have sought to understand how physicians
were involved in information technology and to identify the barriers that might
prevent them from adopting IT in their work practices. For example, Massaro
found in his study of CPOE implementation in the University of Virginia
Medical Center that physicians did not like the amount of time they had to
spend entering orders in a computer system [5]. In a review of computerized
prescribing Schiff and Rucker suggest that physicians do not value the benefits
because they are too busy and “microfocused” to appreciate the shortcomings of
paper-based prescribing practices [6]. Silverstein regrets the poverty of physician
leadership but emphasizes that IT personnel needs to have a deep understand-
ing of medical work practices [7]. He suggests that physicians are less inclined
to go along with top-down IT implementation methodologies but favor a par-
ticipatory approach to application development as described by Sjöberg and
Timpka [8]. In a wider context Blendon et al. found that physicians did not
have the sense of urgency about medical errors and Rosen et al found that they
are skeptical about the interventions such as CPOE to address them [9, 10]. At
the very least critical remarks are placed about the involvement of physicians in
introduction of new information technologies in health care, at most the under-
standing of the involvement is still very fragmentary.
The purpose of the study presented in this paper is to understand how physi-
cians are involved in CPOE by making a comparison of physician involvement
in CPOE implementations in three hospitals in the Netherlands and three hos-
pitals in the USA. Specifically three questions are addressed. How are the physi-
cians engaged in the implementation of CPOE? How do they appropriate
CPOE? How does CPOE impact medical work practices? The concept of
appropriation refers to the process by which people adopt and adapt technolo-
gies, fitting them in their working practices [11]. 
2. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the different outcomes of CPOE implementation in two
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different hospitals Aarts and Berg developed a model that puts medical work at
its core and argued that in order to implement CPOE successfully changing
medical work practices need to have a support base [12]. This requires a thor-
ough understanding of medical work and how the introduction of new infor-
mation technologies might change it. Massaro identified the strict, literal inter-
pretation of rules by the computer as one of the factors that contributed to the
organizational stress that accompanied the implementation of CPOE [5]. In
their study of ordering medication before and after implementation of a CPOE
system Goorman and Berg noted that the system is based on an “abstract con-
ception in which medication is always ordered and prescribed by a doctor, who
gives the order to the nurse, who in turn, gives the medication to the patient
[13].” They further note that: “this standard model does not reckon with the
fact that in daily practice there are many practical and good reasons for nurses
to order medication.” In their study of CPOE systems Gorman, Lavelle and Ash
conclude that the underlying model seems to be based on a rather simplistic,
linear step-by-step sequence for processing orders, that does not reflect the col-
laborative nature of medical ordering [14]. These observations about the inter-
action of CPOE systems with medical work suggest that it might too simplistic
to explain physician resistance in terms of their behavior. This is not to say that
introducing IT will not change or should not change medical work practices.
Groth argues that IT should be introduced with the objective to make (medical)
work better, especially in terms of coordinating tasks [15]. The companion
paper suggests that CPOE implementations tend to be managerial-driven with-
out much understanding of the complex nature of medical work. Therefore
medical work is taken as a focal point in the comparative analysis of physician
involvement of CPOE implementation. More specifically, in trying to answer
the research questions addressed in this paper the comparison tries to identify
how medical ordering was taking place before CPOE, how and what type of
physicians were engaged in the implementation and use of CPOE, how they
appropriated computerized order entry and what impact was reported on work-
flow and behavior.
3. RESEARCH METHODS
3.1 Selection of cases
The comparison is based on hospital cases in the Netherlands and the USA. The
selection of the cases is described in detail in the companion paper. The hospi-
tals and their systems are listed in table 1. Atrium Medical Center (Atrium) in
the Netherlands, El Camino Hospital (El Camino), the University of Virginia
Medical Center (UVMC) and the Veterans Affairs Puget Sound Health Care
Systems (VAPS) in the United Sates have implemented a fully functional CPOE
system. The Academic Medical Center of the University of Amsterdam (AMC)
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has implemented a medication CPOE system and in Radboud University
Medical Center (Radboud) the implementation of the CPOE functionality
failed. Fuller details about the hospitals can be found in the companion paper.
3.2 Data collection methods
The data in this study included the case study interviews with key leaders, proj-
ect leaders, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, other health professionals and tech-
nical experts and were conducted from earlier published research by Goorman
and Berg, Ash et al, and Aarts et al [13, 16-18]. Additional interviews were held
with two pharmacists involved in the implementation of the medication CPOE
system in the Academic Medical Center of the University of Amsterdam
(AMC). In addition, all published papers and documents pertaining to the hos-
pital cases were included in this study [5, 19-25].
The interviews were analyzed using Atlas.ti,
1
a computer application for quali-
tative text analysis. The above-mentioned themes—medical ordering prior to
CPOE, engagement of physicians, appropriation and impact—were used as
units of analysis.
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Table 1 - Hospitals and their CPOE systems
Hospital
Location of Hospital
Acute beds
Annual admissions
Annual outpatient visits
Full Time Employees
Attending Physicians
House Staff
Clinical Service Profile
CPOE system
Radboud
Nijmegen 
953
24,494
381,075
5,902
335
321
Academic 
tertiary
Eclipsys
E7000 
Atrium
Heerlen
1,230
27,928
432,119
2,007
188
80
Tertiary
Eclipsys
E7000 
AMC
Amsterdam
1,002
23,642
332,394
5,335*
473
335
Academic
tertiary
iSoft
Medicator
UVMC
Charlottesville,
VA
547 
29,207
621,993#
5,290
687 
687
Academic 
tertiary
Eclipsys
E7000 
El Camino
Mountain View,
CA
395
20,846
553,430
2,000†
600‡
- 
Tertiary
Eclipsys
E7000
VAPS
Seattle and 
Tacoma, WA
315
11,924
482,701
2,643
186
147
Tertiary - 
adults
CPRS 
# These include home health visits.
* Approximate value.
† Approximate value.
‡ Approximate value. The figure refers to both medical group physicians on medical staff as
hospitalists. The medical group physicians are not employed by the hospital.
1
See http://www.atlasti.de
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Order entry prior to CPOE
The interviews were conducted in the period from 1997 to 2004. The descrip-
tion of the process of medical ordering prior to CPOE is therefore to a large
extent based on memory of the interviewed persons and earlier published
papers. At El Camino Hospital little is known about medical ordering before
CPOE, which has been in place since 1975. However, because El Camino was
a community hospital nurses played an important role in patient care. The
physicians would usually see patients in their private offices and only come to
the hospital for their hospitalized patients. One of the nurses noted: “I think
that El Camino has had a long history of a very close working relationship
between the nurses and the physicians. The physicians, I think, have high regard
for the nurses here …” The nurses then would ensure the continuity of care in
the hospital since they are around 24 hours a day, 7 days per week. This situa-
tion allowed the nurses much leeway to manage patient care and it might
explain why nurses still took verbal and telephone orders from physicians and
entered them in the system. It is therefore very likely that before the imple-
mentation of the CPOE system verbal and telephone orders were quite com-
mon. At the University of Virginia Medical Center according to Massaro prior
to CPOE an order was written in the chart on the patient’s unit and the charge
nurse would take responsibility for the routing of the order to the bedside nurse
and the pharmacy. The pharmacy would complete the order, but if any part of
it was unclear the ordering physician would be paged and clarification would be
obtained by telephone [5]. Similarly in VAPS physicians would write orders and
interact with nurses. In Atrium the physicians were used to working with a
paper based medication order system, which is easy to handle. In many cases
they would rely on experienced nurses who would give patients medication
when they were not around. There was even a repertoire of drugs—especially
pain-relieving drugs—that was informally agreed to be controlled by experi-
enced nurses [13]. A similar situation existed in Radboud, but in an academic
medical center drug prescribing and administration, especially for the numer-
ous clinical research programs were much more protocollized. Similar ways of
working were reported in AMC.
4.2 Physician involvement in CPOE implementation
As reported in the companion article none of the CPOE implementations were
physician driven. In the AMC the implementation of Medicator came closest to
addressing a clinical need, because hospital pharmacists took the view that they
could not take co-responsibility for medication orders unless the orders were
correct and complete and thought that a computerized drug order system could
help them. However, from early on physicians were engaged in the implemen-
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tation process of CPOE systems. In his account of the El Camino CPOE sys-
tem implementation in the 70’s Hodge quoted newspaper headlines informing
how the physicians responded to the new system [20]. The new system was
clearly not perceived as solving problems in medical work practices. 
Massaro characterizes aptly how the physicians were engaged in committees that
were supposed to develop policies for the implementation of CPOE but actual-
ly were used for enforcing policies that were drafted at executive level [5]. Such
an approach did not help to engage physicians. The implementation of CPRS
in VAPS was part of a government decision to implement the system in all VA
medical centers. This was clearly a top-down decision. VAPS returned this deci-
sion into their favor by applying to be a beta test site. VAPS was granted that
position because it was a considered a large site that could provide valuable
input to other centers. After a failed implementation of a previous CPOE sys-
tem, VAPS appointed a physician leader with authority who would be able to
bring the physicians on board. He succeeded by emphasizing the clinical needs
of the physicians, involving them in its development and providing support by
clinicians who were trained as system developers and trainers. Though it was a
vendor system, it was seen as homegrown, a system that the physicians felt own-
ership of. The physician leader focused on residents, who took daily care of
patients, supervised by attendings. In the AMC pharmacists found three clini-
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Doctors look with ill favor at new computers
Physicians deeply split over “dream computer”
“Work-saving” computer enslaves hospital staff, doctors claim 
MDs at odds over hospital MIS
“Computer doesn’t help doctors or patients”
Hospital computer unimpressive
Figure 1 - Newspaper headlines about CPOE implementation in El Camino
Hospital, 1972 – 73 (Source: [20])
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cal departments willing to pilot Medicator. A breakthrough came when resi-
dents in the department of pediatric oncology found that the system was
extremely helpful in managing complex cancer medication trajectories.
Consequently they had pharmacy enter all their medication protocols in the sys-
tem. The residents convinced the board of directors of AMC to keep the system
and put in its full weight to implement Medicator hospital wide. In Atrium,
physicians stayed out of the loop despite the presence of a physician in the
CPOE implementation team. In Radboud staff physicians were involved in the
implementation of the CPOE system. A medical specialist was even made proj-
ect leader. Pilots were set up to test the order entry functionality and were pos-
itively valued by the participants. However, it was not sufficient to enroll the
support of the clinical staff as a whole, especially when the setbacks experienced
in the use of the clerical part of the system made them believe that using it
would cost them too much time [17].
4.3 Appropriation
Except for Radboud and Atrium physicians used CPOE systems to enter their
orders. A closer examination of physician order entry revealed that in UVMC,
VAPS and AMC residents entered orders and attendings did not. In these hos-
pitals entering orders electronically is seen as part of the skills of drug prescrib-
ing that residents have to acquire. Indeed, American teaching hospitals have
house staff training manuals that stipulate what, how and when house staff offi-
cers learn about drug prescribing including the use of computerized order entry.
The years of residency determine the complexity of the medications that they
are allowed to prescribe. In UVMC after the apogee of resistance the introduc-
tion of personalized and departmental order sets proved to be very effective
[21]. Residents were allowed to develop and enter personalized order sets on an
ad hoc basis, which saved them much time. Within two years there were over
2500 order sets. A resident-led oversight committee later reduced this unwieldy
number to a little over 500. Similarly, the development of order sets in VAPS
and electronic medication protocols in AMC were facilitated by clinician com-
mittees.
As mentioned before, in El Camino nurses played a crucial role in the physician
acceptance of CPOE. They trained them how to use it, and helped prepare
order sets and from the 1990’s clinical pathways that made the delivery of care
more efficient. This was not without self-interest. Because the physicians would
only come to the hospital for their hospitalized patients, it saved both the nurs-
es and physicians an enormous amount of time when it would already be known
what should be done. Clinical pathways were developed for a sizeable number
of health problems, and were implemented in the CPOE system. El Camino
physicians could enter orders from their private offices and care activities would
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already be on their way when they came to see their patients. Also nurses were
allowed to enter follow-up orders, including medication refills.
In Atrium physicians did not use CPOE and consequently no order sets were
developed. Nurses and secretaries as a proxy to the ordering physician would
enter each order for a patient separately.
4.4 Impact
Impact in a broader sense has been presented in the companion article. Taking
medical work as focus of analysis, physicians reported that CPOE affected espe-
cially their communication with nurses. Depending on the situation, a physi-
cian would collate the orders and enter them at once for all patients they had
seen or after each patient. During rounding a physician would write orders on
his notepad and after rounding enter them in the system. Or a physician would
enter immediately the orders in the system after having seen a patient. In the
hospitals networked PC’s could be found in physician offices, physician meet-
ing rooms and nurses’ stations. No PC’s were installed in patient rooms.
Physicians who were using CPOE and who had experience with paper-based
ordering reported that it impacted them and especially their relationship with
nurses. A physician at VAPS commented: “I think it actually probably does
interfere with communication – direct communication between physician and
nurse. Just because you don’t have to be next to the person or hand the order to
the nurse.” This would give the nurse the ability to comment on the order or
add insights. Also, she would immediately know what needed to be done in the
next few hours. This immediacy of contact would be lost and could not be eas-
ily compensated by electronic alerting systems that would inform the nurse
about standing orders. Also this impact on medical work practices did not go
unnoticed to nurses. A project pharmacists at VAPS observed: “Well, I know
that the nurses have complained, and still complain, that now that the physi-
cians don’t have to come to the ward to enter their orders and write notes, they
don’t see them there so they can’t ask that Oh-by-the-way question.” At UVMC
Massaro reported that introducing CPOE caused nursing personnel to be taken
out of the ordering loop and that their assistance was no longer available. 
Not always was CPOE seen as detrimental to communication. According to a
project nurse at El Camino the availability of all orders in the system allowed
the nurse to be better prepared to communicate with physicians when they were
rounding. According to another project nurse CPOE has caused everybody in
the hospital to be more interdependent: “It used to be the department could do
whatever it wanted and it didn’t have to impact anybody else. When the new
radiology system came in, that was a special radiology system and it was more
complex than the major hospital system, which is a generalist. The radiology
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system got picky about the orders so [CPOE] pathways had to change and the
doctors hated that they were being asked more questions. That means radiolo-
gy can’t just throw up the system, they have to explain it to all the doctors and
if the doctors don’t like it there’s a dialogue and they talk to one another.”
5. DISCUSSION
The introduction of CPOE did not meet perceived clinical needs of physicians.
They saw it as something that was imposed on them by hospital management.
Much effort had to be put in to enroll physicians in using CPOE. In two Dutch
hospitals it failed. Different strategies were employed to involve physicians. The
most important were leadership, training and user support. VAPS and AMC
made physician use mandatory. In AMC the pharmacists could monitor physi-
cian use through login audits and question them if irregularities were found. In
UVMC, VAPS and AMC house staff entered orders in the system. The attend-
ings did not. In Atrium and Radboud house staff did not use CPOE. The fact
that house staff are employed by the hospital cannot fully explain this situation.
An additional explanation can be offered by the concept of socialization.
Socialization concerns the processes by which physicians in training adopt from
their supervisors the attitudes and values that they consider inherent to the
medical profession [26]. If the attitude of the supervising specialist towards the
use of CPOE—and electronic patient records in general—is indifferent or even
negative, then it is less likely that a resident will develop a positive attitude. Both
in the United States and the Netherlands residents follow their supervisors in
their role as peers. In the Netherlands staff physicians in Radboud and Atrium
opposed the adoption of CPOE and the residents followed them in their atti-
tude. 
In El Camino it was different. The nurses played a key role in the adoption of
CPOE by physicians. At the one hand nurses trained physicians how to use
CPOE and developed order sets for them and at the other hand they enjoyed
more freedom to prepare and refill orders than would be the case at teaching
hospitals. It can be argued that here the nurses played to some extent the role of
residents. This may change because increasingly hospitalists are being hired in
community hospitals to provide for 24 hours, 7 days per week care for hospi-
talized patients. Recent estimates suggest that the current number of 7,000 hos-
pitalists may ultimately rise to 19,000 [27, 28]. It can be only a matter of time
that they will become pivotal in the use of CPOE. According to Poon et al.
some senior managers mentioned that hospitalists already served as facilitators
of CPOE adoption [4].
Once physicians started to use CPOE in the four hospitals, it was interesting to
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note how quickly they started to think how they could make ordering more effi-
cient and it led to an explosion of the use of personal order sets, as evidenced by
the study of Massaro and the review of Payne et al [21, 23]. They found that
order sets allowed them to initiate a string of activities for disease profiled
patients and save them time. Their clinical expertise was crucial for the design
of the order sets. In this way physicians appropriated the use of CPOE. The
phase of developing personal sets can be seen as an important stepping-stone
towards the more structured and evidence based development of department
order sets. After the implementation process stabilized, none of the hospitals
reported serious problems of physician use. Ash proposes the use of the term
infusion to describe the level of sophistication of the use of an innovation [29].
The authors suggest now that infusion is not only a system property, but that
clinical skills and expertise are equally important to reach a sophisticated level
of use. This would explain that in Atrium nurses never used order sets, because
their expertise is different from that of a physician and they work as a proxy to
them. At the other hand, beyond the level of clinical expertise it is difficult for
a physician to conceptualize how better care might be delivered through orga-
nizational transformation and change of medical work practices and conceptu-
alize a new role for CPOE [30].
According to both physicians and nurses professional communication was most
impacted by the introduction of CPOE. The synchronous nature of collective
decision making about patient care was more replaced by asynchronous decision
making by the physician when entering orders. Interviewees were also con-
cerned about the notification process. However, it seems that after a while the
concerns subsided and physicians found other ways to communicate with nurs-
es, for example by telephoning or taking notes while rounding and nurses were
more accustomed to looking up orders in the system and page physicians when
necessary. Apparently new modes of communications settled in.
6. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to involve physicians in CPOE implementation if they do not per-
ceive a need to change clinical work practices. CPOE has been heralded as a
technology that would make medical care more cost effective and increase
patient safety. To make the delivery of care more time and resource efficient is
not seen as a clinical necessity. A recent study shows that physicians meet inter-
ventions to reduce medical errors with caution [10]. CPOE is seen as effective
by only 23% of physicians. The study also suggests that as socialization process
medical education might be instrumental and can help adoption these inter-
ventions.
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However, once physicians are using CPOE, they appropriate the system by
developing order sets and thus using the system to save precious physician time.
They are then mainly focused on their individual practices, and the next step of
addressing the delivery of care at the hospital level is difficult to make.
Physicians still poorly understand long-term benefits of improving patient care
and therefore the need of changing medical work practices.
Change of communication patterns between nurses and physician is seen as the
most important impact of CPOE. The problem seems to subside, as physicians
get more experienced in using CPOE and find new ways of communicating
with nurses.
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CHAPTER 6
EXTENDING THE UNDERSTANDING OF COMPUTERIZED PHYSICIAN
ORDER ENTRY: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL COLLABORATION,
WORKFLOW AND QUALITY OF CARE
Jos Aarts , Joan Ash, Marc Berg
SUMMARY
Objective
To describe the perceived effect of computerized physician order entry
(CPOE) on professional collaboration, workflow and quality of care.
Design
Semi-structured interviews with experts involved in the design, implementation
and evaluation of computerized physician order systems in the United States.
Measurements
The interview transcripts were analyzed using six key concepts that identify con-
text, professional collaboration, workflow and quality of care. Results: The inter-
views reveal the complexity of CPOE. Although providers enter the orders, oth-
ers collaborate in the decision making process. There is a profound impact on
workflow beyond that of the provider. While quality of care is the main impetus
for implementation, it remains terribly difficult to measure the impact on quality.
Conclusions
A proper understanding of CPOE as a collaborative effort and the transforma-
tion of the health care activities into integrated care programs requires an
understanding of how orders are created and processed, how CPOE as part of
an integrated system can support the workflow, and how risks affecting patient
care can be identified and reduced, especially during hand-offs in the workflow.
To be published in: International Journal of Medical Informatics 2006.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) is defined as a process that allows
a physician to enter medical orders directly and to manage the results of these
orders. The concept is receiving an increasing level of attention because the
Institute of Medicine notes that CPOE holds potential for decreasing the num-
ber of medical errors in health care organizations and recommends full-fledged
implementation [1]. The Leapfrog Group - a coalition of over 150 public and
private organizations providing health care benefits - has echoed this plea by rec-
ommending that hospitals introduce computer systems to computerize drug
prescribing and that they be rewarded for it [2]. The California State Health and
Safety Code, section 1339.63, requires the introduction of technology, such as
CPOE, that has been shown effective in eliminating or substantially reducing
medication-related errors, in all California hospitals by January 1, 2005.
In reality, the implementation of CPOE has been problematic. In a recent sur-
vey, Ash et al. found that less than 10% of the US hospitals have implemented
CPOE, a figure even lower than the results of an earlier survey by the same
authors [3, 4]. Several case studies describe how physicians have opposed CPOE
for different reasons, such as the amount of time spent at the computer and con-
cerns about clerical work that fall outside of their professional practice [5-8]. 
Order communication is a highly collaborative process. A case study by
Goorman and Berg suggests that the notion of interdependence in work is a key
feature in creating medical orders and that nurses play an active role in entering
medical orders in computerized systems [9]. Gorman et al. contend that the
model of health care delivery underpinning CPOE is too naïve and suggest a
model of distributed cognition among professionals to understand the creation
of medical orders in a collaborative environment [10]. In a study about com-
munication among health care providers in the ICU Pronovost et al. found how
a daily goals form—developed to improve a common understanding of the daily
goals of therapy—was associated with improved patient outcomes [11].
High-level CPOE experts recognize the difficulties with getting CPOE systems
to work in everyday health care settings. This paper reports results of interviews
with these experts to combine their rich experience and insights with theoreti-
cal insights from medical sociology and the field of Computer Supported
Cooperative Work (CSCW). The goal is to enhance the general understanding
of CPOE implementation and use. More specifically, the notions of profession-
al collaboration and workflow are core themes in this understanding. A proper
understanding of these themes is a sine qua non to reap the full benefits of
CPOE technology in health care work. 
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The experts have been selected from among attendees of a consensus panel
meeting to identify principles for the successful implementation of CPOE; the
first and second authors took part in this meeting [12].
2. EXTENDING THE UNDERSTANDING OF CPOE
CPOE systems have primarily been designed with the tasks and responsibilities
of individual physicians in mind and implementation efforts have been prima-
rily targeted at them. Goorman and Berg, however, argue that the model under-
pinning CPOE contains a projection of medical activities that does not match
the activities of physicians as they actually take place on a ward [9]. In their
study of order creation, Gorman et al. also suggest that the implicit model
underlying CPOE does not take account of its collaborative nature [10]. In
these models, orders originate with a physician, who enters them into a system.
Then the orders are transcribed and distributed to various departments, and are
95
Implications
Figure 1 - Processing of physician orders after Gorman. This is a very simplified,
linear model that does not take account of complexity of the CPOE
workflow. Much of the understanding of CPOE is directed on the
order entry part. Each of the subsequent steps is less understood. Each
of the hand-offs in the workflow is a potential source of errors.
Originator
Order entry
Physician’s orders
Transcription
Pharmacy, laboratory, nursing, etc. Copies
Translation
Treatments, tests, etc.
Patient care
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translated into executable functions such as lab tests, medications, treatments or
other procedures. Health personnel then carry out these procedures that togeth-
er comprise the patient care that is provided (see figure 1). Such views often
simplistically present medical work as a fixed sequence of steps based on the
rationality of the scientific method.
Many scholars have explored the collaborative nature of medical work. In a clas-
sic study Strauss et al. describe how the delivery of patient care can be charac-
terized as managing a patient illness trajectory that includes the total organiza-
tion of work done of over that course [13]. The authors contend that decisions
about patient care are not made by a single individual but are the result of
“negotiations” of health professionals, sometimes even including the patient and
his/her family. They argue that this concept is necessary for a sociological under-
standing of illness management preventing the researchers from being confined
by simplified models of medical work and workflow found in most medical
textbooks. The authors base their concept on close observation of health care
professionals through seeing, hearing, and interviewing. Berg builds on this
understanding by arguing that systems design and implementation should take
into account the fluidity of the process and the content of medical work [14].
He also argues that in practice, boundaries between tasks and roles of health
professionals are not so tightly drawn. 
Pratt et al. argue that medical work, because of its inherent collaborative nature,
can benefit from design and implementation methodologies from the field of
computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) [15]. In the 1980s, CSCW
emerged as an interdisciplinary field that examines how computer systems can
be instrumental in reducing the complexity of coordinating cooperative activi-
ties, individually conducted and yet interdependent [16]. Østerlund found that
seemingly inefficient practices of duplicating or reduplicating patient data in
different documents (whether on paper or in the form of information systems)
in a patient trajectory are in fact instrumental to coordinate medical work activ-
ities among different professionals [17]. From these findings emerges a picture
of patient care that by its very nature is supported by collaborative work prac-
tices. CPOE as a collaborative effort is involves the notion that order creation
and processing are a result of professionals, physicians, nurses, and the patient
making collaborative decisions about patient care. 
This study addresses the following research questions:
• What are the perceptions of high-level experts about professional collabora-
tion and workflow and how they impact the quality of care?
• What are the implications of the findings for the understanding of CPOE?
96
Understanding implementation
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 96
2.1 Professional collaboration
Decisions about medical care are integral to managing patient trajectories and
result from a process of often implicit negotiations among stakeholders, includ-
ing the patient [13]. Knowledge about the patient’s illness and treatment is dis-
tributed among the participants in the trajectory. Creating and processing med-
ical orders result from the interaction of physicians, nurses, other health profes-
sionals and sometimes the patient managing a patient trajectory. In a landmark
ethnographic study of navigation work on a US military vessel, Hutchins found
how cognition is distributed across the members of the navigation team, how
this distributed cognition is different from individual cognition, and how the
meaning of messages pertaining to an understanding of the situation is negoti-
ated among the members to achieve a navigation goal [18]. Hutchins argued
that his findings are valid for any type of teamwork aiming at some common
goal. Goorman and Berg described how in a Dutch hospital the implementers
changed a CPOE system designed for physician medication order entry. By
facilitating nursing input, they restored the distributed way of manual medica-
tion ordering in which these nurses had always played a pivotal role [9]. In a
study about order creation and communication in an ICU, Hazlehurst et al.
showed how complex the interactions and the flows of information between the
actors are. They described the pivotal role of a secretary making sure that a med-
ical order is carried out as desired [19]. The number of studies about the com-
plexity of order creation and communication are still very limited, but the stud-
ies mentioned above suggest that the models of medical work underlying CPOE
may be too focused on the individual cognition and behavior of clinicians.
Order entry, rather, has to be conceptualized as the result of a process in which
the distributed knowledge about a patient problem helps the group members to
interactively achieve a common goal. 
2.3 Workflow
In the routing of the medical order many different professionals are involved,
including nurses, pharmacists, physiotherapists, radiologists and lab techni-
cians. This routing includes the order creation and communication process, and
also the processing of the order at the receiving end and the returning of the
results of an order result. For example, a physician or a nurse may enter a med-
ication order, but then a pharmacist will check the dose and process it and the
order will be returned in the form of a medication sheet for the nurse and a pre-
pared dose for dispensing to the patient. Similar routings can be identified for
other types of medical orders, such a lab orders. Health IT applications such as
CPOE systems will typically support such routings through conceptualizing
these steps as part of a workflow: a linear sequence of circumscribed activities,
to be executed by sharply identified agents, within which each activity creates
necessary input for the next step in the workflow. Both the concepts of profes-
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sional collaboration and workflow have the notion of the involvement of mul-
tiple individuals, but the first emphasizes the synchronous and interactive aspect
of getting work done.
In a study about the effects of CPOE on ICU workflow, Cheng et al. showed
how the actual workflow with many feedback loops deviates from the idealized
workflow [20]. The authors found, for example, that nurses frequently con-
versed with physicians about medical orders and that a pharmacist modification
often results in a second medication sheet printed at the nursing station. In
addition, only parts of the medical order workflow are supported by CPOE sys-
tems. Other parts, such as drug dispensing by pharmacy and drug administra-
tion by nursing are often supported by systems that are sometimes connected to
CPOE systems by interface protocols [21]. For example, automated drug dis-
pensing cabinets containing tailored patient dosages are becoming more com-
mon. However, these machines are not always integrated with CPOE systems.
This means that in the overall medical ordering routings, many hand-offs still
pose a risk for the quality of the ordering process. In the words of Brown and
Duguid, workflow in health care is not a linear, step-by-step process with clear-
cut inputs and outputs and sharply targeted information needs. Rather, in
health care, the ‘workflows’ require many interactions between the activities and
their “owners” that in reality are not sharply demarcated at all [22]. 
2.3 Quality of care
Implementation of CPOE has been recommended to reduce medical errors and
increase the quality of care [23]. Evaluation studies of CPOE implementation
in hospitals in the 70’s and 80’s showed economic savings and also better patient
outcomes in terms of reduction in length of patient stay and improvement of
the quality of medication orders in terms of legibility, completeness and
decrease of transcription errors [24]. Later studies were fully focused on med-
ication errors and adverse drug events. Kaushal et al. reviewed the effects of
CPOE and clinical decision support systems on medication safety and con-
cluded that CPOE significantly decreased medication error rates [25]. But the
evidence is based on a limited set of clinical studies (two controlled trial stud-
ies, two observational studies with controls and one study that employed both
designs). Much less is known about medical errors throughout the entire work-
flow process, but a study by Berman suggests that most medical errors occur
during dispensing (53%), administration (24%) and then prescribing (15%)
[26]. Several strategies have been recommended to reduce errors, such as the use
of bar coding technology and automated dispensing systems [27]. However,
Oren et al. show that the evidence that these technologies reduce medical errors
and adverse drug events is very limited [28]. Reason et al. point out that there
is a risk that technological solutions to increase patient safety may be focused
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too much on individual behavior and they may ignore organizational behavior
[29]. Several studies suggest that physicians in particular are not aware of the
systemic nature and size of the problem [30]. There is anecdotal evidence that
physicians often blame each other about making mistakes and assert that it does
not apply to them. Also, many errors are corrected in the workflow without the
ordering physician becoming aware of it.
The issues raised in the three previous paragraphs suggest that efforts to improve
patient safety and the quality of care should also focus on occasions that may
disrupt the fine fabric of professional collaboration and the workflow involving
many different professionals.
3. RESEARCH METHODS
To extend the general understanding of CPOE, this research focused on the per-
ceptions of experts about professional collaboration, workflow and quality of
care. In October and November, 2003, the first author conducted 16 semi-
structured interviews with 17 experts involved in CPOE implementations (see
table 1). The experts were partly selected from the participants in the first con-
sensus meeting on the successful implementation of CPOE in which the first
and second authors participated [31]. The interviewees represented users,
implementers, vendors and researchers. The first author also visited a commu-
nity hospital that has been using CPOE for many years and interviewed an IT
project leader, a hospital management executive, and two physicians together.
In all, the interviewees represented 12 different organizations, which included
five academic medical centers, three community hospitals, a VA medical center,
a health maintenance organization, and a vendor. The high level of knowledge
of the interviewees offered the authors an opportunity to explore CPOE issues
in-depth. 
The duration of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to one hour and 15 min-
utes and lasted on average 50 minutes. The respondents received by e-mail a
brief note that explained the purpose of the study and listed six topics that
would be addressed during the interview. They were: 
• The description of the CPOE system in use and history of the implementa-
tion. 
• The users of CPOE and their involvement.
• Organizational impact on medical work.
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• Redesign of the CPOE workflow.
• Patterns of collaboration at order creation.
• Effects on quality of care.
The first three topics were meant to provide the context of the involvement of
respondents with CPOE systems. The last three topics were central to the
research questions.
Details about the interviewed experts, their backgrounds and key topics dis-
cussed are listed in table 1. The interview transcripts were analyzed with the
help of Atlas 4ti, a software application for qualitative text analysis, using the
last three topics listed above as units of analysis.
The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Oregon Health
& Science University as part of the “Physician Order Entry: Field Study of
Success Factors (National Library of Medicine grant LM06942-02).”
4. RESULTS
The interviews resulted in 269 typewritten pages (single line spacing, A4 paper
format). We will now briefly highlight some findings from the interviews focus-
ing on context, professional collaboration, workflow and quality of care. The
context encompasses the first three interview topics; and they are not listed sep-
arately. Organizations described in this section are those associated with the
interviewees (see table 2). 
5. CONTEXT
All university medical centers represented by these interviewees have imple-
mented CPOE systems that have been in place for about a decade. One com-
munity hospital has had a CPOE system operational for three decades. The
other community hospitals are planning to implement CPOE, have contracted
with a vendor, and are already conducting pilots. The VA medical center and
the health maintenance organization in this study have implemented CPOE as
an integral part of their electronic patient record systems. The vendor repre-
sented by an interviewee has a large installed base of clerical and clinical systems,
but its CPOE product is operational in less than ten hospitals. Two academic
medical centers represented here have developed a strong research base for
CPOE related clinical outcome studies. The main characteristics of the organi-
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zations are listed in table 2.
Though one community hospital, the VA medical center, and the health main-
tenance organization have acquired widely available systems, their involvement
with the design and implementation was such that these systems were essential-
ly homegrown. The users and system designers collaborated intensively on loca-
tion to develop and improve the CPOE system. All respondents from organiza-
tions using CPOE indicated that implementation lead times are on the order of
three years or more up to the moment that a substantial number of physicians
are using it. All implemented systems have the order entry piece; few of them
are really integrated into comprehensive systems that cover the complete work-
flow including pharmacy and drug dispensing. The implementation of CPOE
is seen by all as quite complex.
The respondents from organizations that have implemented CPOE all mention
a high degree of physician use. None of them, at the time of the interviews, had
made CPOE use mandatory, but they created conditions that left physicians
very little choice. For example, the medical director of the health maintenance
organization explains that over 95% of the physicians do order entry because of
a policy that only physicians can sign off medical orders: “It is not a written pol-
icy [to do computerized order entry], but it is the general policy.” 
The community hospitals that are planning to implement CPOE systems can-
not be so sure that physicians will enter their own orders electronically. The
interviewees from these hospitals fear that physicians will consider such a task
as clerical and they emphasize their prudent methods for involving them. Their
physicians are not employed by the hospitals, but they have, as part of large
medical groups, agreements to send their patients to the hospital. If they are
unhappy with one hospital, they can sometimes send their patients relatively
easily to another. The CPOE project leaders focus on physicians who can be
considered as early adopters and they try to identify immediate benefits for
them—such as making their workflow more efficient and appealing to their
pride in providing quality care—and by trying not to upset them by making
CPOE use mandatory. They expect that peer pressure will bring other physi-
cians on board. Nurses are often much more involved in the medical ordering
process than physicians are. In these hospitals, nurses are very involved in han-
dling medical orders, sometimes guided by clinical protocols and guidelines.
Even so, CPOE pilots are placing the physician in the foreground. In teaching
hospitals, which include the academic medical centers and the VA medical cen-
ter, it is common to delegate medical order entry work to house officers.
Entering medical orders is seen as part of their training. It is much more diffi-
cult to do that in community hospitals, which usually do not employ residents.
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In order to increase physician use of CPOE, the community hospitals are seek-
ing to involve hospitalists who are employed as primary care physicians or
internists by the hospital or the contracted medical group. In the hospital they
take routine care on a 24-hour basis of the patients sent in by private physicians.
After explaining the pilot test in a rehabilitation unit, a medical director of clin-
ical information systems in a community hospital describes the implementation
strategy this way: “So after we do rehab, we’re gonna go after the hospitalists.
And the hospitalists are internists that are paid by the hospital, so they’re hos-
pital employees. Then we’re gonna go after the house staff. They’re residents.
Then we’re gonna start rounding with private physician groups one by one, but
by then we’ll have the house staff and the residents on it, so if it hasn’t worked
for the hospitalists and the residents then we pull the cord on the project. If it
has worked for them, then we can use them to sell it to the other physicians.”
The medical group associated with the community hospital that is known for
its high physician involvement in CPOE employs hospitalists for taking a care
of the hospitalized patients belonging to the group, and they thus accept a large
part of the burden of doing order entry.
The respondents in the organizations that have implemented CPOE all indi-
cated that physicians have made electronic order entry part of their work life
and found it hard to compare with the situation before. However, ongoing
changes in the CPOE system may still affect medical work practices. For exam-
ple, in the health maintenance organization, workstations are now being
installed in the exam rooms. Up to this point, order entry would take place in
the physician’s office after the patient had been seen. The physician would take
notes on a piece of paper and then bring that to his office and do the order
entry. Taking notes and rereading gives the physician the opportunity to recon-
sider his decision-making and alter his decisions if necessary. Introducing the
workstation in the exam room would allow immediate order entry if this fits the
physician’s individual workflow.
4.1 Professional collaboration
None of the interviewees from institutions that have implemented CPOE
described explicitly the problem of the complex decision-making that precedes
order entry. There is nevertheless a distinction between the stage before enter-
ing the order, during which people interact and decide what to do, and the act
of entering the order itself. The physician enters the order because he or she is
best able to appreciate and interpret the suggestions of the associated decision
support system.
For the respondents who are implementing CPOE in community hospitals, the
explicit and implicit roles that nurses play in creating orders are an issue. When
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preparing a CPOE pilot in a hospice unit of a community hospital, the project
pharmacist found that nurses and physicians had developed ways of working
with pain medication orders that allowed liberal bounds for dosing. It was per-
haps the small size of the group which made “everyone comfortable with each
other’s work and therefore [they] had a pretty liberal, had a lot of leeway to do
what they felt was necessary for the care of the patients.” He observed that it
turned out that it was difficult to use the structured format that computer entry
really requires.
The chief information officer of a community hospital, on the other
hand,expects that CPOE will facilitate the introduction of clinical paths, for
cardiology for example, and that having clinical paths will require more explic-
it collaboration between physicians and nurses and that their collaboration will
be supported by clinical guidelines and protocols.
4.2 Workflow
The respondents all agree that redesign of the workflow needs to be addressed
more adequately. Most of the work on CPOE was until recently mostly focused
on the order entry part and the associated decision support because of the
intrinsic complexity of implementation. A clinical researcher of a teaching hos-
pital that has implemented CPOE comments that “CPOE is a big project, and
doing each of the back end links is quite time consuming. So it is not an unrea-
sonable approach to do things, for example, just to put in the front-end and
perhaps put in a little link to pharmacy and then to say that we are gonna go
back later and do the links to the other ancillaries later on.” A director of qual-
ity informatics who has been involved in CPOE implementation projects in
other academic medical centers acknowledges that “many people even in a
sophisticated health care institution think explicitly about what are the process-
es, you know, the fact that there is a decision making process, and that the
physicians execute their orders and then the nurses take off their orders and
some of those things get routed to the lab and some of those things get routed
to pharmacy and some of these things get routed to radiology and then the radi-
ologists take over, and that, if you wanted to improve something you would tar-
get various aspects of that process.” 
Three issues emerged. First, there is the possible lack of understanding in hos-
pitals about how IT relates to workflow. The software specialist reported a case
in which a hospital wanted to have CPOE in first and then add charting,
ignoring that orders might get lost because nurses would have no way of know-
ing whether an order was in. She suggested a careful rethinking of each step in
the workflow, assessing what technology would need to come first and then
deciding about CPOE before it becomes the “dark ordering side of the loop.”
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Second, there is a concern how the roles of the participants in the workflow
would change. The same software specialist reported a case of a communication
breakdown in which, after implementation of CPOE, nurses were not informed
about orders and could not initiate interventions because the doctors entered all
orders themselves. The project pharmacist reported the role of the pharmacist
in verifying orders. In most CPOE implementations, the pharmacist would still
verify orders and get back to the physician if he felt that the order was incorrect
or inappropriate. Introducing advanced decision support in CPOE might
reduce the role of pharmacist to mere dispensing. However, the pharmacist’s
role might actually become broader. According to the project pharmacist: “ …
but also at a more general sense being able to look at the entire picture and see
if there are some omissions to a patient therapy or if some therapies appear to
be redundant, you know, and that’s a more of a bigger picture role. And there
have been several publications in the last few years about the value of pharma-
cists in patient rounds, ICU rounds; I think that’s a role that they are going to
be transitioning in to as POE continues to roll out.”
The third issue concerns the notification process. Before CPOE implementa-
tion, nurses would know about medication for patients before the order went to
the pharmacy and they could start to prepare for dispensing almost immediate-
ly. A CPOE project leader summarizes the problem: “So one of the big hurdles
that we are trying to identify and meet is this sort of new order notification
process. How does the nurse know, or anybody know, when there are new
orders in the system. Currently, they are written, the nurse actually or the ward
clerk or unit secretary actually enters them into the computer, so that is when
they know. If it is CPOE, the physician can either be entering those orders in
on the unit, they could be on another unit, they could be in their office or
indeed they can be at home, entering an order. So, that whole new order noti-
fication process is a big change with CPOE, and we have done things to get the
nurses with a sort of electronic notification, electronic alerts to counteract that
sort of thing.”
4.3 Quality of care
The positive effects of CPOE on reducing medication errors, publicity about
the IOM reports on patient safety, and the subsequent stream of reports by con-
sulting firms about the necessity of CPOE and the current level of implemen-
tation, were the most important reasons why hospitals implement CPOE. They
recognize that the number of scientific studies is limited and that the results of
the Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Regenstrief Institute studies are hard to
extrapolate because of the poor replicability. However, as the hospital executive
noted: “Key to us is patient safety initiatives.”
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Apart from the respondents from the academic research institutions, none of the
respondents who had implemented CPOE had any direct proof of improved
quality of care. In the health maintenance organization and the Veterans Affairs
medical center implementations of CPOE systems, the quality of care was very
much associated with their preventive medicine and public health emphases.
Because the orders become part of the electronic medical record, the physicians
were able to flag patients for check-ups and special treatments. According to
interviewees, this integrated functionality improves patient outcomes.
5. DISCUSSION
Not surprisingly, several dimensions of complexity of CPOE implementation
and use emerges from the interviews. First, implementation is a thoroughly
social process in which the roles and responsibilities of health professionals are
changing. Second, CPOE needs to fit the workflow, which is not always well
understood. Third, evidence of a positive impact on the quality of care is still
limited. The results of this study are consistent with theoretical insights from
the sociology of medical work and the design of systems supporting collabora-
tive work.
5.1 Professional collaboration
The role of the physician is key to CPOE implementation because the physi-
cian is expected to be responsible for entering orders. Implementation efforts
focus on strategies for involving physicians. In the academic medical centers,
house officers (residents and fellows) enter orders as part of their training, super-
vised by their superiors. Another strategy is to design system features in such a
way that they are only useful for physicians. The major concern about physi-
cians interacting with CPOE systems is that they take additional time, con-
firmed in a study by Doolan and Bates [32]. Many efforts are therefore made to
adapt the system such that physicians can do the task faster or that the value of
the information they get from the system compensates for time lost.
Respondents from community hospitals that are planning to implement CPOE
systems want to maintain good working relationships with self-employed com-
munity physicians. They are concerned about the future role of nurses who
entered medical orders on behalf of physicians. There is a trend toward hiring
more hospitalists—primary care physicians and internists who are employed by
medical groups or hospitals to take care of patients in the hospital on a 24/7
basis. Hospitalists seem to do most of the computerized order entry tasks and,
like house officers, they are employees, so their use of CPOE can be mandated.
A review of the hospitalist movement estimates that currently 7,000 hospitalists
are employed in community hospitals across the United States and that their
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number will grow to 19,000 [33]. One can infer from these figures that hospi-
talists will play a key role in CPOE, and will ease the problem of involving self-
employed physicians.
The growing shortage of health care personnel will probably also increase the
need for delegating tasks, including drug order entry, to highly qualified pro-
fessionals such as nurse practitioners. In the UK, specialized nurses are author-
ized to prescribe drugs in defined circumstances using a tailored formulary and
special guidelines and protocols [34].
The observations of the respondents parallel findings of Strauss et al. that
patient care can be characterized as group work [13]. Gorman et al. concludes
from a study of physician order entry in critical care that an approach focused
on the outcome of the medical decision and the entering of the order in the sys-
tem ignores the complexity of group work in which the medical order comes
into existence [10]. According to Gorman et al., group work appears to facili-
tate sense making and involves mutual construction of understandings over
time. Despite the focus on physicians’ use computerized order entry, different
professions are very much involved as well. While in teaching hospitals the bur-
den of order entry is carried by residents and house staff, an increasing number
of hospitalists fulfill a similar function. This tendency will probably not change
the group work and nurse’s role that is so essential in creating orders. A proper
understanding of CPOE in different health care settings requires an under-
standing of order creation as a complex professional collaborative process at the
point of care.
5.2 Workflow
A narrow focus on order entry results in both an overly linear and also frag-
mented view of the workflow. The problems are threefold. First, and closely tied
to the previous point about professional collaboration, the roles, tasks and
responsibilities of different professionals are in practice much less clearly cir-
cumscribed than they are taken to be by many system designers [22]. Second,
changes in these roles, tasks and responsibilities of different professionals remain
mostly implicit and not clarified. For example, when decision support becomes
an integral part of CPOE, will the role of the pharmacist be reduced to merely
dispensing the drugs? Or when the pharmacist has a key role in assuring the
quality of medication ordering, how will that affect workflow? Or should the
role shift towards counseling the physician, helping to develop guidelines and
protocols, and taking part in clinical rounds? Before introduction of CPOE, the
nurse would often know immediately that an order was being written. Now the
nurse needs to be notified electronically, which raises the questions about when
that will happen and how that will happen. From the interviews a picture
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emerges that many solutions to these problems are quite ad-hoc. Third, many
different information systems that are not integrated support parts of the CPOE
workflow. For example, when a medication order arrives in the pharmacy, it
may be entered and verified in a system that is not connected to the order entry
system, and the medication might then be packaged with a barcode label and
processed in a different system for dispensing. 
The IOM report envisages a health care system that supports continued
improvement in the six aims of safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, time-
liness, efficiency and equity [23]. The services in such a system are “coordinat-
ed across practices, settings, and patient conditions over time using increasing-
ly sophisticated information systems.” In this vision CPOE should be part of an
integrated IT system fully supporting the continuum of care. This requires a
transformation of the delivery care system into care programs with measurable
outcomes, integrated planning, restructuring and delegation of tasks, and IT
supporting the process of care. As a hospital executive observed: “Other indus-
tries would never allow the fragmentation to occur that occurs in health care.
The automotive industry, the finance, I mean, they just, it is all about consoli-
dation and dis-intermediating all that crap from happening, right? We have
allowed intermediations and hand-offs to happen, and quite frankly, when you
think about it, that is why health care doesn’t deliver at the level that it can.
Every hand-off is an opportunity for failure.”
5.3 Quality of care
Research on the benefits of CPOE in preventing medical errors has mainly been
focused on the order entry piece and on the individual behavior of the physi-
cian. All respondents quote these studies and the recommendations of the IOM
and interested groups such as the Leapfrog Group as the main reason to imple-
ment CPOE and expect that their organizations will see dramatic improvements
in the quality of care. According to Bates et al., the benefits of CPOE derive for
the most part from physicians interacting with decision support [35]. The stud-
ies, however, seem to ignore the collaborative nature of health care work and the
fact that order entry is part of a complex workflow. According to Hutchins,
many errors in group work are corrected through the interactions of the actors
and group performance seems to protect against errors or failures of individual
members [18]. Hutchins argues further that the individual response to errors
results from mutual learning, allowing newcomers to adopt explicit and implic-
it rules set in the group. These findings imply that similar mechanisms should
be found in health care work when it is seen as a collaborative effort. The ques-
tion needs to be asked whether and how computerized decision support will be
able to substitute for the safety network that characterizes current practices of
creating and entering orders collaboratively.
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While at the point of creating and entering orders the synchronous characteris-
tic of professional collaboration may be important, Hutchins’ arguments also
holds true when considering workflow, where time sequential, asynchronous
activities across organizational boundaries (within or outside a hospital) are
dominant. The use of different information technologies in the workflow such
as order entry systems, pharmacy systems, and dispensing systems adds another
degree of complexity that can be a serious source of errors and failures.
Analyzing the workflow to reduce errors and improve the quality of care can
lead to the next step of rethinking the workflow. According to Groth, the revo-
lutionary impact of IT is that it makes possible new coordination mechanisms
and thereby new forms of organization [36]. The interviewees from the health
maintenance organization described how their information system enabled
them to design targeted programs for patients with specific health problems
such as diabetes. The information system, which is an integration of an elec-
tronic medical record and a physician order entry system, allows identification
of patients who have been diagnosed with, for example, diabetes, use of order
sets and assessment of disease specific outcomes. Introducing CPOE requires
integration not only at the system level, but also at the level of patient care. The
example of the health maintenance organization shows how the integrated
approach allows a change from order management that centers around order
creating, processing and retrieving results to program management in which
activities are planned, integrated and organized towards disease profiled
patients. The next step then for improving quality is to create care pathways, to
examine the roles are of the actors in the pathways, and to assess how CPOE
might fit into such concept.
5.4 Limitations of the study
This study has several limitations. First, the selection of experts may be biased
because they were chosen from among the participants of an invitational con-
sensus meeting. However, the potential for bias was minimized because of the
variety of their professional backgrounds and their organizations and because
the semi-structured format of the interview was consistent in all interviews.
Second, the data obtained about CPOE were largely self-reported, although the
contents were verified by comparing data from multiple sources. 
6. CONCLUSION
The interviews show a rich picture of CPOE that includes practical issues of use
and implementation and policy issues related to organizational strategy and
changing health care practices. The interviewees acknowledge the complexity of
integrating those issues into a comprehensive approach. But the next step might
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require the abandonment of accepted truths, such as the belief that only a
licensed physician can enter orders and that this will therefore increase patient
care quality. As one informant noted, if you focus on a subatomic task to
increase patient safety you may well decrease patient safety in the overall process
of care. For example, the current uncertainty about introducing CPOE in com-
munity hospitals could be turned into strength if hospitals and medical groups
work together to create patient care pathways across organizational boundaries
and examine how information technology might fit in such a concept for
increasing the quality of care. An increasing number of hospitalists are being
hired to provide the continuity of care and they are becoming instrumental in
the implementation of CPOE.
Extending the understanding of CPOE then translates in an understanding of
care pathways and addressing the question how CPOE might fit into such a
model. Care pathways can be analyzed through observational methods. Insights
from CSCW may help to design and implement CPOE in a collaborative envi-
ronment.
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CONCLUSION
The introduction of an information system in health care practices is a thor-
oughly social process in which both the technology and the practice are trans-
formed. That is the general conclusion of this thesis. Such a broad conclusion
could easily provoke the reaction: “So what?” Let me draw upon the conclusions
of the research described in the previous chapters to make this general conclu-
sion more specific.
The basic assumption in chapter 1 is that an implementation process can be
characterized by stages and that this process is in continuous interaction with
the health care environment in which the information system is implemented.
These stages are not clear-cut in the sense that they have defined inputs and out-
puts or that they can be strictly delineated. Rather, the stages help to identify
appropriate activities to implement a system. The implementation process inter-
acts with the health system, or more precisely, with health care work. A health
care organization is centered on health care work. It facilitates and constrains
what health care workers can do. The interaction has an ethnographic connota-
tion in the sense that a change manager has to interact with health care work to
understand how an information system might fit. She needs not just to ask, but
also to observe, to enquire, to respond, etc., in the sense that Marc Berg
describes as essential for a sociotechnical approach, a detailed, on-site insight of
work practices [1].
Chapter 2 addressed the question how the outcomes of the implementation of
a CPOE system can be explained from a sociotechnical perspective. A sociotech-
nical approach stresses the importance of the intertwinement of technology and
its social environment and suggests a variety of aspects to explore this inter-
twinement. The chapter presented a detailed account of the implementation of
a CPOE system in Radboud University Medical Center from the moment when
there was a perceived need to acquire a clinically focused information system
until 12 years later when the implementation of the core functionality of physi-
cian order entry was abandoned. The case study showed the clash between the
rationality of the system expressed in technical and functional specifications and
its actual use. The new system did not require a keyboard and memorization of
command keys and the implementers thought that the new system would be
easier to use. The opposite happened: the system slowed down the users and
more personnel needed to be hired to cover the workload. This was quite con-
trary to expectations. I introduced then the concept of ‘fit,’ a match between the
requirements of work practices and the capabilities of the system. I argued that
‘fit’ is not an intrinsic property of the technology or a work practice, but needs
to be created. ‘Fit’ is the result of a process in which both work practices and
technology change. Indeed, users have to change the way they work. In similar
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fashion a system will not behave as it often was intended. People will tinker with
the system to make some tasks easier or more efficient. For example, the CPOE
system was originally designed for American-style inpatient clinical work and
had to be adapted for the typical Dutch “ambulatory clinic” emphasis in hospi-
tal work. The case showed also that time was a crucial element. Decisions about
the technology that made perfectly sense at the beginning of the project were
constraining in hindsight. In the early 90’s people were used to keyboards and
character based screens. When the system was activated users were already
acquainted with Windows-based applications and a mouse as an interaction
device. The screen design of the information system looked very outdated. It
was very similar to how WordPerfect was ousted by Microsoft Word. The point
is that this change could not be predicted. It didn’t happen suddenly; it emerged
as a new technology penetrated the market. Using Wanda Orlikowski’s termi-
nology I labeled this phenomenon as emergent change [2]. The challenge is not
to predict change, but how to respond to it. Fox example, the mainframe based
CPOE system was emulated on a PC’s while it retained the character-based look
and feel. The designers could have considered not only the emulation of the sys-
tem itself, but also of a Windows look-and-feel. Finally, the case showed how
closely technology and organization were connected. Often users assume that
introducing a new system means that also new computer technology will be
installed. However, the installed computer hardware and its technical infra-
structure constrained the choice for a new system. The choice was limited to
systems that could run on the existing computer mainframe. It was not only an
issue of just some pieces of hardware. Complex hardware requires expertise for
development and maintenance and expertise is not easily exchangeable.
In chapter 3 I addressed the different outcomes of the implementation of
CPOE systems in Radboud University Medical Center and Atrium Medical
Center in Heerlen. Contrary to Radboud, Atrium implemented the full func-
tionality of order entry, but the hospitals had in common that physicians stayed
out of the loop. I explained the difference by looking closely at the nature of
medical work practices. I argued that users were more interested to know how
their work would change because of the system than to know what the system
would look like. It is the acceptance of the change of work practices that is cru-
cial for the acceptance of an information system. I also argued that medical
work practices and professions are less tightly coupled then one would expect.
Physicians considered electronic order entry as not belonging to their profes-
sional domain, but the nurses and secretaries saw entering orders as an exten-
sion of what they already did; they therefore made the CPOE system part of
their work practices.
Chapter 4 and 5 described the comparison of CPOE implementation strategy
of three hospitals in the Netherlands and three in the United States. I compared
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the implementation on ten aspects and found that the differences between the
Netherlands and the United States were not substantial. All hospitals cited the
need to save costs and increase efficiency of health care delivery as the main rea-
sons to implement CPOE. Even in project management where American lead-
ership could be posited against Dutch negotiating and compromising, the dif-
ference was more gradual than absolute. However, all implementations took a
minimum of five years to complete. Apparently this long time is intrinsic to any
implementation of a complex information system. Hospital executives should
therefore not count on swift results and rapid return on investments, but rather
plan for long implementation lead times and take into account the uncertainty
that is part of it. The implementations were mainly management driven and did
not meet perceived clinical needs of the physicians. However, once physicians
started using the system they tried to make the system more efficient. Instead of
entering each order separately they combined orders into order sets for types of
patients that they see often. They considered order sets far more efficient than
handwriting orders. I suggested that their clinical expertise helped them to
increase the sophistication of use and allowed them to appropriate the system.
This kind of improvised improvement is what Claudio Ciborra calls ‘bricolage;’
it is not really planned, it helped them to appropriate the system, but it still
innovative [3]. In Atrium nurses and secretaries entered orders electronically as
a proxy for physicians, but their lack of clinical expertise prevented the devel-
opment of order sets.
Chapter 6, finally, aimed to extend the understanding of CPOE to include pro-
fessional collaboration and workflow and see how CPOE impacts the quality of
care. Here I argued that order communication is a highly collaborative process.
An apparently simple process such as prescribing medication for a patient is the
result of physicians and nurses talking to each other and exchanging viewpoints,
which ultimately leads to a decision. And that decision is entered as a drug
order. CPOE systems have primarily been designed with the tasks and respon-
sibilities of a physician in mind, and therefore a potential conflict can arise
between the system and its use. Moreover, medication ordering is part of a
workflow in which an order is received and processed by a pharmacist and sent
back in the form of a medication and a drug dosage to be administered to the
patient by the nurse. Interviewed CPOE experts acknowledged the complexity
of getting such systems to work in a clinical environment. A proper under-
standing of CPOE as a collaborative effort requires an understanding of how
orders are created and processed, how CPOE as part of an integrated system can
support the workflow, and how risks affecting patient care can be identified and
reduced, especially when the order moves from one professional to another.
Coming back to the general conclusion, the study shows how work practices
change, for example when physicians develop order sets to make their prescrib-
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ing work a little easier to do. Technology changes also, if only because new func-
tionality is added. That is a social process. The changes are not easily pre-
dictable. That is a predicament for an implementer. Maybe she would to like to
design a system according to blueprints and to plan systematically its deploy-
ment. But Claudio Ciborra advises her to make organizational improvisation
part of the implementation process, to allow prospective users to tinker with the
system and let them find ways of working that suits them best, plan for the
unexpected and value emerging practices and give up strict control [3]. The
generalization is situated in the principle, not in the predictability of individual
cases.
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SAMENVATTING
“Het is gemakkelijker om een mens naar de maan te lanceren dan een zieken-
huis informatiesysteem te implementeren,” schrijft Morris Collen in zijn boek
over de geschiedenis van de medische informatica in de Verenigde Staten [1].
Dit ene zinnetje illustreert treffend hoe moeilijk het is om in een ziekenhuis een
informatiesysteem in te voeren. Het ziekenhuis wordt door Collen omschreven
als de “meest complexe organisatie die ooit door mensen is bedacht.”
Organisatieverandering is kenmerkend voor de implementatie van infor-
matiesystemen. Niet altijd zijn het veranderingen ten goede; vaak presteert een
organisatie slechter nadat er een systeem is geïmplementeerd. Snel wordt dan
geconcludeerd dat het systeem op een of andere manier slecht is ontworpen. In
1975, toen het ontwerpen en bedienen van informatiesystemen vooral werden
gezien als een technische activiteit, schreef Henry C. Lucas al over falende sys-
temen: “Onze ervaring doet echter vermoeden dat de voornaamste oorzaak van
het mislukken van informatiesystemen gezocht moet worden in het gedrag van
organisaties [2].” Dertig jaar onderzoek heeft geleid tot een toename van de
kennis van informatiesystemen in de context van organisaties, maar de lijst van
succesvolle implementaties is heel beperkt. Een zorginformatiesysteem is bij-
zonder moeilijk te implementeren omdat het niet alleen de organisatie als geheel
beïnvloedt, maar ook het werk van zorgprofessionals die hun professionele
autonomie koesteren.
De toenmalige directeur Staf Zorg van het UMC St Radboud te Nijmegen
stelde in de zomer van 1997 het onderzoek voor dat beschreven wordt in dit
proefschrift. Hij vroeg mij of ik belangstelling had hun nieuwe ziekenhuisinfor-
matiesysteem te bestuderen. Hij beschreef het systeem als een geautomatiseerd
ordercommunicatiesysteem dat artsen in staat zou stellen hun medische orders
in te voeren. Het projectteam dat verantwoordelijk was voor de implementatie
kon wel enige feedback gebruiken en hij dacht dat het wel een goed onderwerp
zou zijn voor een proefschrift. Ik zag een unieke kans om de geschiedenis van
een systeem te documenteren vanaf het eerste begin van de ontwikkeling tot de
volledige ingebruikname. Het was een belangwekkend systeem omdat het
gericht was op het medisch handelen in tegenstelling tot andere ziekenhuisin-
formatiesystemen die voornamelijk voor administratieve doeleinden waren ont-
worpen. Het ingewikkelde project zou uiteindelijk 5000 professionals inclusief
artsen aangaan. In het begin leek de implementatie voorspoedig te verlopen en
waren er geen voortekenen van de mislukking die twee jaar later zou blijken.
Deze studie gaat over implementatie en over informatiesystemen die de zorg
ondersteunen. Implementatie bestrijkt het invoeringstraject van een infor-
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matiesysteem vanaf het moment dat het nodig wordt gevonden om een orga
nisatieprobleem aan te pakken tot het gebruik in werkpraktijken. Om de
uitkomst van een implementatietraject te kunnen begrijpen moet men terug-
gaan in de geschiedenis om belangrijke gebeurtenissen te identificeren die de
richting van het traject hebben beïnvloed en in de tijd volgen hoe de infor-
matietechnologie werd ingevoerd en geïnstalleerd.
Zorginformatiesystemen zoals elektronische patiëntdossiers zijn bedoeld om de
toenemende informatiebehoefte van zorgverleners en de uitvoering en coördi-
natie hun werkzaamheden te ondersteunen. 
Deze studie gaat het in bijzonder over geautomatiseerde ordercommunicatie
systemen. Ordercommunicatie systemen stellen een zorgprofessional in staat
om medische orders elektronisch in te voeren en na een verloop van tijd het
resultaat ervan te zien. Medische orders vormen een sleutel in de zorgverlening
in de zin dat zij het resultaat zijn van medische beslissingen. Bijvoorbeeld, wan-
neer in een ziekenhuis een arts vindt dat een patiënt behandeld moet worden
met een geneesmiddel, schrijft zij een medicatieopdracht. De opdracht of order
wordt ontvangen door de apotheek. De apotheek controleert de order, maakt
een medicatielijst en prepareert en verpakt het geneesmiddel. De ver-
pleegkundige dient tenslotte het geneesmiddel toe aan de patiënt. Door middel
van een ordercommunicatie systeem kan de arts een opdracht direct in de com-
puter invoeren en daardoor vervalt de noodzaak om een briefje te schrijven en
de order steeds handmatig te kopiëren. Vele voordelen worden toegeschreven
aan ordercommunicatie systemen. Onduidelijkheden als gevolg van moeilijk
leesbare of onvolledig ingevulde receptenbriefjes worden vermeden. Het ver-
minderen van het aantal onnodige telefoontjes bespaart kostbare tijd van artsen.
Medicatiekosten kunnen verminderd worden wanneer het voorschrijven
gebaseerd is op het formularium van het ziekenhuis. Elektronische signalerin-
gen waarschuwen de arts over doseringen, interacties van geneesmiddelen,
geneesmiddelallergieën en tenslotte de mogelijke schadelijke gevolgen van het
toedienen van geneesmiddelen (‘adverse drug events’). Ordercommunicatie sys-
temen worden dan ook gezien als een technologie waarmee het aantal medische
fouten verminderd en de patiëntveiligheid bevorderd kan worden. Het gezag-
hebbende Institute of Medicine van de National Academy of Sciences in de
Verenigde Staten publiceerde in 2000 en 2001 twee rapporten waarin werd
aangedrongen op de implementatie van dergelijke systemen [3, 4].
Vier jaar later echter constateerde Joan Ash en haar collega’s dat nog slechts in
minder dan 10% van de Amerikaanse ziekenhuizen ordercommunicatie syste-
men waren geïmplementeerd [5]. De grote kloof tussen de vermeende voorde-
len en de feitelijke situatie bewijst hoe moeilijk het is om zulke systemen in de
klinische praktijk te laten functioneren.
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Een onderzoek naar de implementatie van informatiesystemen kan niet los
gezien worden van een begrip van de organisatorische context. De sociotech-
nische benadering die ik in dit onderzoek hanteer, benadrukt het belang van de
verwevenheid van technologie en sociale omgeving. Zij is niet zozeer een
welomschreven theorie, maar een perspectief dat tot ontwikkeling is gekomen
in het onderzoeksgebied van informatiesystemen in organisaties en ‘computer
supported cooperative work’, en in wetenschaps- en techniekstudies. Het
sociotechnische perspectief stelt de onderzoeker in staat diverse aspecten van de
verwevenheid tussen organisatie en technologie te verkennen en te doorgron-
den. De sociotechnische benadering in deze studie heeft drie algemene ken-
merken.
Op de eerste plaats gaat de benadering ervan uit dat de rollen en taken van zorg-
professionals nauw met elkaar en de organisatorische omgeving verbonden zijn.
Materiële artefacten, zoals een formulier, de inrichting van een kantoor of een
computersysteem, structureren van zorgprofessionals, verdeelt hun verantwoor-
delijkheden en bepaalt hoe hun relaties eruit zien. Bijvoorbeeld, een intakefor-
mulier voor patiënten stuurt hoe verpleegkundige van een patiënt een anamnese
zal afnemen en welke informatie zij opschrijft. Als het formulier vervangen
wordt door een computersysteem verandert de manier waarop de ver-
pleegkundige anamnese afneemt. Op het papieren formulier slaat de ver-
pleegkundige de vragen over die zij niet relevant vindt voor de anamnese. Een
computersysteem dwingt haar alle vragen te beantwoorden, ook al zijn ze niet
relevant voor de patiënt die ze nu ziet.
Ten tweede is medisch werk typisch een proces van samenwerking en gedeelde
verantwoordelijkheid. In een klassieke studie beschrijven Anselm Strauss en zijn
medeonderzoekers hoe patiëntenzorg gekarakteriseerd kan worden als het ‘ma-
nagen van een zorgtraject [6].’ Dit houdt in dat alle betrokkenen, inclusief de
patiënt, hun activiteiten coördineren en op elkaar afstemmen om zorg mogelijk
te maken. Medisch werk is heel pragmatisch en fluïde omdat zorgprofessionals
steeds reageren op onverwachte gebeurtenissen en omstandigheden die zo ken-
merkend zijn in de gezondheidszorg.
Tenslotte is een grondig empirisch inzicht in medische werkpraktijken noodza-
kelijk om te begrijpen hoe een informatiesysteem deze praktijken kan onder-
steunen. Kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden zijn uitermate geschikt om inzicht
te krijgen in de complexe relaties tussen zorgprofessionals en een informatiesys-
teem. De methoden omvatten onder meer observatiestudies, interviews en do-
cumentstudies. Observatiestudies geven inzicht hoe zorgprofessionals hun taken
uitvoeren, zoals het gebruik van een computer, hoe zij medische orders invoeren
en hoe zij met collega’s samenwerken wanneer zij gebruik maken van een infor-
matiesysteem. Interviews geven inzicht in de manier waarop zorgprofessionals
121
Samenvatting
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 121
feiten en gebeurtenissen waarnemen en beoordelen en zijn vooral waardevol
wanneer er geen andere manier bestaat om gegevens te verzamelen, zoals over
gebeurtenissen in het verleden. Documenten vormen een rijke bron van
gegevens over de organisatie en in deze studie omvatten zij beslis- en imple-
mentatiedocumenten, vergaderverslagen, gebruikershandleidingen, infor-
matiebulletins, artikelen en wetenschappelijke publicaties. De combinatie van
verschillende gegevensbronnen stelt de onderzoeker in staat om feiten en
gebeurtenissen te correleren en valideren.
Het doel van de studie beschreven in dit proefschrift is om de implementatie
van geautomatiseerde ordercommunicatie systemen te begrijpen vanuit een
sociotechnisch perspectief.
De studie bestaat uit drie delen. In het eerste deel (hoofdstuk 1) wordt een
implementatiemodel van informatiesystemen in organisaties zoals ziekenhuizen
beschreven. Dit model vormt als het ware het decor van de casestudies in dit
proefschrift. Het tweede deel (hoofdstuk 2 en 3) beschrijft casestudies van de
implementatie van ordercommunicatie systemen in het Universitair Medisch
Centrum St Radboud te Nijmegen en het Atrium Medisch Centrum te
Heerlen. In het laatste deel (hoofdstuk 4, 5 en 6) worden de casestudies in een
breder perspectief geplaatst door een vergelijking met casestudies van de imple-
mentatie van ordercommunicatiesystemen in Amerikaanse ziekenhuizen.
Bovendien werden interviews gehouden met Amerikaanse deskundigen op het
ordercommunicatie systemen over professionele samenwerking, de workflow
van medische orders en de impact op de kwaliteit van zorg. Het laatste deel van
de studie werd uitgevoerd tijdens mijn verblijf in de afdeling medische infor-
matica en klinische epidemiologie van de Oregon Health & Science University
in de Verenigde Staten.
De volgende onderzoeksvragen komen in het proefschrift aan de orde.
• Wat zijn de algemene kenmerken van een implementatietraject van een
zorginformatiesysteem?
• Hoe kunnen de uitkomsten van de implementatie van een ordercommuni-
catie systeem in een ziekenhuis worden verklaard vanuit een sociotechnisch
perspectief?
• Welke factoren kunnen vanuit het perspectief van medisch werk gezien, de
verschillende uitkomsten verklaren van de implementatie van een ordercom-
municatie systeem in twee Nederlandse ziekenhuizen?
• Hoe kunnen de implementatiestrategieën van ordercommunicatie systemen
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in Nederlandse en Amerikaanse ziekenhuizen vergeleken worden en op welke
wijze worden artsen erbij betrokken?
• Hoe kan de perceptie van experts op het gebied van ordercommunicatie sys-
temen op de stroomlijning van medische werkprocessen, professionele
samenwerking en de impact ervan op de kwaliteit van zorg bijdragen tot een
beter begrip van ordercommunicatiesystemen?
De hoofdaanname in hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift is dat een implemen-
tatieproces gekenmerkt kan wordt door fases en dat het proces in voortdurende
wisselwerking verkeert met de organisatorische omgeving. De fases zijn niet
scherp omschreven in de zin dat ze een gedefinieerde input en output kennen,
maar laten toe de geëigende activiteiten vast te stellen om een systeem te imple-
menteren. De implementatie staat in wisselwerking met medisch werk dat de
kernactiviteit van een ziekenhuis is. De interactie heeft een etnografische notie
in de zin dat een goed begrip van medisch werk nodig is om te begrijpen hoe
een informatiesysteem daarin past. Een implementatieteam moet daarom kun-
nen doorvragen, observeren, doorgronden en gevoelig zijn voor signalen en
gebeurtenissen op een wijze die Marc Berg als essentieel beschouwt voor de
sociotechnische benadering [7].
In hoofdstuk 2 behandel ik de vraag hoe vanuit een sociotechnisch perspectief
de implementatie van een ordercommunicatie systeem geïnterpreteerd kan wor-
den. In het hoofdstuk wordt een gedetailleerd verslag gepresenteerd van de
implementatie van een ordercommunicatiesysteem in het UMC St Radboud
vanaf het moment dat de behoefte aan zo’n systeem werd gesignaleerd tot het
moment dat twaalf jaar later de implementatie van de kernfunctionaliteit van
ordercommunicatie werd gestaakt. De casestudie maakt het conflict zichtbaar
tussen de rationaliteit van het systeem uitgedrukt in technische en functionele
specificaties en het feitelijke gebruik. In het nieuwe systeem waren het gebruik
van een toetsenbord en het onthouden van functietoetsen niet meer nodig en
het implementatieteam dacht dat het systeem daardoor gemakkelijker te
gebruiken zou zijn en men met minder menskracht toe zou kunnen. Het tegen-
deel bleek waar: het systeem werkte zeer vertragend en meer medewerkers
moesten aangenomen om de werklast te verlichten. De gebeurtenis stemde niet
overeen met de verwachtingen dat op administratief personeel bezuinigd kon
worden. Ik introduceer het Engelstalige begrip ‘fit’ als een overeenstemming
tussen de eisen die voortvloeien uit werkpraktijken en de mogelijkheden van het
informatiesysteem. Ik stel dat ‘fit’ geen intrinsieke eigenschap is van een tech-
nologie of een werkpraktijk, maar dat het gemaakt moet worden. ‘Fit’ is het
resultaat van een proces waarin zowel werkpraktijken en technologie veran-
deren. Gebruikers zullen ‘knoeien’ met het systeem om sommige taken
gemakkelijker of efficiënter te maken. Het ordercommunicatie systeem was ont-
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worpen voor de Amerikaanse situatie waarin patiënten op klinische afdelingen
waren opgenomen en het moest aangepast worden aan het Nederlandse systeem
van patiëntenzorg in poliklinieken. Vervolgens maakte de casus zichtbaar dat de
tijdsduur van de implementatie cruciaal was. Beslissingen over de keuze van de
technologie waren aan het begin van het implementatietraject uitermate zinvol
en pas achteraf bleek dat ze de gebruikers beperkingen oplegden. In de tussen-
liggende tijd raakten de gebruikers vertrouwd met Windows-toepassingen en
verwachtten zij dat het ordercommunicatie systeem zich op dezelfde manier zou
gedragen. Het schermontwerp zag er ouderwets uit. Het proces was heel
vergelijkbaar met de verdringing van het tekstverwerkerprogramma
WordPerfect door Microsoft Word. Het punt is dat deze verandering niet kon
worden voorspeld. De verandering gebeurde niet plotseling; het werd gaan-
deweg duidelijk naarmate een nieuwe technologie de markt penetreerde. In
navolging van Wanda Orlikowski’s terminologie noem ik dit verschijnsel ‘emer-
gent change [8].’ De uitdaging ligt niet in het voorspellen van verandering, maar
op het formuleren van een antwoord daarop. Tenslotte laat de casus zien hoe
nauw technologie en organisatie zijn vervlochten. Gebruikers denken vaak dat
de introductie van een nieuw systeem ook gepaard gaat met nieuwe compu-
tertechnologie. In werkelijkheid dicteerde de reeds aanwezige computertech-
nologie en technische infrastructuur de keuze voor een nieuw informatiesys-
teem. Complexe hardware vereist expertise voor ontwikkeling en onderhoud, en
expertise is niet zo gemakkelijk te vervangen.
In hoofdstuk 3 probeer ik de verschillende uitkomsten van de implementatie
van ordercommunicatie systemen in het UMC St Radboud en het Atrium
Medisch Centrum te verklaren. In tegenstelling tot het UMC slaagde Atrium
erin om de volledige functionaliteit van ordercommunicatie te implementeren,
maar in beide ziekenhuizen namen artsen niet aan het proces deel. Ik verklaar
de verschillen door de aard van medisch werk als uitgangspunt te nemen. Ik stel
dat gebruikers meer willen weten hoe hun werk verandert als gevolg van het sys-
teem, dan dat ze geïnteresseerd in de specifieke eigenschappen ervan. Het is de
bereidheid om veranderingen in werkpraktijken te aanvaarden die cruciaal is
voor de acceptatie van een informatiesysteem. Ik stel dat de relatie tussen
medisch werk en de professie niet zo sterk is als het lijkt. Artsen beschouwden
het elektronisch invoeren van orders als niet behorend tot hun professionele
domein, verpleegkundigen en secretaresses zagen het echter als iets dat zij al lang
deden; zij maakte daarom het elektronisch invoeren van orders tot onderdeel
van hun dagelijkse werkpraktijken.
In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 beschrijf ik de vergelijking van de implementatiestrategie
van ordercommunicatie systemen in drie Nederlandse en drie Amerikaanse
ziekenhuizen. Uit de vergelijking blijkt dat de verschillen tussen Nederland en
de Verenigde Staten niet wezenlijk zijn. Alle ziekenhuizen noemden kostenbe-
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sparingen en vergroting van efficiency als de belangrijkste redenen om order-
communicatie systemen in te voeren. Zelfs in projectmanagement, waarbij de
Amerikaanse nadruk op leiderschap geplaatst kon worden tegenover de
Nederlandse consensus en compromis cultuur, bleken de verschillen meer
gradueel dan absoluut. Uit de bestudeerde casussen bleek voorts dat alle imple-
mentaties minimaal vijf jaar duurden. Klaarblijkelijk is deze tijdsduur wezenlijk
voor elke implementatie van een complex informatiesysteem.
Ziekenhuisbestuurders zouden daarom niet moeten rekenen op het snel
terugverdienen van investeringen in informatietechnologie, maar eerder plan-
nen voor langdurige trajecten en de daaraan gerelateerde onzekerheid incal-
culeren. De implementaties waren voornamelijk geïnitieerd door het manage-
ment en leken niet tegemoet te komen aan de behoeften van de artsen. Op het
moment echter dat artsen het systeem begonnen te gebruiken, probeerden zij
het systeem meer toe te snijden op de inrichting van hun werkpraktijken. In
plaats van iedere order apart in te voeren, maakten zij combinatieorders voor
specifieke groepen van patiënten die zij vaak zagen. Het elektronisch invoeren
van combinatieorders vonden zij veel efficiënter dan het handmatig schrijven
van orders. Ik vermoed dat hun klinische expertise de artsen in staat stelden om
het gebruik van ordercommunicatie systemen op een hoger plan te brengen en
zo tot deel van hun werkpraktijken te maken. Deze manier van ‘geïmpro-
viseerde’ verbetering is wat Claudio Ciborra ‘bricolage’ noemt [9]. De verbeter-
ing is niet echt gepland, het is wezenlijk voor professionals om een infor-
matiesysteem in hun werkpraktijken in te passen, en het kan daarom als een
innovatie betiteld worden. In Atrium Medisch Centrum maakten ver-
pleegkundigen en secretaresses het ordercommunicatie systeem zich eigen, maar
hun gebrek aan klinische expertise weerhield de ontwikkeling van combi-
natieorders.
In hoofdstuk 6 tenslotte verbreed ik het begrip van ordercommunicatie door
vraagstukken van professionele samenwerking en workflow erbij te betrekken en
na te gaan hoe ordercommunicatie de kwaliteit van zorg beïnvloedt. Ik stel hier
dat ordercommunicatie gekenmerkt wordt door een hoge mate van samen-
werking tussen artsen, verpleegkundigen en andere zorgverleners. Een ogen-
schijnlijk eenvoudig proces zoals het voorschrijven van een geneesmiddel aan
een patiënt is het resultaat van artsen en verpleegkundigen die met elkaar over-
leggen en gezichtspunten uitwisselen totdat een beslissing is overeengekomen.
De beslissing wordt als een medicatieorder ingevoerd. Ordercommunicatie sys-
temen zijn echter gebaseerd op een nogal simplistisch en lineair workflow model
van medische orders en ontworpen voor individueel gebruik door artsen, en
daarom is een conflict tussen dergelijke systemen en het feitelijk gebruik niet
denkbeeldig. In werkelijkheid maken apothekers, verpleegkundigen en de
patiënt deel uit van de workflow. De geïnterviewde deskundigen erkennen hoe
moeilijk het is om ordercommunicatie systemen deel te laten uitmaken van een
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klinische werkomgeving. Een juist begrip van ordercommunicatie systemen als
een gezamenlijke inspanning van zorgprofessionals vraagt inzicht hoe orders tot
stand komen en hoe ze verwerkt worden, hoe de workflow er uit ziet en hoe risi-
co’s voor de patiëntenzorg geïdentificeerd en verkleind kunnen worden, vooral
wanneer de order vele handen passeert.
De algemene conclusie van het proefschrift is dat het invoeren van een infor-
matiesysteem zowel de werkpraktijken als de technologie verandert. De veran-
dering is in essentie een sociaal proces. Veranderingen zijn niet gemakkelijk te
voorspellen. Dat is een dilemma voor een implementatieteam. Wellicht wil het
team een systeem ontwerpen met behulp van blauwdrukken en het hierna sys-
tematisch implementeren. Claudio Ciborra adviseert echter het team om
improvisatie een wezenlijk deel te laten zijn van het implementatieproces, om
toekomstige gebruikers te laten ‘knoeien’ met het systeem en uit te laten vinden
hoe het het beste ingepast kan worden in de dagelijkse werkpraktijk, om te plan-
nen voor het onverwachte en nieuwe gebruikspraktijken positief tegemoet te
treden en strikte sturing te laten varen. De generalisatie van de bevindingen is
gelegen in het principe, niet in de voorspelbaarheid van individuele implemen-
tatietrajecten.
REFERENTIES
1. Collen MF. A history of medical informatics in the United States 1950-1990. Bethesda:
American Medical Informatics Association; 1995.
2. Lucas HC, Jr. Why information systems fail. New York: Columbia University Press; 1975.
3. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS, editors. To err is human, building a safer health
system. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 2000.
4. Committee on Quality of Health Care in America. Crossing the quality chasm, a new
health system for the 21st century. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 2001.
5. Ash JS, Gorman PN, Seshadri V, Hersh WR. Computerized physician order entry in U.S.
hospitals: results of a 2002 survey. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2004;11(2):95-9.
6. Strauss AL, Fagerhaugh S, Suczek B, Wiener C. Social organization of medical work.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; 1985.
7. Berg M. Patient care information systems and health care work: a sociotechnical approach.
Int J Med Inform 1999;55(2):87-101.
8. Orlikowski WJ. Improvising organizational transformation over time: a situated change
perspective. Inform Syst Res 1996;7(1):63-92.
9. Ciborra C. The labyrinths of information, challenging the wisdom of systems. Oxford:
Oxford University Press; 2002.
126
Understanding implementation
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 126
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Writing a thesis is work of solitude; working for a thesis is not possible without
the help of people. Basically there are three categories of people: people who
helped me in my path towards my thesis, people who helped me during the the-
sis work and people who formed part of my social network.
My latent interest of being at the forefront of innovation was nurtured when I
as a student of physics did my masters dissertation work in the Department of
Experimental Solid State Physics (EVSF 2) of Radboud University Nijmegen.
The then head of the department, professor Peter Wyder, considered students
like me as an integral part of his research team and encouraged them to give
talks at the weekly research meetings. After graduation, I got a teaching position
in higher professional health care education, but I was not a mere teacher of
physics courses to nursing students. Numerous people encouraged me to
explore the opportunities of computers in health care and translate that knowl-
edge into courses. This got me involved in national projects to develop curricu-
lum frameworks for health informatics. It is impossible to thank all these peo-
ple individually, but I make an exception for Sylvia Hoekstra, who partnered
with me during my career for almost twenty years. A crucial step in the devel-
opment of my interest in health informatics and research was my period as a
guest researcher at the Institute of Medical Informatics of Erasmus MC from
1988 to 1992. Though my efforts to write a thesis then did not materialize, it
did lay the groundwork for the research described in this thesis. I thank there-
fore professors Jan van Bemmel and Johan van der Lei, Astrid van Ginneken
and other colleagues of the institute that they gave me the opportunity to get
acquainted with research in medical informatics.
In January 1993 I took a position as senior lecturer at Fontys Hogescholen in
Eindhoven with the special task to develop a model curriculum of health infor-
matics for Dutch higher professional health care education and to coordinate
efforts to develop learning materials. The projects allowed me to address the
question how information systems might fit in clinical practice, which eventu-
ally led to Fontys Hogescholen funding the initial phase of the research
described in this thesis. I therefore thank Peter Roosenboom and Harmen
Grebel for giving me the opportunity to explore these insights and my Causa
colleagues Anke Duijnhouwer, Bas de Leng, Herman van Lieshout, Anne
Oostendorp, Marianne Schade, Jan Steyaert and others for our valuable and
pleasant collaboration. 
International networking was extremely important for the development of my
knowledge and insights and I met many people who contributed to that.
127
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 127
Among others I mention Cynthia Bournazos and Bonnie Kaplan. Two occa-
sions determined the path of my career. In 1996 the president of the European
Federation for Medical Informatics, late professor Jean-Raoul Scherrer, sup-
ported the founding of Working Group “Organizational Impact of Medical
Informatics,” which enabled me to bring together people interested in this
emerging field and contribute to European medical informatics conferences.
The second occasion was the development and start of a master course of health
informatics that specifically addressed the organizational issues of health infor-
matics. I thank Victor Peel and Graham Wright for our collaboration in this
project, which also resulted in a couple of joint publications. It is fortunate that
the master course found a new home at Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
The research described in this thesis took off in 1997 when Dick Herfst, direc-
tor of nursing at UMC St Radboud in Nijmegen, suggested that I investigate
the implementation of their new hospital information system. I acknowledge
the board of directors of UMC St Radboud for allowing this research and the
project leaders Andries Hoitsma and Herman van Beem for their support. In
the person of Wim Beckers I acknowledge the help of all implementation team
members during the fieldwork.
Doing research without an academic ground base is impossible. At a conference
in Philadelphia in June 1977 Joan Greenbaum suggested that professor Hans
Doorewaard of the Faculty of Management Sciences of Radboud University
Nijmegen would be a good supervisor. Sometimes you have to travel far abroad
to get to know someone next-door. Hans allowed me to take part in the week-
ly research seminars in his group and to let me discuss my earliest ideas of the
research. I am grateful that he is now my second promotor. 
My academic ground base became more solid when in 1999 I was appointed as
assistant professor at the Institute of Health Policy and Management of Erasmus
University Rotterdam. Marc Berg was key in that move. In 1996 through a
mutual acquaintance I met Marc when he was still at Maastricht University and
I found in him a person who immediately understood about my interests in the
complex relationship between information technology and health care work.
When Marc came to Rotterdam he asked me to join him and to develop cours-
es about IT and health care. He was instrumental to get me on the track of the-
orizing, but immediately recognized that because of my background I would
never become a theorist and that I would foremost remain an empiricist. He
knew how to handle my long-windedness and my unorganized way of managing
affairs. I am very grateful that he is my promotor.
Next to my research in UMC St Radboud I was able to conduct fieldwork in
Atrium Medical Center in Heerlen in 2001 and 2002. I thank the board of
128
Understanding implementation
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 128
directors of the hospital for this opportunity and Roger Renkens and his col-
leagues for all practical help. 
Very important was the opportunity to conduct research as a visiting scientist at the
Department of Medical Informatics and Clinical Epidemiology of Oregon Health
& Science University in Portland, Oregon, in 2003 and 2004. I am grateful to Joan
Ash that she invited me to the Menucha expert meetings to discuss the difficulties
and challenges of implementing CPOE systems and to be member of her research
team POET, the Physician Order Entry Team. I am much obliged to Joan that she
is my copromotor. I thank Jim Carpenter, Cody Curtis, Richard Dykstra, Ken
Guappone, Veena Seshadri, and Dean Sittig as members of POET for being inspir-
ing colleagues. I thank William Hersh especially, not only for hosting me at his
department, but also for facilitating the second international conference
Information Technology in Health Care, Sociotechnical Approaches in Medical
Informatics, in September 2004 in Portland. This successful conference was a
hotbed for new research ideas. I am grateful to my co-chair Paul Gorman for the
intensive and successful collaboration in this event.
My intellectual home base is our research group RITHM (Research in IT in
Health care and Management). The weekly meetings are important to discuss
the ripe and unripe ideas of research. I thank Roland Bal, Barbara Blank,
Antoinette de Bont, Stans van Egmond, Bert Huijsman, Yvonne Jansen, Femke
Mastboom, Habib Pirnejad, Irma van der Ploeg, Jolande Verhulst, Brit Ross
Winthereik and Teun Zuiderent for being good colleagues, and especially
Samantha Adams and Arjen Stoop for our intensive discussions about almost
any imaginable subject.
A social network holds everything together. I thank Anneloes van Staa that she
made me feel welcome in Rotterdam when I started to work there. Jan-Kees
Helderman was an excellent roommate for many years and together we mas-
tered the chaos of our cohabitation. Longtime friends understood my drive for
doing research. I especially mention Liesbeth Pierson, Veronica Fabian-Kraus
and Jon Kraus. I am very happy that Liesbeth and Jon join me as paranymphs
in the defense of my thesis. 
Above all, my family had many times to endure my single-mindedness. Creating
an undisturbed working environment asked a lot of them. I am grateful for the
numerous times that my wife Ricky with her eye for detail examined my writ-
ings. Without the support of her and my daughter Anne this thesis could not
have been written.
Nijmegen, July 2005
129
Acknowledgements
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 129
130
Understanding implementation
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 130
CURRICULUM VITAE
Jos Aarts was born in Heerlen on November 4, 1951. 
In 1970 he graduated from ‘gymnasium’ at Jansenius Scholengemeenschap (now
Reynaertcollege) in Hulst. He studied physics at Radboud University
Nijmegen, obtained in 1978 a BSc in physics and mathematics and in 1980 an
MSc in physics education with the dissertation "Fabry-Pérot Interferometry at
Low Temperatures." From 1980 until 1999 he held several posts in higher health
care education where he designed and taught advanced health informatics
courses. His last position was at Fontys Hogescholen in Eindhoven where he
developed a model curriculum of health informatics and coordinated a project
to develop learning materials for this curriculum. 
Since 1999 he is employed at the Institute of Health Policy and Management of
Erasmus MC in Rotterdam, initially as an assistant professor and currently as a
senior research scientist. He is chair of Working Group ‘Organizational Impact
of Medical Informatics’ of the European Federation for Medical Informatics. He
is a member of IFIP Working Group 8.2 ‘Information Systems and the
Organization.’
He is married to Ricky van Oorschot. They have one daughter, Anne, who is a
student of law at Utrecht University.
131
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 131
132
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 132
NOTES
133
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 133
134
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 134
135
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 135
136
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 136
137
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 137
138
•OPMAAK DISSERTATIE.qxd  26-07-2005  16:16  Pagina 138
